Search through thousands of pages on Integral Theory
TRANSLATE THIS ARTICLE
Integral World: Exploring Theories of Everything
An independent forum for a critical discussion of the integral philosophy of Ken Wilber
Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion, SUNY 2003Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

SEE MORE ESSAYS WRITTEN BY FRANK VISSER

NOTE: This essay contains AI-generated content
Check out my other conversations with ChatGPT

What If Russia Invaded Ukraine for Security Reasons?

A Third Perspective on Geopolitical Realism, Russian Threat Perceptions, and the Difference Between Explanation and Justification

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

The Revenge of Geopolitical Realism, When Explaining Great-Power Behavior Becomes Excusing It

Introduction: Taking the Russian Argument Seriously

There is a question that deserves more attention in discussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine: What if Russia really did invade because its leaders believed that their country's security was threatened?

Not because Vladimir Putin was necessarily irrational, not simply because he wanted to restore the Russian Empire, and not because he was indifferent to Russia's national interests. What if the invasion was the outcome of a strategic calculation in which the Kremlin concluded that the geopolitical situation was becoming intolerable and that military action was preferable to accepting further Western influence over Ukraine?

This possibility should not be dismissed out of hand.

Russia is a major power with legitimate security interests. Its historical experience of invasion, its geographical exposure, its declining influence in Eastern Europe, and its perception of NATO as a potentially hostile military alliance are all relevant to understanding its foreign policy.

Indeed, refusing to take these concerns seriously would make for an inadequate geopolitical analysis.

But accepting that Russian security calculations may have caused the invasion raises a second, more important question: Were those calculations correct?

And even if they were understandable from the perspective of the Kremlin, did they justify the invasion of a sovereign neighboring country?

These questions must be kept separate.

The purpose of this essay is not to dismiss geopolitical realism but to take it seriously enough to examine its assumptions, its explanatory power, and its limitations. It is an attempt to move beyond the simplistic opposition between two positions: Russia invaded because it was an imperialist aggressor, or Russia invaded because the West left it no alternative.

The actual explanation may be considerably more complicated.

1. Security Perceptions Are Real Political Causes

One of the most important insights of international relations theory is that political actors respond not simply to objective circumstances but to their perceptions of those circumstances.

A country can feel threatened even when its neighbors do not intend to threaten it. Conversely, a country can underestimate a genuine threat.

This distinction is particularly important in the Russian case.

From Moscow's perspective, the post-Cold War European security order developed in an increasingly unfavorable direction. NATO expanded eastward, former Warsaw Pact countries joined the alliance, Western political and economic influence increased in the former Soviet space, and Ukraine gradually moved away from Russia's political orbit.

The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members of the alliance, although neither received a membership timetable.

For Russian strategists, this was a serious development. Ukraine occupies a particularly important geographical position, sharing a long border with Russia and providing access to the Black Sea. Its integration into Western military structures would have changed the strategic environment around Russia.

Whether this prospect constituted an immediate military danger is another question. But it is reasonable to conclude that Russian leaders regarded it as an unwelcome strategic possibility.

We should therefore distinguish between a perceived threat and an objectively demonstrated threat.

The former can cause wars even when the latter is exaggerated or nonexistent.

If Putin believed that Russia's strategic position was deteriorating and that waiting would make the situation worse, his decision to use force may have followed a recognizable strategic logic.

That does not mean the calculation was correct.

2. The Security Dilemma: Two Sides Feeling Threatened

The security dilemma offers a useful framework for understanding the confrontation.

When one country strengthens its security, another may interpret that development as a threat. It responds with its own military preparations, which in turn increase the insecurity of the first country.

This process can become self-reinforcing.

From Moscow's perspective, NATO enlargement represented a gradual erosion of Russia's strategic depth. From the perspective of Eastern European countries, however, NATO enlargement represented protection against possible Russian domination.

Both perceptions have historical foundations.

Poland and the Baltic states did not join NATO because they were eager to threaten Russia. They sought protection against a country whose Soviet predecessor had dominated their region for decades.

Finland and Sweden likewise reconsidered their military positions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, eventually joining NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively.

The resulting paradox is striking: Russian attempts to prevent NATO expansion helped produce further NATO expansion.

But the security dilemma does not require us to decide that only one side had security concerns.

Russia could feel threatened by Western military developments while its neighbors could feel threatened by Russian military power. Both perceptions could be genuine.

The difficulty begins when one country's insecurity is treated as more legitimate than another's.

Why should Russia's desire for strategic depth take precedence over Ukraine's desire for strategic independence?

Why should Moscow's perception of NATO determine Kyiv's foreign policy?

A security dilemma is a description of a dangerous interaction, not a moral authorization for the stronger party to dictate the choices of the weaker one.

3. The Difference Between National Security and Regime Security

There is another complication that deserves closer attention: the distinction between the security of the Russian state and the security of Putin's political regime.

These are not necessarily identical.

A democratic and economically successful Ukraine, increasingly integrated with European institutions, could have represented a challenge to the Russian political model.

