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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

Isaac the Dog Talks Back to Wilber

A Canine Intervention in Integral Ontology

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

An unexpected visitor at Integral HQ

It was a quiet afternoon at Integral HQ.

Ken Wilber was sitting at his desk, surrounded by copies of Integral Spirituality, A Theory of Everything, several diagrams of AQAL, and a particularly complicated chart showing the relationship between worldspaces, Kosmic addresses and the four quadrants.

He had just written the words:

ONTOLOGY DOES NOT EXIST.

He leaned back, satisfied.

At that precise moment, there was a knock at the door.

Not an ordinary knock.

Three short scratches.

Wilber looked up.

"Who is it?"

The door opened.

A golden retriever walked in.

He wore no clothes, no glasses and no visible philosophical credentials.

"Hello," said the dog.

Wilber stared at him.

"You can talk?"

"Apparently."

Wilber frowned.

"That depends on your worldspace."

The dog sighed.

"Oh, we're going to have that conversation, are we?"

"What is your Kosmic Address?"

Wilber picked up a notebook.

"Let's establish some basics. What is your name?"

"Isaac."

"Isaac what?"

"Just Isaac."

"Species?"

"Dog."

Wilber smiled.

"There is no such thing as the dog."

Isaac looked at him.

"I beg your pardon?"

"There are various dogs enacted within various worldspaces. A dog as such does not exist."

Isaac glanced down at his paws.

"That's interesting."

"Thank you."

"So what am I?"

"You are an enacted phenomenon within your particular worldspace."

Isaac thought about this.

"Can I still have dinner?"

"That depends on your Kosmic Address."

Isaac sighed.

"I was afraid you'd say that."

The dog refuses to disappear

Wilber began explaining.

"You see, Isaac, what you call yourself is actually the result of a complex developmental and cultural enactment. Different worldspaces disclose different aspects of what we conventionally call 'dog.'"

"Such as?"

"A child may experience you as a pet. A biologist sees an organism. A veterinarian sees a patient. A philosopher might see an example of animal consciousness."

Isaac nodded.

"And you?"

"I see an enacted holonic phenomenon within a particular worldspace."

Isaac stared at him.

"That's a very complicated way of saying you see a dog."

Wilber frowned.

"No. I don't see the dog."

Isaac wagged his tail.

"Look again."

Wilber looked.

Isaac was still there.

"You're still there," Wilber admitted.

"Exactly."

The bite test

Isaac walked over to the desk.

"Let's conduct an experiment."

"An integral experiment?"

"Something like that."

Isaac gently put his teeth around Wilber's trouser leg.

Wilber jumped.

"Ow!"

Isaac let go.

"Did I just enact a bite?"

Wilber rubbed his leg.

"Well, technically—"

"Or did I bite you?"

Wilber hesitated.

"You bit me."

"Good."

Isaac sat down.

"Now here's the important question. Did your worldspace create my teeth?"

"No."

"Did your interpretation create the pressure on your leg?"

"No."

"Did my cultural status as a companion animal produce the sensation?"

"No."

"Did your Kosmic Address prevent the bite?"

Wilber looked at his trousers.

"No."

"Then perhaps," said Isaac, "there is something about me that exists whether or not you have the correct theory about me."

Wilber was silent.

Isaac smiled.

"Reality bites."

The problem with "for"

Wilber regained his composure.

"You are confusing ontology with epistemology."

Isaac raised an eyebrow.

"I thought that was what you were doing."

Wilber frowned.

"Let me explain. You exist for a particular worldspace."

"Fine."

"And different worldspaces enact you differently."

"Fine."

"But there is no single pregiven 'you' behind those enactments."

Isaac scratched his ear.

"Does that mean there is no dog?"

"There is no dog as such."

Isaac considered this carefully.

"So when my owner throws a ball, there is no dog as such running after it?"

"Correct."

"Then who is running?"

"An enacted subject-object holon."

Isaac looked behind himself.

"Where?"

"What?"

"The dog."

"What dog?"

"Exactly."

Isaac discovers the advantage of being an organism

Isaac had now become interested.

"Suppose I walk outside."

"Yes?"

"And I encounter another dog."

"Yes?"

"And that dog is bigger than me."

"Yes?"

"Does the fact that we inhabit different worldspaces mean that neither of us is objectively bigger?"

Wilber paused.

"It depends upon the mode of disclosure."

Isaac nodded gravely.

"I see."

He then stood up.

"Would you like to come outside?"

"Why?"

"I'll show you a mode of disclosure."

Wilber followed reluctantly.

In the garden, Isaac encountered a very large German shepherd.

The shepherd looked at Isaac.

Isaac looked at the shepherd.

The shepherd growled.

Isaac immediately decided that whatever his Integral theory might say, this was a situation in which some perspectives were more urgent than others.

He ran.

Wilber watched him disappear around the corner.

"Interesting," he murmured.

The scientific dog

Back inside, Isaac resumed the conversation.

"Let's try another example."

"Go ahead."

"Suppose a scientist examines me."

"Yes."

"She discovers that I have DNA."

"Yes."

"Did I have DNA before she discovered it?"

Wilber hesitated.

"Of course."

"So DNA existed before the relevant scientific worldspace enacted it?"

"In a certain sense."

Isaac wagged his tail.

"What sense?"

Wilber looked annoyed.

"The ontological sense."

Isaac smiled.

"Ah."

He sat down.

"So ontology does exist."

Wilber shook his head.

"Not in the traditional sense."

"Then perhaps you should say that."

Wilber looked at him.

Isaac continued.

