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Jeff Meyerhoff, M.A., L.S.W. is the author of "Bald Ambition: A Critique of Ken Wilber's Theory of Everything" and other essays on integral theory. He majored in economics and sociology and has studied philosophy, psychology, politics and spirituality. He's been employed as a social worker for the last 25 years. His weekly radio show, "The Ruminator," is archived at www.wmfo.org. His blog is www.philosophyautobiography.blogspot.com and his email is [email protected].

The Man-machine Vs. A Man

On Propaganda

Jeff Meyerhoff

I recently appeared to discuss the workings of propaganda on a new YouTube channel called “The Peacemonger,” hosted by former British diplomat Ian Proud, In response, an entity I call Visser-Grok, a bionic amalgam of man and A.I. machine, has criticized my radical critique of how propaganda is used by dominant powers to manufacture consent in their publics in "Western Propaganda and the Elite War Agenda". Here are my responses to Visser-Grok's criticisms of my views. (I interpolate my responses to Visser-Grok, using V-G: in the text before Visser-Grok's statements and JM: in the text for my, Jeff Meyerhoff's, replies.)

V-G: This interview is a thought-provoking, if somewhat meandering, deep dive into Chomsky-inspired media criticism, blending historical analysis with contemporary geopolitics. Meyerhoff and Proud deliver a coherent radical critique of Western imperialism, substantiated by references to books, experts, and patterns (e.g., U.S. interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). It's refreshing in its unapologetic challenge to mainstream narratives—e.g., framing U.S. actions as elite-driven dominance rather than benevolent errors—and highlights cultural nuances often ignored in realist theories (Freeman's China insights add depth). The discussion on social media's democratizing effect feels timely, especially amid 2026's ongoing conflicts, and their coinage of "healthy isolationism" as an alternative to endless wars is a sharp, pragmatic pitch.

The Echo Chamber Risk

V-G: However, it occasionally veers into unsubstantiated territory: Claims of "smashing states" as a deliberate neocon strategy (while true in outcomes) overlook internal policy debates or unintended consequences.

JM: But this misses the argument. The argument is that an essential criterion for assessing the purpose of foreign policy interventions is to see if there is a consistent pattern of results (the above noted “truth in outcomes”) as opposed to the common view that aggregates politician's statements of the nation's intentions as the nation's intention. I argue that the results of US actions, in the 21st century alone, have such a consistent pattern of destruction, and done largely in violation of international law, that the explanation that the U.S. intends to create freedom, democracy, stability and the rule of law, doesn't work as an explanation of U.S. foreign policy. There's too much data that contradicts the claim that the U.S. is intending to create good outcomes. To accept the stated goals and intentions we'd have to conclude that the executors of U.S. foreign policy were wildly, methodically, and consistently incompetent over a hundred years period.

JM: We're looking for an explanatory model that explains as much of the evidence as possible. The claim is that using a model that gives primacy to our side striving to do good for “us” and “them” can't explain why foreign policy results so consistently contradict the stated foreign policy intentions.

JM: An explanatory model has to explain all confirmed facts, so any model will need to explain all relevant data such as “policy debates”. And while we need the concept of “unintended consequences,” the whole point of using the actual, consistent, and repeated outcomes of policy was to show an unstated, hidden, but effective, intention in the policy makers.

JM: I think V-G is promoting the myth of a neutral, objective perspective that doesn't exist. Although that perspective is useful, when used properly in rational discourse, as a regulative model.

JM: There certainly are internal policy disagreements. In the early 1970s in the U.S. there was a debate about Israel-Arab relations between the Henry Kissinger Israel-only side and Treasury Secretary William Simon's balanced approach between Israel and the Arabs. The Kissinger side won out and we've had fifty years of U.S.-Israeli maximalism in contradiction of the US's own alleged two-state solution. Likewise, there was a policy debate in the early 1990s regarding the U.S., NATO, Europe and Russia. The US maximalist position won out and has prevailed since the latter 90s. Why does Visser/Grok need me to recount these policy differences when the effective results - that Visser/Grok agree are “true” - are being asserted as the best method for determining a nation's true intentions? Shouldn't Visser/Grok argue why looking at the consistent results of foreign policy actions as a better guide to intentions is a problematic method?

