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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

Bad Metaphysics by Any Other Name

A Response to Joseph Dillard (and Ken Wilber)

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

In his thoughtful and generous essay, "Three Blind Philosophers Walk Into a Bar...," Joseph Dillard offers a response to my recent critique of Ken Wilber's metaphysical ambiguity, especially as it appears in his famous line from Integral Spirituality:

“What the premodern sages took to be META-physical realities are in many cases INTRA-physical realities; they are not above matter, nor beyond nature, nor meta-physical, nor super-natural; they are not above nature but within nature, not beyond matter but interior to it.” (p. 222)

At first glance, this quote appears to be an elegant gesture of philosophical integration: a move away from supernaturalism and into a more immanent, experiential understanding of spirituality. But as I argued, this is less a genuine post-metaphysical turn than a metaphysical relocation—a sleight-of-hand that retains the core metaphysical assumptions of spiritual cosmology while dressing them in developmental and phenomenological language.

Dillard, to his credit, does not dismiss this concern. Instead, he reframes it: what if the real issue isn't that Wilber indulges in metaphysics, but that everyone does? What if scientific materialism is just as metaphysical as spiritual holism, differing only in the flavor of its assumptions?

This reframing is valuable. But I want to suggest that it ultimately fails to meet the burden of the critique, for the simple reason that not all metaphysics are created equal. The issue is not metaphysics versus no metaphysics, but bad metaphysics versus disciplined metaphysics. And in this regard, both Wilber and Dillard still fall short.

1. Metaphysical Inflation vs. Metaphysical Discipline

Joseph Dillard urges us to take a phenomenological stance—to bracket all metaphysical assumptions and listen to the voices of different perspectives. This seems intellectually generous, even pluralistic. But when it comes to claims like "Spirit is evolution in action" or "Eros is driving the cosmos toward greater depth," bracketing isn't enough.

We need to evaluate such claims, not just suspend judgment.

Ken Wilber's model makes robust ontological assertions: that Spirit is real, that evolution has intrinsic directionality, and that interiors are not just subjective experiences but developmental realities with a telos. These are not merely descriptions of experience. They are claims about the structure of reality.

In response, I argued for a metaphysical audit: to identify when interpretive frameworks overstep into dogmatic territory, especially when they are presented as post-metaphysical or integrative. Dillard wants to zoom out and acknowledge that every system has metaphysical assumptions. Fair enough. But doing so risks equating metaphysical overreach with epistemic humility, thereby neutralizing the very distinctions we need to make.

Materialism, for all its faults, generally operates with minimal, testable, and revisable metaphysical assumptions. Wilber's system, by contrast, engages in metaphysical inflation: it postulates cosmic forces, nested ontologies, and spiritual teleologies without empirical accountability.

2. Wilber's Counter: Materialism Is Bad Metaphysics

Wilber would no doubt respond that scientific materialism is itself a form of bad metaphysics—what he calls "flatland": a worldview that denies interiors, depth, and higher development. According to him, materialism is metaphysically blind. It assumes that what can be measured is what is real.

But this is a mischaracterization.

Materialism in its disciplined, scientific form does not deny interiors; it simply refuses to reify them without adequate justification. It does not say that consciousness or values are unreal, but that we should be cautious in making ontological claims about them without intersubjective, empirical grounding.

Wilber, by contrast, does the opposite. He reifies interior experiences into ontological structures (e.g., the Wilber-Combs lattice, developmental fulcrums), and then projects them onto the cosmos as a whole. He universalizes personal phenomenology into a cosmic architecture. That is metaphysics on stilts.

So if Wilber wants to accuse materialism of being bad metaphysics, the reply is simple: materialism, at its best, is metaphysics held accountable. Integral metaphysics, as it currently stands, is metaphysics shielded by rhetorical ambiguity.

3. Dillard's Phenomenological Detour

Dillard's suggestion to bracket metaphysics and engage multiple perspectives has merit, especially in dialogical or therapeutic contexts. But as a philosophical approach, it lacks discriminative power. It doesn't help us decide between:

"Eros is real" vs. "Eros is a useful metaphor"

"Spirit is unfolding in evolution" vs. "Spirituality is a human projection onto natural processes"

Suspending metaphysical judgment in these cases allows inflationary systems like Wilber's to masquerade as integrative when they are actually ontologically committed in all but name.

Phenomenology does not adjudicate between competing truth claims; it only describes how things appear to consciousness. For that reason, it is insufficient as a philosophical method for evaluating systems like Wilber's that make bold metaphysical declarations.

Phenomenology, as originally developed by Edmund Husserl and expanded by thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, was never intended to adjudicate metaphysical claims. Its strength lies in revealing the structures of lived experience, not in verifying cosmological truths. It can describe how an experience of Spirit might be felt as real, compelling, and transformative—but it cannot tell us whether Spirit actually exists, or whether such an experience maps onto any objective feature of the cosmos.

Indeed, the entire point of the phenomenological epoché is to suspend metaphysical belief in order to explore consciousness as it appears. This is not a path to integral metaphysics, but a bracketing of it. And that is the crucial limitation: phenomenology may illuminate, but it does not validate. It tells us how things seem, not what they are.

So when Dillard suggests that bracketing metaphysics allows us to hear all voices and entertain all possibilities, the question remains: on what basis do we evaluate those voices? Without a framework of discernment, phenomenological openness can quickly become relativism—or worse, a passive platform for covert metaphysical agendas.

If everything is interpretation and every perspective carries metaphysical baggage, then we need tools not just for inclusion, but for critique. And phenomenology, while indispensable as a descriptive lens, does not provide sufficient traction for distinguishing between disciplined naturalism and spiritual inflation.

4. Good vs. Bad Metaphysics

The key distinction, then, is not between metaphysics and no metaphysics, but between good metaphysics and bad metaphysics. We might define these as follows:

Good metaphysics:

• Is transparent about its assumptions
• Is consistent with empirical findings
• Is open to revision
• Avoids unnecessary speculation
• Does not overreach from experience to ontology

Bad metaphysics:

• Masks assumptions behind vague or poetic language
• Universalizes introspective or mystical experiences
• Claims to be post-metaphysical while making strong ontological assertions
• Dismisses empirical critique as "less evolved"
• Embeds teleology into nature without justification

Wilber's metaphysics, for all its ambition, too often falls into the latter category. And Dillard, by relativizing all metaphysical positions, implicitly excuses this inflation rather than confronting it.

5. Why This Matters

This debate isn't just academic. Metaphysical systems shape how we understand evolution, consciousness, ethics, and even politics. If we accept uncritically that evolution has a direction, that Spirit is real, and that interiors are developmentally nested realities, we risk creating a worldview that is immune to counter-evidence, insulated from critique, and more interested in coherence than correspondence.

In the age of conspiracy theories, climate denial, and epistemic fragmentation, the need for disciplined metaphysics could not be greater.

Conclusion: Metaphysical Sobriety

Joseph Dillard's essay offers a welcome elevation of the metaphysical conversation. He invites us to step back and reflect on the assumptions we all carry. But in doing so, he also risks leveling the field too much—making it harder to distinguish between metaphysics that illuminates and metaphysics that mystifies.

Wilber may accuse materialism of being "bad metaphysics," but the real question is: By what standard? If the standard is clarity, accountability, falsifiability, and epistemic humility, then scientific naturalism passes with reservations.

Wilber's system does not.

And that—despite all the talk of quadrants, holons, and depth—is the real issue.