"Instead of saying 'ontology does not exist,' you could say: 'No human being has access to a completely perspective-free description of reality.'"

Wilber was silent.

"That would be perfectly reasonable."

Isaac scratched his neck.

"But saying 'therefore the dog does not exist independently of perspectives' is something else."

Wilber sighed.

"You've been reading philosophy."

"No."

"Then how do you know this?"

"I've been living in reality."

Isaac meets Kant

That evening, Isaac found a copy of Kant on the bookshelf.

He opened it with his paw.

"This fellow had a useful distinction."

Wilber looked over.

"Which one?"

"The distinction between the conditions under which something is known and the thing itself."

Wilber nodded cautiously.

"Kant is more complicated than that."

"Naturally. Philosophers make everything complicated."

Isaac turned a page.

"But the basic point remains."

"What point?"

"You don't get to conclude that because my appearance depends upon the structure of your experience, I therefore depend upon the structure of your experience for my existence."

Wilber raised an eyebrow.

"You're becoming rather philosophical."

"I'm a dog."

"Exactly."

"Which means I've had plenty of time to observe humans."

Isaac meets Peirce

Isaac then found Peirce.

"This is better."

Wilber sighed.

"Peirce?"

"Yes. He distinguishes between the object as represented and the object that exceeds the representation."

Wilber said nothing.

Isaac continued.

"That's rather useful."

"How so?"

"It means you can admit that every perspective gives you only a partial sign of me without pretending that I am nothing but the sign."

Wilber stared at the dog.

"You are making a semiotic argument."

"Apparently."

Isaac looked pleased.

"And there is another advantage."

"What?"

"If I am merely an enacted sign, then when I leave the room you can conclude that I have ceased to exist."

"That doesn't follow."

"Exactly."

The disappearing dog

Isaac walked toward the door.

"Watch."

He stepped outside.

Wilber waited.

Ten seconds.

Twenty seconds.

One minute.

The room was empty.

Wilber looked at the chair where Isaac had been sitting.

"Interesting."

He walked to the window.

Isaac was in the garden.

Alive.

Independent.

Chewing a stick.

Wilber opened the door.

"Isaac!"

Isaac looked up.

"Yes?"

"I can still see you."

"Yes."

"But suppose I couldn't?"

"Then I would still be here."

"How do you know?"

Isaac looked mildly offended.

"Because I have an appointment with the vet tomorrow."

The veterinary worldspace

Wilber suddenly became interested.

"Wait. The veterinarian!"

Isaac groaned.

"Please don't start."

"The veterinarian sees you as a biological organism and a patient."

"Yes."

"A child sees you as a companion."

"Yes."

"A philosopher sees you as an object of inquiry."

"Yes."

"An integral theorist sees you as a holon."

"Unfortunately."

"But all of these are legitimate perspectives."

"Agreed."

"And none exhausts you."

"Correct."

"So perhaps the integral insight is not that there are many dogs."

Isaac's tail began wagging.

"Go on."

"But that there are many ways of knowing one dog."

Isaac smiled.

"Now you're getting somewhere."

A modest proposal

Isaac returned to the office.

"Perhaps you should rewrite Appendix 2."

Wilber looked alarmed.

"What would you suggest?"

Isaac dictated:

There is no single perspective-free description of the dog. Different observers, cultures and developmental stages disclose different aspects of the dog. These perspectives are real and valuable, but they need not constitute different dogs. The object can exceed its descriptions.

Wilber stared at the sentence.

"That's rather good."

"I know."

"It sounds almost realist."

"It is."

"Critical realist?"

"Why not?"

Wilber looked troubled.

"But then what happens to enactment?"

"Keep it."

"Keep it?"

"Of course. Just don't make it do more philosophical work than it can handle."

Wilber thought about this.

"Enactment describes how reality becomes available within a perspective."

"Exactly."

"It doesn't necessarily explain how reality exists independently of that perspective."

"Exactly."

"That's a subtle distinction."

Isaac wagged his tail.

"Yes. Humans have been discussing it for quite some time."

The final test

Wilber leaned back.

"All right, Isaac. One last question."

"Go ahead."

"If there really is a dog independently of worldspaces, how do we know which descriptions of the dog are correct?"

Isaac smiled.

"By testing them against the dog."

"How?"

"Observation. Experiment. Comparison. Prediction. Interaction. And sometimes getting bitten."

Wilber laughed.

"That sounds remarkably scientific."

"It is."

"And what about different cultural interpretations?"

"They can tell us different things about how humans understand dogs."

"And contemplative experience?"

"Interesting, but don't assume your private experience gives you universal access to canine ontology."

Wilber looked at him sharply.

"You've been reading Frank Visser."

Isaac said nothing.

He merely wagged his tail.

Reality bites

The next morning, Wilber returned to Appendix 2.

He crossed out:

"Ontology does not exist."

He replaced it with:

"Ontology is not exhausted by any particular perspective."

Then he paused.

He added:

"The dog exceeds the worldspace."

He sat back.

Isaac looked over his shoulder.

"Much better."

Wilber smiled.

"You know, Isaac, you may have a point."

"Of course I do."

"How can you be so sure?"

Isaac stood up.

He walked toward the door.

At the threshold he turned around.

"Because, Ken, you can debate my ontology all afternoon."

He lifted one hind leg.

"But I still have to pee."

And with that, Isaac disappeared into the garden.

Wilber watched him go.

For the first time in years, he wondered whether perhaps the most integral thing to do was not to add another quadrant.

Perhaps it was simply to let the dog be a dog.

And, somewhere in the distance, Isaac barked.

Reality had spoken.

Again.