V-G: The praise for alternative sources risks echo-chamber vibes, and they gloss over potential biases in those (e.g., Mearsheimer's Ukraine views have been contested for downplaying Russian agency). Overall, it's a solid 8/10 for skeptics of MSM—informative and conversation-sparking, though it assumes familiarity with Chomsky et al. If you're into anti-establishment geopolitics (e.g., fans of Judging Freedom or The Duran), this is worth the watch; otherwise, it might feel like preaching to the converted.

JM: Although, these alternative sources are a reaction to, and constructed from, a critique of, those very mainstream, non-echo chamber views.

JM: But you're right to point out the danger of a small, critical, alternative group avoiding ingroup criticism to both hold the cohort together by avoiding conflict and because the mainstream provides the other that “we” - the in-group - are opposing. What I advocate for the alternative cohort is stronger critical questioning from hosts and more inter-expert disagreement when that is present.

V-G: While the interviewer champions "alternative Western experts" like Mearsheimer, Freeman, and Johnson for providing evidence-based counters to mainstream propaganda, such narratives aren't immune to their own flaws and manipulations. One key limitation is the risk of creating insulated echo chambers, where contrarian views reinforce preconceptions without rigorous scrutiny, potentially amplifying selective facts or oversimplifications (e.g., portraying U.S. policies as purely sociopathic elite schemes while minimizing geopolitical complexities).

JM: Right. That's a danger, and we need to think critically about our own views. But, still, while helpful cautionary advice, the central question is: Are the assertions by members of this cohort right or wrong? The claims of anyone must first be responded to on their own terms.

Manufacturing Contrarian Consent

V-G: More critically, these narratives can be co-opted or outright manufactured by adversarial actors, such as Russia, to sow division in the West. Russia's information operations, documented extensively since its 2014 annexation of Crimea and escalating with the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, actively promote contrarian themes that align suspiciously with the video's critiques—e.g., framing the war as a "proxy conflict" provoked by NATO expansion, "Nazification" of Ukraine, or Western hypocrisy in global interventions. State-backed outlets like RT and Sputnik, along with Telegram channels and social media bots, disseminate these narratives globally, tailoring them to resonate with anti-establishment audiences in Europe, Latin America, and Africa.

JM: But that political actors can appropriate a legitimate critique and use it for their propaganda is always a danger for any view. One way to lessen the availability of that bad misappropriation of critical views is to, like Chomsky, make your own, fact-based, assessment of the political players - such as those designated as “enemies” - who are demonized by the mainstream. Chomsky can, did, and does, strongly criticize the old Soviet Union and the current Russian government for authoritarianism, oppression of individual liberties, anti-democratic policies, violation of international law, and systemic corruption. All the ills (and strengths) of Russia can be examined, identified and demonstrated through argumentation with evidence. But these clear-eyed, fact-rooted, critiques may or may not be relevant to our assessment of Russian foreign policy. Similar to how we may note that the U.S., compared to most nations, excels at protecting individual liberties, but has numerous and consistent examples of thwarting freedom in other nations. This is the knee-jerk, black-and-white thinking of both those who adopt the prevailing propaganda AND those whose criticality of the mainstream causes them to just reverse the mainstream black-and-white thinking and declare that it's actually white-and-black thinking that's the truth. So now it's the Russians or Chinese or Iranians - US designated “enemies” - who are all good (but admittedly make mistakes) and the U.S. and west who are the bad guys.

