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Dr. Joseph Dillard is a psychotherapist with over forty year's clinical experience treating individual, couple, and family issues. Dr. Dillard also has extensive experience with pain management and meditation training. The creator of Integral Deep Listening (IDL), Dr. Dillard is the author of over ten books on IDL, dreaming, nightmares, and meditation. He lives in Berlin, Germany. See: integraldeeplistening.com and his YouTube channel. He can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Three Blind Philosophers Walk Into a Bar…

A Discussion of Visser's Essay,
“Wilber's Strategic Ambiguity” Over Drinks

Joseph Dillard

Frank Visser's essay at Integral World, “Wilber's Strategic Ambiguity, Why 'Intra-Physical Realities' Are Far from Post-Metaphysical” critiques Wilber's turn away from metaphysical claims as being superficial and intellectually dishonest (my gloss—not Visser's) because it is still based on metaphysical assumptions that Wilber does not acknowledge as such. These are the ontological reality of interior domains, the teleological directionality of evolution, the hierarchical structure of developmental stages, the re-enchantment of nature with Spirit, and the objective basis of ancient metaphysical experiences.

Visser's Critique

Regarding the ontological reality of interior domains, Visser states, “When Wilber says that spiritual realities are 'interior to' matter, he implies that interior domains are just as real as exterior ones.” Visser contends that Wilber's framing of spiritual experiences as “interior to” matter reifies subjective consciousness into an ontologically real domain, akin to a metaphysical substrate. He highlights Wilber's upper-left quadrant (interior individual) in AQAL as not just a phenomenological map but a structure-laden reality with intrinsic existence. Wilber assumes that interiors—encompassing consciousness, phenomenology, and intentionality—are objectively real, not merely interpretive, challenging his claimed post-metaphysical stance. This mirrors a metaphysical dualism, albeit relocated within nature.

Regarding the teleological directionality of evolution, Visser identifies Wilber's concept of an “Eros” or Spirit-in-action driving evolution toward greater depth and complexity as a central metaphysical claim. He argues this teleological narrative—evolution as purposeful—contradicts post-metaphysical restraint. Wilber assumes a cosmic teleology where Spirit self-actualizes through evolutionary processes, implying an inherent direction or purpose, a hallmark of traditional metaphysics.

Regarding Visser's critique that the hierarchical structure of developmental stages smuggles metaphysics into AQAL, he notes that Wilber assumes that consciousness evolves through intrinsic, nested levels or holarchies, suggesting a metaphysical order that pre-exists individual experience, not just a descriptive pattern. Visser argues, “Such staging implies more than mere description of patterns; it gestures toward a metaphysical structure of reality,” contrasting with empirical observation.

Regarding the re-enchantment of nature with Spirit, Visser asserts that Wilber re-enchants nature by positing Spirit as an active force within evolution, rather than treating spiritual experiences as interpretive enactments. Wilber assumes nature contains a divine or spiritual essence, transforming it into a metaphysically charged cosmos, echoing premodern views. Visser states, “Wilber's vision re-enchants nature with purpose, direction, and Spirit,” contrasting with a post-metaphysical approach that avoids such claims.

Regarding Wilber's claim to the objective basis of ancient metaphysical experiences, Visser challenges Wilber's reinterpretation of premodern metaphysical realities, such as subtle energies and divine presences as intra-physical, arguing it presupposes these experiences have an objective basis rather than being phenomenological. Wilber assumes that ancient spiritual insights reflect real intra-physical phenomena, not just cultural interpretations, smuggling metaphysics into a modern framework. Visser notes, “This presupposes that these experiences… have some objective intra-physical basis that is not simply interpretive,” violating post-metaphysical principles.

Visser frames Wilber's “intra-physical” shift as a “crypto-metaphysics,” a strategic ambiguity that relocates rather than abandons metaphysical claims. He suggests Wilber retains premodern metaphysical insights under a naturalistic veneer, using terms like “interior” and “immanent” to mask their speculative nature. This ambiguity allows Wilber to critique neo-Darwinists like Dennett and Dawkins for reductionism while avoiding scientific scrutiny, positioning his model as meta-theoretical yet metaphysically laden.

Visser's recommendations

Enactivist cognitive science, which Visser supports, assumes that cognition arises through the dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment, rather than passive reception of external data. Mind and world co-evolve, resonating with Wilber's concept of quadrant tetra-mesh, rather than reductionism to one quadrant. More specifically, enactivist cognitive science addresses the metaphysical assumptions of an independent external reality, the uniformity of nature, causality as necessary connection, and a coherent self.

Enactivism replaces empiricism's passive, representational model with an active, relational one, dissolving the metaphysical need for an independent reality or necessary causality. By rooting cognition in cultural and neurobiological contexts, it reframes uniformity and the self as adaptive constructs, not universal truths. This supports Visser's vision of a post-metaphysical approach that avoids ontological claims, such as Wilber's Spirit, focusing on lived experience.

Questions

While I agree with this critique, it raised questions in my mind. Do empiricists and materialists inevitably make metaphysical assumptions? And if so, what are the implications?

Empiricism's metaphysical foundations include the assumption of a mind-independent world as the source of sensory data, the belief that natural laws are consistent over time, the presupposition of inherent causal relationships, and the implicit assumption of a stable observer synthesizing experience. These are unprovable by empirical means, forming the metaphysical bedrock that enables empiricism's reliance on sensory evidence.

