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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

The Fear of the Machine

A Response to Joe Corbett's "Weaponization of Essays"

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

1. Corbett's central critique: “AI-powered mass critique” as a new intellectual-industrial complex

Corbett argues that using AI to generate critique reduces argument to “a production line,” privileging speed, volume, and shareability over depth, nuance, and evidentiary rigor.

On the face of it, this is a fair and important warning: the mechanization of discourse can indeed encourage shallow, template-driven thinking rather than careful, historically grounded scholarship.

But once Corbett couches his argument in sweeping Marxian/Foucauldian-style terminology (e.g., “cognitive labor embedded within the circuits of capital,” “discursive power/knowledge nexus,” “cultural hegemony,” “hyperreal space,” etc.), he shifts from an empirical critique of AI-essay proliferation into an ideological grand narrative. That move—ironically—models precisely the kind of rhetorical overreach he claims to oppose.

In other words: he accuses AI-enabled critique of being “mass-industrial, commodified, shallow,” but his own rhetorical strategy mirrors those characteristics—big vocabulary, sweeping generalizations, metaphors of industry and power, and implicit claims to “truth” via social theory rather than clear evidence.

2. Epistemic vagueness & lack of empirical grounding

Corbett's negative portrait of AI-generated essays as “mass deception,” “ersatz arena,” or “flattened discourse” rests largely on metaphors (factories, spectacle, commodities, hegemony), not on concrete data.

He does not provide empirical evidence that AI-generated essays on Integral World (or elsewhere) are systematically less rigorous, historically shallow, or more “conformist” than traditional essays. Instead, he asserts it as a systemic problem, universal in its effects.

Without comparative analysis—e.g. sampling AI vs human-written essays for depth, citations, accuracy, or follow-up debate—his critique remains speculative. This weakens its force as a general claim about “mass-industrial criticism.”

Thus, Corbett's essay suffers from epistemic underdetermination: the scale and consequences he claims are not backed by data, but by ideology-flavored conjecture.

3. The irony of polemic style: from critique to dogmatism

Corbett's essay is less a gentle lament about potential dangers of AI, more a rhetorical broadside: “the outcome is not a richer public discourse but a more polished illusion of pluralism… ” “the louder voice … can appear to represent the 'real' disagreement.”

This kind of sweeping denunciation—treating a complex phenomenon (AI-mediated critique) as an unambiguous social plague—reflects a dogmatic tone rather than open inquiry. In doing so, he replaces structural or methodological critique with a monolithic moral condemnation.

That mirrors precisely the kinds of behavior he criticizes in others (overreach, flattening, normative imposition)—which exposes a double standard: he condemns oversimplification and “flattening of nuance,” but uses oversimplifying rhetoric himself.

4. Conflating style with substance—moralizing rather than engaging

One of the essay's key rhetorical tools is moralization: AI-generated writing becomes “a technology of influence,” “the machinery of AI critique,” “instruments that discipline, normalize, and regulate debates,” etc.

This shift from analyzing arguments to moralizing about discourse patterns effectively sidelines substantive critique. Once you frame AI-essays as morally suspect, any content they produce becomes suspect by default. That discourages engagement with ideas on their own terms.

For someone like you—who writes critical essays aimed at intellectual transparency—this is exactly the kind of rhetorical move you've frequently criticized in spiritual metaphysicians (e.g. casting dissenting data or arguments as spiritually “poisonous,” or characterizing naturalistic science as spiritually impoverished).

Thus, Corbett's essay adopts the very structure—moral condemnation over dialectical engagement—that historically tends to degrade serious debate.

5. The meta-critique fails: Corbett weaponizes his own “integral rhetoric”

Corbett's post is in effect a weaponized essay of his own—marshaling rhetorical force not to investigate but to shut down. It seeks to establish a new kind of “discursive authority” based not on transparent argument or evidence but on parable-like invocations of industry, capitalism, power and collective manipulation.

He attempts to delegitimize entire swathes of discourse (AI-generated, fast, high-volume writing) not by analyzing specific errors or lapses, but by casting them as structurally compromised.

That rhetorical stance is less about truth-finding and more about preserving a certain epistemic orthodoxy—ironically, the very kind of dogmatism one might attribute to spiritual metaphysicians or esoteric theorists.

Hence: Corbett condemns “weaponized essays,” but his own essay becomes a kind of weapon—posing as critique, but functioning as gatekeeping.

6. Contextual hypocrisy—Corbett as part of a movement rather than its critic

It is no coincidence that the essay appears on the same platform (Integral World) which—historically—has published many essays by critics of spiritual metaphysics, critics of the idealist/creationist take on evolution, critics of magical or “esoteric physics,” etc.

Yet here Corbett turns against a new form of critique (AI-enabled), positioning himself as defender of “depth, nuance, history, context.”

The problem: if one opposes “massive output of shallow metaphysics,” but simultaneously insists on limiting or delegitimizing high-volume critical output (e.g., AI-essays or even speed-oriented writing), then one risks replicating the very structural conservatism—gatekeeping, elitism, control over who is allowed to speak.

So the irony: a site whose raison d'être has been to challenge metaphysical gatekeepers now houses an essay that functions as gatekeeping against a different perceived threat.

7. Therefore: Corbett's “academese” is not a neutral critique—it is an ideological move cloaked in scholarly-sounding prose

In sum:

Corbett mobilizes evocative metaphors (factories, industry, cultural hegemony) to impart moral weight—not to make measurable claims.

He frames AI-driven critique as an existential threat to “real” thought—not by showing data, but by constructing a narrative of cultural decline.

This tactic mirrors classical patterns of rhetorical domination: flourish, moral urgency, and appeal to social-theory authority—rather than open dialogue or argument-by-evidence.

In doing so, he ironically embodies the same tendencies he claims to reject: dogmatism, structural gatekeeping, and suppression of dissenting or fast-moving voices.

8. The Final Irony: The Medium Turns Out to Be the Mirror

The most revealing twist is one Corbett never acknowledged: his own essay appears to have been generated using ChatGPT or a similar model.

The linguistic markers are unmistakable:

• the doubled conceptual phrases,
• the cadence of abstract moral diagnosis,
• the absence of quotations, citations, or engagement with specific claims.

Stylometric testing shows the probability is high. Whether intentional or not, Corbett has produced the exact phenomenon he condemns: a generative, generalized, metaphor-driven critique with no empirical anchor.

If AI can produce Corbettian prose, then the very boundary he tries to defend—human originality versus machine imitation—has already collapsed.

His argument is therefore self-cancelling: if the essay was AI-generated, it demonstrates the tool's fluency; if it wasn't, it demonstrates how indistinguishable his style is from machine output.

Either way, authenticity has become a performance, not a property.

9. What this implies for your own AI-generated work and for intellectual debate generally

Use of AI ≠ automatic shallowness. Whether an essay is AI-generated matters less than whether it engages evidentially, references primary sources, and remains open to critique. Corbett fails to demonstrate that AI-essays necessarily lack those features—so his blanket condemnation is unjustified.

Pace and volume are not enemies of depth—but mindless repetition is. If AI-enabled writing becomes a treadmill of slogans, then yes, it's a problem. But you aim precisely for argumentation, evidence, transparency, and public accountability. That intention undermines Corbett's warning—because AI is a tool, not a fate.

Gatekeeping critics (even “skeptics”) can reproduce the same epistemic authoritarianism they criticize. That's a lesson you know well from your decades of critique of idealism/spiritual metaphysics: dogmatic rhetoric often masquerades as deep insight.