JM: Another common mistake of this clumsy black-and-white thinking and its unthinking reverse is to confuse domestic society with that society's foreign policy. For years, people actually defended Israeli foreign policy by saying: they are the only democracy in the Middle East! People don't seem to know, although a moment's thought would demonstrate it, that both authoritarian and democratic societies can both do good and bad in their foreign policies. The U.S., rightly lauded for its first amendment to the Constitution that protects the rights of the individual, murdered 3 million Southeast Asians in an unprovoked war of choice aimed at destroying Vietnamese self-determination. Likewise, it is certainly possible that an authoritarian society can be right in their foreign policy. And they, like liberal democracies, can be wrong in a specific foreign action. One has to examine each instance to determine what is occurring and how to judge it.

JM: When caught within the unconscious mainstream doctrinal choices, people mistakenly think there are only two positions available. Either our side is good and the enemy bad, or the enemy is the good guy and we are bad. But I contend there is a third position. One can embrace one's reason, and values, and commitment to data, and evaluate all sides domestic and foreign actions and judge each according to what one determines using one's independent position. I can say that Iran is currently being victimized by the U.S.-Israeli-EU AND Iran has a weak democracy that is subordinate to a repressive clergy and suffers from both corruption and incompetence, while being tortured domestically for ten years by an illegal and murderous US economic siege.

V-G: For instance, in countries like Hungary, Italy, and Germany, pro-Russian messaging has infiltrated right-wing populist discourse, portraying Ukraine as weak or corrupt and Russia as a defender against Western imperialism. Techniques include deepfakes, forged documents, and amplified "factoids" (as the video itself terms distorted facts), which erode trust in mainstream sources but often introduce their own biases, such as downplaying Russian atrocities or territorial ambitions. Even allies like China echo these through outlets like Xinhua, creating a "virtuous cycle of disinformation." This manufacturing isn't always overt; it can involve seeding doubt via influencers or "useful idiots" in the West, leading to narratives that, while contrarian to MSM, inadvertently align with Kremlin goals of undermining support for Ukraine.

JM: Are you saying that large nations-states use covert operations to affect other nations' media?! I'm shocked! It must only be the “bad guys” who do that! Right?! Or maybe, all hegemons do this and the U.S., the biggest hegemon, more than most. We need to be wary of all nation-state's propaganda. Perhaps Visser-Grok only described the bad guy's misinformation and propaganda because of its ideological bias in favor of the west? Shouldn't all sides to a conflict be evaluated critically? What happened to V-G's advocacy of balance?!

JM: But the alternative cohort should not, and mostly does not, uncritically accept the adversaries' propaganda. For sixty years, Chomsky's acute, fact-based, critiques demonstrated his critical points using mainstream western sources such as The NY Times, Washington Post, US government sources and stodgy, western foreign policy journals like Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, all mostly opposed to his views. You mention The Duran as an alternative source. What I find striking and convincing about The Duran - and there is no better daily reporting on Ukraine - is the careful way they sift the whole range of sources. We hear about Ukrainian sources, Russian sources, anti-Russian British sources such as the Telegraph and The Financial Times, as well as the anti-Russian New York Times and the variety of battlefield map services that are arrayed from pro-Ukrainian to pro-Russian with neutral mappers in between. Because the duo at the Duran have followed and reported on the war daily since before it started, they have lived each reiteration of hope for the new weapon system, the battle to deploy it, the hopes it will be a game-changer, the use of the false hope to get more aid money and weapons, and the disappointment and curious collective amnesia after things don't improve for Ukraine. What's wrong with that? Perhaps Visser/Grok doesn't know enough about my views to offer an informed critique? Perhaps Visser-Grok is trapped in the very black-and-white thinking I diagnose but of which Visser-Grok is ignorant?

V-G: The video's reliance on such sources without addressing these risks highlights a broader issue: Contrarianism, while valuable for balance, demands equal skepticism to avoid becoming another form of manufactured consent, potentially manipulated by foreign powers to exploit Western divisions. In essence, true critical thinking requires interrogating all narratives—mainstream and alternative alike—for biases, funding, and agendas.

