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Dr. Joseph Dillard is a psychotherapist with over forty year's clinical experience treating individual, couple, and family issues. Dr. Dillard also has extensive experience with pain management and meditation training. The creator of Integral Deep Listening (IDL), Dr. Dillard is the author of over ten books on IDL, dreaming, nightmares, and meditation. He lives in Berlin, Germany. See: integraldeeplistening.com and his YouTube channel. He can be contacted at: [email protected]

SEE MORE ESSAYS WRITTEN BY JOSEPH DILLARD

Down the Rabbit Hole

Interlocutions With the White Rabbit and Mad Hatter
Where's the Beer?

Joseph Dillard

While my previous essay, “Three Blind Philosophers Walk into a Bar..”, focused on the ubiquity of metaphysical assumptions and why they are unavoidable, in this essay, which is a response to Visser's response, “Bad Metaphysics By Any Other Name…,” to the above essay, I want to step back further and approach the issue from the broader perspective of problem-solving in general.

Life is full of problems, and uncovering our metaphysical assumptions and then deciding which ones are valid and which are not is only one example of the bigger issue of how we approach problem solving on any issue.

As I read Visser, his critique of Wilber in regard to metaphysical inflation is that Wilber 1) does not sufficiently surface and table his metaphysical assumptions, and 2) as a result, his biases color his conclusions. We can see this in how Wilber appropriates empiricism to validate his “eye of spirit,” basically using appeals to personal experience and authority to justify unexamined metaphysical assumptions. This is one—flawed—approach to problem solving. What are the options?

The inevitability of metaphysical assumptions

Could that be true? Are metaphysical assumptions inevitable? And if it is, how come? And how do our metaphysical assumptions get in the way of our ability to solve our problems?

We all like to think our arguments are based on logic and reason, not metaphysics. In fact, the assumption is that to say that someone's position, in this instance Wilber's, is based on metaphysical assumptions is basically to critique it as something other than a rational or logical position.

A second reason why acknowledgement of metaphysical assumptions is uncommon is because metaphysical assumptions are non-falsifiable. That means they are pre-rational, implying that our arguments, reason, and logic, which are not pre-rational but are in fact rational, are being used to validate a prepersonal, pre-rational position, despite our denials. Who thinks their position is prepersonal or pre-rational?

A third reason is that to the extent that we base our self-image on being reasonable, rational, and objective, the entire idea that our arguments are based on metaphysical assumptions threatens our identity. That causes cognitive dissonance. Humans will do, think, and believe almost anything to avoid threats to their sense of self.

The unavoidability of non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions

Metaphysical a priori assumptions are unavoidable. This is because of the limits of empirical validation, because they are required for cognitive structuring, the importance of intersubjective agreement, our dependency on ontology to avoid solipsism, and the evolutionary adaptive benefits of some metaphysical assumptions.

Human cognition relies on presuppositions to organize experience into meaningful patterns. Without assuming causation, such as that events have antecedents, we couldn't predict or learn. Non-falsifiable assumptions underpin the scientific method itself. Testing them requires stepping outside the system, which is impossible. Shared metaphysical assumptions enable communication and collaboration. Rejecting them fragments discourse. The assumption of an external reality is inherent in perceiving ourselves as agents within a world. Denying it leads to solipsism, which is impractical for action. Evolutionary pressures favor assumptions that enhance survival. Avoiding them risks paralysis. To repeat, metaphysical a priori assumptions are unavoidable. What is avoidable is our unwillingness to own up to our own. Who is willing to do a “metaphysical audit?” Who has sufficient objectivity regarding their assumptions to be able to do so?

The function of phenomenology in stage 1 of problem solving

Visser points out that phenomenological bracketing is intrinsically relativistic. I not only agree, my position is that relativism is the purpose of phenomenological bracketing. I am not sure at all that Husserl did not support phenomenological bracketing, in and of itself as intrinsic to his methodology, regardless of its use. I think he did. What is the suspension of assumptions other than a movement into a position of non-judgmentalism? Isn't the suspension of judgment intrinsically relativistic? Husserl's methodology is indeed focused on description, not on determining validity. It is not intended to adjudicate claims and, to go further, it can't.

The intent of my previous essay was not to adjudicate Wilber's metaphysics but to 1) note that we all function on the basis of metaphysical assumptions, often unrecognized, and 2) promote phenomenology as a means of surfacing those assumptions.

In his response to my essay, Visser essentially changed the goal posts of our discussion from “Wilber does metaphysics; metaphysics BAD!” To “Yes, we all do metaphysics but some metaphysics are better than others.” I agree.

However, that change brings up another underlying issue: “How do we determine what metaphysical assumptions are true or useful or helpful? That will depend at least in part on what truth criteria we are assuming—correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic. Wilber notes that there are different truth criteria for different quadrants, all of which determine our approach to problem solving, which is the broader, underlying issue that Visser raises by his response.