The danger was not necessarily military. It could also have been ideological and political.

Ukraine's political development demonstrated that a post-Soviet society could pursue an alternative relationship with Europe, develop competitive political institutions, and challenge entrenched authoritarian power.

For the Kremlin, this possibility may have been threatening in ways that traditional military analysis does not adequately capture.

A successful neighboring country with cultural and historical connections to Russia could undermine the argument that Russia requires centralized authoritarian government and a distinctive geopolitical sphere of influence.

This introduces the concept of regime security.

A government may perceive developments abroad as threatening not because they endanger the country's territory but because they undermine the political arrangements through which that government maintains power.

In this sense, the Kremlin's concerns about Ukraine may have combined several different considerations:

The military implications of Ukraine's Western orientation.

The loss of Russian influence over a strategically important neighbor.

The weakening of Russia's claim to great-power status.

The possibility that a successful alternative political model might inspire opposition inside Russia.

These motivations are not mutually exclusive.

Indeed, a government can sincerely believe that its own political survival is essential to national security. But this is precisely why we must distinguish the security of a country from the security of its rulers.

Protecting Putin's political system is not automatically equivalent to protecting Russia.

4. Was the Invasion a Rational Strategic Calculation?

Suppose we accept that the Kremlin believed its strategic position was deteriorating.

What might have been the reasoning behind the decision to invade?

One possible reconstruction is the following.

First, Russia regarded Ukraine's westward orientation as a long-term strategic loss. The political developments of 2014 had already demonstrated that Moscow could no longer reliably determine Ukraine's direction through its traditional political influence.

Second, the Kremlin believed that this loss of influence could eventually become irreversible. Ukraine's military cooperation with Western countries was increasing, and its political identity was becoming more distinct from Russia's.

Third, Putin and his advisers may have concluded that waiting would strengthen Ukraine and make future intervention more difficult.

Fourth, they apparently believed that the Ukrainian government could be overthrown relatively quickly, that Ukrainian resistance would be limited, and that Western governments would not respond with sufficient unity or determination to make the operation prohibitively expensive.

This final assumption was catastrophic.

Russia's military planning appears to have rested on a profound misunderstanding of Ukrainian society and political leadership. The Kremlin underestimated the Ukrainian national identity, the determination of the armed forces, and the willingness of the population to resist.

It also underestimated Western support for Ukraine.

Research by Mikhail Polianskii, published in Nationalities Papers, examines how Russian leadership misperceptions about Western economic dependence and political resolve contributed to the decision to invade. The Kremlin apparently believed that Western countries would be reluctant to bear the costs of confronting Russia. [1]

This suggests an important possibility: the invasion may have been strategically motivated but based on profoundly inaccurate assumptions.

A decision can be rational in the limited sense that it follows from an actor's beliefs and objectives, yet disastrous because those beliefs are wrong.

5. The Problem with Calling the Invasion Irrational

It is tempting to describe Putin's decision as irrational because the consequences have been so destructive.

Russia has suffered enormous military losses, economic disruption, diplomatic isolation from much of Europe, and a strategic dependence on China that it might otherwise have avoided.

NATO has expanded. Ukraine has become more hostile to Russia. European governments have accelerated their military preparations.

But judging the rationality of a decision exclusively by its eventual consequences is problematic.

We need to reconstruct what the decision-makers believed at the time.

If Putin expected a rapid victory, a compliant Ukrainian government, and limited Western resistance, the invasion may have appeared attractive from his perspective.

The problem was that his expectations were wrong.

This is where the distinction between rationality and good judgment becomes important.

A leader can make a decision that is internally consistent with his objectives and still demonstrate terrible judgment about the circumstances in which he is acting.

Moreover, rationality depends on the objectives being pursued.

If Putin's principal objective was to preserve Russian security, the invasion was an extraordinary strategic failure.

If his objective was to prevent Ukraine from becoming an independent political and cultural alternative to Russia, or to restore Russian domination over the country, the calculation was different.

The same military operation can therefore appear more or less rational depending on what we believe the actual objective was.

This is why identifying the Kremlin's objectives matters so much.

6. The NATO Question: A Genuine Concern or a Convenient Explanation?

We should not evade the most controversial part of this discussion.

Did NATO expansion cause the invasion?

The answer depends partly on what we mean by cause.

NATO enlargement was certainly part of the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. The 2008 Bucharest declaration was particularly provocative from Moscow's perspective.

But Ukraine was not on the verge of joining NATO in February 2022. There was no imminent accession timetable, and important NATO members were not prepared to offer immediate membership.

Furthermore, Putin's December 2021 security proposals went well beyond simply demanding that Ukraine remain outside NATO. They included demands for a substantial rollback of NATO's military posture in Europe, including restrictions relating to countries that had joined the alliance after 1997.

This suggests that the dispute concerned the wider European security order, not merely the immediate military status of Ukraine.

Yet even this does not settle the matter.