JM: Yes, I agree. And part of my critique is that there are three positions on the war, or any event. First, there is the home nation's assumption that it is the good guy (who admittedly makes mistakes) and the other guy, “our enemy,” is the bad guy, whose bad actions are manifestations of their evil. In the second view, there are those who sense something's wrong with the mainstream view that “we” are the good guys and “they,” “the enemy,” are the bad guys. They reverse the narrative and realize that “we,” my country, is actually the bad guy and the “enemy” is actually the good guy. The second, rebel's, view thinks they must defend the wrongly demonized enemy from criticism and interpret their bad actions as mistakes not evidence of evil. But then, less well-known, is a third position. This is the anti-authoritarian, libertarian socialist, anarchist, Chomsky position that does not ally with any side in these black-and-white ways. The third position retains its independent criticality and applies its universal standards of conduct to any party within the specifics of the political-economic-historical conjuncture we find in the present.

JM: You, ignorant of these three positions and thinking there are only two choices, assign me position two, because you think there are only two choices. What's missed is that one must understand a specific individual's view before criticizing it instead of criticizing one's strawman version of one's opponent.

Russian War Propaganda

V-G: Just as Western powers are critiqued in the video for manufacturing consent through media illusions and elite interests, Vladimir Putin has employed similar tactics to rally domestic support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, framing it as a defensive "special military operation" rather than an act of aggression. Through state-controlled media like RT and Sputnik, the Kremlin has propagated narratives of "denazification" and "genocide" against Russian-speakers in Donbas, invoking distorted World War II imagery to evoke national vengeance and portray Ukraine's leadership—despite President Zelenskyy's Jewish heritage—as fascist threats.

V-G: This disinformation, built over a decade of anti-Ukrainian propaganda since the 2014 Crimea annexation, emphasizes historical unity ("one people") and NATO encirclement as existential dangers, while using whataboutism to deflect criticism by comparing it to Western interventions. Tactics include fabricated pretexts like faked videos of Ukrainian attacks, amplified by senior officials including Putin himself, to justify military action and suppress dissent at home—though this has backfired internationally and even among some Russians, revealing the limits of such manufactured narratives in sustaining prolonged conflict.

JM: Every national elite has to mobilize their population by manufacturing consent. That content can range from accurate information to falsehoods. We would need to assess each nation's persuasion campaign. We can distinguish militarily between the Russia's special military operation (SMO) and a full-scale war. You have not contradicted the Russian view of an SMO. You may be able to, but we don't know because you've made no argument, simply assuming the rightness of your view. Just stating it under the banner of “propaganda” doesn't mean it's inaccurate. You need to demonstrate that factually. Similar to the claim of the SMO as defensive. While the Russian invasion itself is obviously an aggression and violation of law, we need to ask about the geo-political fight that is its thirty years context. Visser/Grok seems to think that just making reference to this is enough offering no argumentation. Russian desires for denazification do identify powerful, destructive, and repulsive white supremacist and Neo-Nazi movements in the Ukrainian military and politics. Prior to the Russian invasion, the anti-Russian western press routinely exposed these racist and fascistic organizations in Ukraine. Although, not so mysteriously, these western exposes of the Neo-Nazis disappeared when Ukraine became the west's “proxy” or “battering ram” against Russia. How did the west, with its supposed free press, enforce such doctrinal obedience? Have structural sociologists of media explained how a diverse, decentralized, western media “knew” to eliminate all stories of the role of Nazis and white supremacists in Ukrainian state after 2022?

JM: But what if the information used by the Russian elites is accurate? Russia can make a solid case, using US and western sources, that the last thirty years is cogently summed by saying the U.S. and NATO have been using overt and covert means to penetrate the traditional Russian sphere of influence near their borders to gain a power advantage and weaken Russia's security. Actually, one can trace a vast arc on a map from the Baltics all the way down to the Caucasus states that the west has been infiltrating to gain geo-strategic advantages over Russia. Doesn't Visser/Grok, with its vast access to knowledge, know this?! Russia could have a powerful case that the west is posing an existential threat; including numerous statements in the west that regime change is a western goal in Russia. (An instance where politicians stated intentions aid the argument.)