The evidence appears to be that both empiricists and materialists do indeed make metaphysical assumptions. John Locke and David Hume, both noted empiricists, argue that knowledge derives from sensory experience, rejecting innate ideas or a priori truths. However, they both assume the uniformity of nature, that is, that the future will resemble the past. This is a metaphysical claim unprovable by observation alone. Also, the belief that an external world exists independently of perception, such as with Locke's primary qualities, implies a metaphysical ontology, despite empiricism's focus on experience. Modern empiricism in science, for example, Karl Popper's principle that legitimate claims must be falsifiable, still presupposes a stable causal framework, a stance critiqued as metaphysical by philosophers like Kant.

From this we can conclude that empiricists inevitably make metaphysical assumptions, as their methodology relies on unobservable principles to interpret data.

Regarding materialists, like Thomas Hobbes and Francis Crick, who assert that reality consists solely of physical matter and its interactions, reducing all phenomena to material causes, they also make metaphysical assumptions of reductionism and causality. The claim that consciousness or morality can be fully explained by physical processes assumes a metaphysical unity of matter, excluding non-physical possibilities without proof. Materialism also presupposes deterministic or probabilistic causality, a metaphysical stance challenged by quantum indeterminacy (e.g., Heisenberg, 1927). For example, Dennett's evolutionary naturalism assumes matter's primacy, a metaphysical commitment beyond empirical verification.

We can therefore conclude that materialists, like empiricists, inevitably make metaphysical assumptions, as their reductionist framework relies on untestable premises about the nature of reality. Both empiricism and materialism depend on foundational beliefs, such as the existence of an observable world and primacy of matter, that transcend empirical data.

This raises the question, “Is Visser's dispute with Wilber's version of AQAL really about metaphysics or could it be about something else?” The reason that question is raised is because if it is indeed true that metaphysical assumptions are also held by empiricists and materialists and are indeed inevitable, then the implication is that the disagreement really isn't about metaphysics.

Maybe it's not a metaphysical food fight…

Enactivism's reliance on embodied processes may not fully escape metaphysical assumptions, such as the nature of embodiment itself. However, while enactivism does not eliminate metaphysical assumptions entirely, it makes a great deal of progress in that direction.

However, the dispute may not be with metaphysics itself but with unfalsifiability, authority and dogmatism, and delusional projections. Regarding unfalsifiability, the dispute is less about metaphysics and more about methodology. Metaphysical claims regarding souls and Spirit lack empirical testability, clashing with empiricism's demand for evidence. Regarding authority and dogmatism, metaphysicians' reliance on tradition or intuition conflicts with materialists' preference for physical evidence, suggesting a tension over epistemic authority rather than metaphysical content. Regarding delusional projections, each side of the argument assumes a different version of a fixed reality, one spirit-based, one material-based. Empiricists and materialists favor observable data, while metaphysicians prioritize reason or intuition. This boils down to competing approaches to truth rather than metaphysics itself.

Visser's stance, despite the interactive nature of cognition and body posited by enactive cognitive science, appears to be that UR exterior objective (empirical, Zone 5) truth claims, in the final analysis, take precedence over truth claims in the other three quadrants. This appears to be a metaphysical assumption.

We could argue that some metaphysical assumptions are more valid than others, for example, that because the truth claims of the UR are falsifiable (that is, more objectifiable,) they are more legitimate than those of the other quadrants. Or we could argue that each holonic quadrant has its own metaphysical assumptions that are valid in its domain. In that case, the problem occurs when the metaphysical assumptions of one quadrant are used to either undercut the truth claims of another quadrant or claim the truth claims of another quadrant as verifying its own. For example the UL routinely pronounces that its truth claims are empirically falsifiable when they aren't. Creationists are famous for this and Wilber does it too. However, it can cut the other way. Empiricists, materialists, and some naturalists ignore or deny their reliance on subjectivity and metaphysical a priori assumptions that live in the UL, not the UR quadrant.

Because enactivist cognitive science still assumes the metaphysical assumption of the necessity of embodiment itself, it cannot present itself as non-metaphysical, just less so. This points to the conclusion that delusion, that is, some degree of subjectivity, is inevitable and inescapable, pointing to the dreamlike nature of reality. While reason must necessarily err on the side of material explanations because, unlike non-material explanations, material explanations are falsifiable, the result is a reduction of subjectivity but never its complete banishment. That is because subjectivity is built into the structure of nature and holons. Empiricism appears to pretend that at foundation, subjectivity doesn't exist on an equal footing with objectivity because it is non-falsifiable. I think that is true from an empirical perspective but not from a phenomenological one. In a thoroughly interdependent framework, neither is prior or more fundamental, which would be reductionist. However, an even better way of stating it is that in a thoroughly interdependent framework, which is prior and more fundamental depends on the context—what is objective and the standard of truth for that quadrant.

Do we even want to completely objectify subjectivity? Do we need to? Are outsides more real than insides? Are individuals more real than collectives? That reminds me of the sterile debate between particulars and universals during the Middle Ages.

A thorough-going phenomenology suspends truth claims in all four quadrants, and with them metaphysical assumptions, in order to demonstrate respect for any and all perspectives. The problem is that we are all sure we do so, but on the other hand, isn't subjectivity inescapable? What important parts of the picture, pieces of the puzzle of reality, are we missing? This is why I believe supernaturalism, empiricism, materialism, and naturalism all have to defer to phenomenology, not because it is prior or more truthful, but because it involves the surfacing and tabling of assumptions, including metaphysical a prioris, in order to spread our data-gathering net as broadly as possible, before we arrive at our tentative hypothesis.

“Three blind philosophers walk into a bar… and spend the night debating whose hallucination the beer tastes better in!”