The Kremlin may genuinely have regarded the post-Cold War security architecture as fundamentally unfair and increasingly dangerous. It may have concluded that diplomatic negotiations would not produce the desired revision.

But there is a difference between wanting a different European security order and having the right to impose one through military aggression.

Nor can we assume that NATO was the sole or even decisive motivation.

Putin's historical writings and speeches indicate that his concerns extended beyond military alliances to the very nature of Ukrainian statehood.

The NATO explanation is therefore important but insufficient.

7. The Imperial Dimension of Security

There is a deeper problem with the Russian security argument.

What exactly does Russia mean by security?

In conventional military terms, security means protecting a country's territory, population, political independence, and ability to defend itself.

But great powers have historically interpreted security more expansively. They often seek buffer zones, friendly governments, strategic depth, and influence over neighboring countries.

This is where security and imperial ambition can become difficult to distinguish.

Russia's historical desire to maintain influence over Ukraine is not merely a product of its geographical exposure. It is also connected to a particular conception of Russian identity and historical entitlement.

Putin's 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians questioned the historical separation of the two peoples. His February 2022 address further challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine's independent political development.

These are not simply arguments about NATO military infrastructure.

They concern the relationship between national identity, historical ownership, and political sovereignty.

A state that considers its neighbors' independence inherently threatening has defined its security requirements in an extraordinarily expansive manner.

If Russia can only feel secure when Ukraine is politically subordinate, then Ukrainian independence itself becomes the perceived threat.

This creates an impossible situation.

Ukraine cannot simultaneously be sovereign and satisfy a Russian demand for control over its political orientation.

At that point, the language of security begins to conceal a struggle over who has the right to decide Ukraine's future.

8. The Counterfactual: Could the War Have Been Prevented?

A useful way to test competing explanations is to ask what might have happened under different circumstances.

Would Russia have invaded if NATO had never announced the possibility of future Ukrainian membership?

Would Putin have accepted a permanently neutral Ukraine, provided that its sovereignty and European economic orientation were respected?

Would Russia have been satisfied with arms-control agreements, limits on foreign military deployments, and a renewed European security dialogue?

We cannot answer these questions with certainty.

But they are essential because they help distinguish between different causal explanations.

If a neutral Ukraine with genuine sovereignty would have satisfied Russia, the security dilemma explanation becomes more persuasive.

If Moscow would still have sought political control over Ukraine because of its historical and imperial conception of the relationship, then NATO expansion was not the fundamental cause.

There is evidence supporting both the importance of external security concerns and the importance of Putin's broader ambitions.

Elias Götz and Per Ekman's 2024 analysis of the causes of the invasion is particularly useful here. They distinguish between deep causes, intermediate causes, and proximate causes. Ukraine's strategic and historical importance to Russia formed part of the deeper background; Ukraine's westward orientation and declining Russian influence contributed to the intermediate pressures; and Putin's misjudgment of Ukrainian resistance and the highly personalized Russian decision-making system help explain the decision to launch a full-scale invasion rather than pursue a more limited course of action.

This kind of multi-causal explanation is preferable to searching for one master cause.

9. The Most Important Strategic Miscalculation

Perhaps the greatest mistake in the Russian security calculation was its failure to recognize that Ukraine had become an independent political actor.

The Kremlin appears to have treated Ukrainian political preferences as temporary, externally manipulated, or historically illegitimate.

It underestimated the extent to which Ukrainian national identity had developed, particularly following the events of 2014.

It also underestimated the determination of Ukrainian citizens to resist an invasion.

This was not simply a military intelligence failure. It was a fundamental failure of political understanding.

Russia's leadership appears to have assumed that Ukraine could be treated as a strategic object rather than as a society capable of making its own choices.

In this sense, the invasion revealed a paradox of great-power thinking.

The Kremlin wanted to secure Russia's geopolitical position by subordinating Ukraine. But the attempt to do so strengthened Ukrainian national identity and made future reconciliation with Russia much more difficult.

A strategy based on denying the agency of another country can generate precisely the resistance that makes the strategy fail.

10. What This Means for Geopolitical Realism

Taking Russian security calculations seriously should lead us to a more sophisticated form of realism, not to the abandonment of realism.

We should acknowledge that Russia's geographical position, historical experience, military concerns, and perceptions of NATO influenced its decisions.

We should also acknowledge that Western policymakers sometimes underestimated the importance of Russian threat perceptions and overestimated the capacity of economic interdependence to moderate geopolitical rivalry.

But we should not confuse a state's security perceptions with objective necessities.

Nor should we assume that the interests of a great power automatically override the sovereignty of smaller countries.

The same realism that encourages us to understand Russia's security concerns should encourage us to understand Ukraine's security concerns.

And the same analysis that recognizes the strategic importance of Russian territory should recognize the strategic importance of Ukrainian territory to Ukrainians themselves.

There is no intellectually honest reason to apply geopolitical realism selectively.


PLEASE NOTE: Comments containing links are not allowed, to avoid spam.


Comment Form is loading comments...