JM: So Visser/Grok thinks it's enough to simply state what the Russian elites say are their reasons for war as an argument that those assertions are false?! But mustn't one argue for their untruth rather than assume falsity simply because it's a staple of western propaganda?

JM: If your assertion is that nation-states mobilize their populations for war/defense then it's just a bland truism. Some mobilizations, like the Vietnamese mobilizations against their French and U.S. invaders, are good and noble because they really are defending against an evil aggressor.

JM: And the old hoary whataboutism misunderstanding. I guess since Grok just accumulates the dominant views it doesn't know the killer comeback to whataboutism that I provide below.

Zelensky as the US "Attack Dog"?

V-G: Regarding Zelenskyy's role, the video's "attack dog" metaphor oversimplifies his position as a leader defending national sovereignty against an existential threat, rather than aggressively prolonging conflict for personal gain. Zelenskyy has consistently rejected deals requiring territorial concessions (e.g., full Russian control of Donetsk, despite Russia holding only Luhansk outright among its claimed provinces), backed by polls showing 75% of Ukrainians oppose such terms amid war-weariness.

JM: My attack dog metaphor referred to Israel, not Zelensky. (Hey, machines, like humans make mistakes.) It tried to capture the give-and-take in the U.S.-Israeli alliance in contrast to those who say Israel is in control. For Zelensky, I used the puppet metaphor; for Israel, it was the attack dog. Let's keep our metaphors straight Visser/Grok!

V-G: This stance aligns with his push for security guarantees and peace with dignity, as emphasized in recent addresses to the EU Parliament and a Nordic-Baltic summit in Kyiv, where leaders pledged 12.5 billion in defense aid and 918 million in energy support. However, European unity isn't uniform—Hungary's veto of EU sanctions and a $100 billion+ loan for Kyiv illustrates internal divisions, contradicting the video's blanket claim that "Europe wants the war to continue." Initiatives like France and the UK's "Coalition of the Willing" reflect growing resolve to counter Russian aggression, but analysts note Europe's slow aid delivery and defense budget increases (to 5% of GDP, pledged over nine years) as factors prolonging the stalemate.

JM: There are certainly dissenting EU states. I was referring to the dominant states - France, Germany, Italy - and the EU leadership who consistently push the Russia threat, Russia hybrid war, and more spending on weapons. That's the dominant view and that's what I was referring to in my generalization.

War Mongering Europe?

V-G: The claim that "Europe wants the war to continue" is one-sided and oversimplifies a complex landscape of European positions, motivations, and constraints in February 2026, four years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

V-G: European support for Ukraine remains robust overall, with the EU having significantly increased military aid (up 67% in 2025) and approving a 90 billion loan for budgetary and military support in 2026-2027. Leaders from countries like France, the UK, Germany (under figures like Friedrich Merz), and the Nordic-Baltic states continue to emphasize that Russia must not achieve its goals through aggression, warning that a "bad peace" (e.g., one rewarding maximalist Russian demands) would invite further instability.

V-G: High Representative Kaja Kallas has highlighted fears that Russia could gain more diplomatically than militarily, given its slow, costly advances and failure to meet even 2014 front-line progress despite enormous losses. Initiatives like the "Coalition of the Willing" (involving many EU states plus the UK, Norway, Iceland, and T rkiye) reflect urgency to counter Russian momentum, including plans for potential postwar enforcement mechanisms if violations occur. This stance stems from strategic self-interest: a Russian victory or capitulation-forced settlement would undermine European security, embolden hybrid threats, and erode NATO's credibility, potentially leading to higher long-term costs (e.g., refugee flows, energy disruptions, or renewed aggression).

V-G: However, this is far from uniform enthusiasm for indefinite continuation. "Ukraine fatigue" exists in pockets—evident in Hungary's repeated vetoes on EU sanctions and aid packages, as well as public/economic pressures in some member states amid rising energy costs and defense budget strains. Analysts note Europe's slower aid delivery compared to earlier years and pledges to ramp up defense spending (e.g., to 5% of GDP over time) as responses to the stalemate rather than outright desire for perpetual war. Some voices (e.g., in France and Italy) express interest in eventual sanctions relief if a deal emerges, but this is conditional on meaningful Russian concessions.

JM: Ah, so Visser-Grok agrees that my generalization that “Europe wants the war to continue” is a good generalization. I fully acknowledge that when one makes a generalization about a unit as large as Europe there will be dissenting voices. Those dissenting voices must continually counter the rhetoric and actions of the EU and E3 leadership. For example, the EU leadership wanted to illegally take Russia's frozen assets to fund Ukraine. But other European forces Belgium, Ukraine - and the financial establishment said no, and the EU leadership had to back down, and find another way to fund the war. The main strong thrust of the EU and UK is more war, more military spending, and opposition to the U.S. sponsored negotiations.

Russia's Maximalist Demands

V-G: The core asymmetry lies in Russia's unchanged maximalist demands, which make genuine alternatives to continued resistance (short of capitulation) elusive. As of February 2026, Putin and Russian officials insist on:

&bulll; Full Ukrainian withdrawal from (and recognition of Russian control over) Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts—including areas Russia does not fully occupy (e.g., ~20% of Donetsk).

&bulll; Ukraine's permanent neutrality/non-alignment, demilitarization (drastic army caps, no long-range weapons or Western infrastructure).

&bulll; "Denazification" (banning Ukrainian nationalism, elevating Russian language/culture/Orthodox Church influence, potentially regime change or pro-Russian governance).

&bulll; NATO legally enshrining non-expansion (reversing post-1997 enlargement, abandoning eastern partnerships)—effectively dismantling aspects of the alliance.

&bulll; Lifting sanctions without reciprocity.

V-G: These echo Russia's pre-2022 ultimatums and remain non-negotiable in Kremlin rhetoric, with officials signaling no satisfaction from partial territorial concessions alone. Putin has stalled talks (e.g., refusing direct Zelenskyy meetings, rejecting unconditional ceasefires), using battlefield pressure and disinformation to force capitulation while preparing for more reserve call-ups amid recruitment/economic strains.

V-G: Ukraine's response, articulated by Zelenskyy, rejects unilateral withdrawals or sovereignty-eroding terms: any deal requires mutual compromises (e.g., reciprocal troop pullbacks in Donbas), Ukrainian public approval via referendum, ceasefire for safe elections, and robust security guarantees (preferably NATO-like, with U.S./European enforcement to deter renewed aggression). Zelenskyy has shown flexibility on discussions (e.g., troop adjustments if mirrored by Russia) but insists no deal can cost independence—echoing polls where most Ukrainians oppose ceding territory without guarantees.

V-G: In this context, "continuing the war" is less about European elites craving conflict and more about the absence of viable middle-ground options when one side (Russia) demands total capitulation while the other (Ukraine) refuses existential surrender. Negotiations (e.g., ongoing Geneva/Abu Dhabi talks, potential March trilateral) show procedural movement but substantive deadlock, with U.S. pressure for a deal by mid-2026 adding tension. Without Russian moderation—or decisive shifts in military/economic leverage—the binary remains resistance (with Western aid) versus capitulation, not a choice Europe unilaterally imposes but one shaped by Putin's intransigence. A balanced view requires acknowledging both Western inconsistencies and Russia's role in blocking compromise.

JM: Here you show a big bias. We seem to all know that Russia's “demands” judged “maximalist” by Visser/Grok are the “core asymmetry” that makes alternatives “elusive.” Oh where is Visser/Grok's vaunted balance now?! Russia wouldn't accept this characterization. Why does Visser/Grok present such a biased view when it can objectively tell us what is the true reality?

JM: No, you're wrong, the pre-2022 Russian position did not include a “demand” for control of Donetsk. How could Putin and Zelensky have agreed to a draft peace proposal in Spring 2022 - that U.S.-UK vetoed - if it included that Russian demand?

JM: Yes, Russia's demands are mostly non-negotiable now. They were negotiable in 2022 and prior. But now, as Visser/Grok refuses to acknowledge, Russia has won on the battlefield. Just as any nation would and does, the negotiation position reflects the new battlefield realities. It's lousy that in practice right makes might, but that is the world dominant Hegemons act within.

JM: In general, Visser/Grok responds as if we live in a fantasy world where weaker powers who have lost on the battlefield can appeal to national sovereignty as an argument for why they should get what they want. I wish right and wrong decided geo-political outcomes. And we should strive for a world where they are ever more powerful. But that is not our world. In our world nations like the U.S., Russia, China, demand a sphere of influence because it's to their advantage and other, competing, peer powers try to gain advantage over their rivals by overtly and covertly moving weaker near-states to their orbit. Visser-Grok might want to check its vast store of knowledge to learn this international relations truism.

JM: For Visser/Grok, when it's to the West's advantage we suddenly live in a world of principle to be wielded against its enemies. But the West does not apply those lofty principles to its own actions against its weaker near-states.

JM: And here we arrive at the famous western misunderstanding of what it calls the argument of “whataboutism.” The west contends that the US-NATO inclusion of Eastern European states, near or directly on Russia's borders, in an anti-Russian alliance is justified because those weaker Eastern European states have the right to determine their own foreign policy and the U.S. is simply responding to their rightful request. The opposing view says that the U.S. does not and would never allow such a thing on their border and violently stops nations who do. The U.S. even has the longstanding Monroe Doctrine whose thrust is a U.S. restriction on the foreign policy of the states of Latin America. Here is an obvious contradiction. The U.S. can violently control a whole hemisphere (and even other parts of the world) but other powers don't get that right. Here's where the anti-Russian says that it's still right for the U.S. to honor Eastern European alliance preferences despite the U.S. policy of violating it; that it's still good that the right principle is applied in Eastern Europe even though the U.S. routinely violates it. But here is where the western critic's real point is missed. We are trying to explain US behavior consistently. We want an explanatory model that explains US actions in Eastern Europe and in the Western Hemisphere. If we say the explanation for U.S. actions in Eastern Europe is its adherence to principle and an essential requirement of principles is their consistent application and explanatory efficacy, then the glaring contradiction between applications of the principle will make it, as an explanation of behavior, wrong. Is there another explanation of U.S. behavior that could explain the bizarre contradiction that the U.S. applies a foundational legal and moral principle in one domain but not in the other? Here's a possibility: It could be that it is not the principle that motivates US policy - since it is so routinely and consistently violated - but some other explanation that explains US actions in these domains. What could explain ALL the evidence consistently? Maybe, just maybe, the U.S., like hegemons throughout history, is actually interested in furthering and increasing their security, power, and resources through foreign policy! If we test this as an explanation of U.S. behavior, instead of adherence to principle as our explanation, we can make consistent sense of both the U.S. policies in the Western Hemisphere and in Eastern Europe. The U.S. wants to gain more advantages and control. They strive for this result by eliminating competition in their own hemisphere, their sphere of influence, AND by invading their competitor's sphere of influence and bringing the states the competitor fears into the U.S.-Europe sphere of influence. Using the standard realist explanation that nation-states really want power, and exploit talk of principle to achieve that gain, we get a consistent explanation of US power in Eastern Europe AND the Western Hemisphere. That's the point that is missed by both accusers and those accused in the ignorant talk of “whataboutism”.

JM: Because V-G just aggregates the dominant knowledge from the web it wouldn't know of this further argument that a lone creative human can imagine. The LLM's virtually unlimited knowledge does not include my all too human creative thinking.

Alternatives to Endless War

V-G: The video's notable blind spot is the absence of balanced discussion on alternatives to endless war, such as U.S.-brokered talks in Geneva (set for next week as of mid-February 2026), where the Trump administration—having paused direct U.S. military aid—is reportedly pressuring Kyiv for concessions by early summer to shift focus to U.S. midterms. "Ukraine's submission to Putin" isn't a realistic or discussed option in mainstream discourse, as it would likely entail demilitarization, neutrality, and territorial losses—terms Zelenskyy deems unacceptable, per his February 18 rejection of Trump-pressured deals.

V-G: UN officials, including Secretary-General Antönio Guterres and High Commissioner Volker T rk, advocate for an immediate ceasefire and Russian withdrawal, emphasizing the war's unacceptability and calls for Russia to halt attacks on energy sites. Experts outline three potential outcomes: a frozen conflict with incremental Russian gains, a negotiated truce involving compromises (e.g., on Donbas), or prolonged attrition until one side's resources collapse—none favoring quick "submission," given Russia's strained economy and military despite functional adaptations.

V-G: These omissions highlight how contrarian views, while critiquing Western propaganda, can exhibit their own biases—focusing on elite corruption in Ukraine (e.g., aid siphoning) and Western short-termism without equally scrutinizing Putin's manufactured domestic consent through state media narratives of "denazification" and NATO threats. A more complete analysis would weigh both sides' propaganda, acknowledging that peace requires mutual de-escalation, not unilateral capitulation. As the war grinds on with no imminent end, blind spots like these risk oversimplifying a tragedy that has displaced millions and reshaped global security.

JM: Why do you characterize the current “peace talks” as an “alternative” to war? My view disagrees with that judgment. What is my view of the current peace talks? Visser/Grok doesn't know nor care. It simply repeats the standard black-and-white thinking that dominates the web because the bionic amalgam can't think creatively. My perspective has to explain all the “facts” and does so by creating a different interpretation of the role of negotiations in the US-Ukraine-Russia war.

Avoiding All Propaganda

V-G: To avoid propaganda from all sides—whether from Western mainstream media, state-backed outlets like RT, alternative contrarian sources, or social media influencers—cultivate consistent habits of critical thinking and media literacy. Start by diversifying your sources: actively seek out perspectives from multiple outlets across the ideological spectrum, including those that challenge your existing views, rather than relying on algorithmic feeds that reinforce biases. Pause before reacting emotionally or sharing content, especially if it provokes outrage, fear, or moral superiority—these are classic propaganda triggers designed to bypass reason.

JM: I agree. That's what I do. For example, on The Duran the analysts use a mix of pro-Ukrainian western sources such as The Financial Times, independent sources, and Russian sources. Propaganda during war is especially rife. It requires understanding the differing perspectives on the war. It appears that Visser/Grok can't contrast differing perspectives because it seems to collect the dominant view and then presume some unearned “balance” that it is not demonstrating as it is unable to even articulate correctly the view it is opposing.

V-G: Verify claims rigorously: check the original source, author credentials, funding, and date; cross-reference with independent fact-checkers (e.g., reputable ones like PolitiFact or Snopes, while noting their own potential leanings); and look for primary evidence rather than secondary interpretations. Question the "why": who benefits from this narrative, what facts are omitted, and does it rely on loaded language, whataboutism, or selective framing? Apply the same scrutiny to contrarian or "alternative" voices as you do to mainstream ones—examine their track record, potential affiliations (e.g., funding ties or echo-chamber incentives), and whether they acknowledge counter-evidence.

V-G: Build long-term resilience through education: practice "horizontal reading" (quickly scanning multiple sources for consensus), limit time on polarizing platforms, and engage in reflective habits like journaling biases or discussing topics with diverse people offline. Ultimately, no single source is infallible; the goal is not to find "the truth" in one place but to triangulate reliable facts through reason, evidence, and skepticism toward all power structures—domestic or foreign—that seek to manufacture consent. This approach, while demanding, empowers genuine informed judgment over manipulated narratives.

JM: This is good advice. I agree. It's what I do. V-G would know this if it had the knowledge it lacks.