“Good” and “Bad” Metaphysical Assumptions

Visser's distinction between good and bad metaphysics is important and relevant. “Bad” metaphysics are vague, universalizing, and dismissive, while “good” metaphysics are transparent, empirical, and revisable. And how can we even get to determining whether our metaphysical assumptions are good or bad if we aren't even aware that we have metaphysical assumptions? My claim is that most of us assume we do not. We think our judgments and world views are based on reason and logic, not on metaphysics. In fact, if we asked Wilber, “Is AQAL based on metaphysical assumptions?” What do you suppose he would say? I will go further. Think of your favorite empiricist/scientist. If you asked him/her, “What metaphysical assumptions underlie your theoretical position?” What do you think the answer is likely to be?

If we don't first surface and “bracket” our metaphysical assumptions, on what grounds can we claim that our problem-solving is not prejudiced at the outset? As a result we mostly waste our time validating our biases instead of problem-solving. In fact, this is what most of us do most of the time. We think we are problem-solving when we are having fun justifying our worldview and identity. That not only can be fun but generates a great deal of exciting drama that makes us feel like we are living our lives when we are mostly jousting at windmills or in dispute with our own shadow. I don't mean “shadow” in the Jungian sense, but in the literal sense of mistaking our own shadows for something oppositional or controversial to defend against.

Lack of awareness of our metaphysical assumptions is a real blind spot that not only Wilber has but that we all have. While that may be true and perhaps inevitable due to the inherent subjectivity of perception, we can always do more to surface and table our assumptions. That was the basic point of my first essay. Beyond that, Visser is correct in arguing that differentiating good and bad metaphysics is essential and that phenomenology is not enough.

Surfacing common toxic, non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions

Absolute moral superiority, predetermined destiny, human exceptionalism, and eternal conflict as natural are examples of common toxic, non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions. These need to be surfaced before they can be addressed. If they are not, they become major blocks to problem solving. The belief that our moral framework is inherently and universally correct is a form of absolute superiority that defends us from any and all challenges. It is often tied to our cultural or religious identity. It is toxic because it promotes intolerance, justifying violence or exclusion, and stifles dialogue. It assumes a fixed moral truth, ignoring contextual relativity, leading to conflict, such as the Israel-Gaza conflict. It leads to individuals and groups believing that their ethics justify suppressing dissent, causing social fragmentation.

The assumption that life outcomes are fixed by fate, divine will, or cosmic design is the toxic metaphysical assumption of predetermined destiny. It encourages passivity or fatalism, hindering personal and collective agency and undermining effort toward change, perpetuating suffering. For example, believers in karma accept poverty as “meant to be,” resisting economic uplift.

Human exceptionalism, the belief that humans are fundamentally superior to other species or nature, with a right to dominate, is a third toxic metaphysical assumption. It drives environmental degradation and species loss, ignoring interdependence, leading to ecological collapse. For example, prioritizing human industry over biodiversity causes habitat loss.

The belief that competition or war is an inevitable feature of existence is the metaphysical assumption of eternal conflict as natural. It is toxic because it normalizes violence, fueling geopolitical instability, perpetuating cycles of harm and blocking peace efforts. Obviously, just recognizing these non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions doesn't get rid of them. Recognition is phenomenological surfacing. They then need to be suspended as more functional options are suspended. But because metaphysical assumptions are adaptive, for the reasons noted above, they are extremely difficult to change, even when recognized.

Problem-Solving as a foundational issue

In the realm of this forum, Integral World and Integral theory, we are mostly attempting to solve problems around the determination of what is a viable integral position and what is not. For example, how inclusive should integral be? Does it have boundaries? How do we determine what is more or less integral? When I survey the essays at Integral World, mine included, I see that these are unspoken underlying problems that I and other authors are attempting to clarify, if not solve. Dealing with unrecognized, non-falsifiable, and/or “bad” metaphysical assumptions is one example.

Frank Visser, in his response to to my previous essay indirectly raised the issue of problem solving by noting that my advocation of phenomenological bracketing of assumptions lacks discriminative power, unable to adjudicate Wilber's bold claims, unlike Husserl's intended use. In short, phenomenology doesn't solve problems. Visser writes, “when it comes to claims like 'Spirit is evolution in action' or 'Eros is driving the cosmos toward greater depth,' bracketing isn't enough. We need to evaluate such claims, not just suspend judgment.”

I couldn't agree more. That is why I advocate a two-stage approach to problem solving: first surface and bracket your assumptions so as to cast your net as broadly as possible; second, make a commitment to a falsifiable position and test it.

A two-stage approach to problem-solving

For me, taking a phenomenological approach is the first stage in a fundamental two-stage approach to problem solving. I cannot say it is the best or only approach, only that I have found it to be effective on some, even many, problems.

Phenomenology is a first, necessary, information-gathering step because it surfaces and suspends our assumptions so we can more objectively access alternative perspectives and solutions. It is necessary because we want to spread our net as broadly as possible during the information gathering stage, with particular emphasis on counter-arguments to our own. When we back off and look at the issue of “good” and “bad” metaphysics from the perspective of problem-solving in general, what I find is that while a phenomenological stance makes sense in the first stage of the solving of many problems, it is a poor choice in the second necessary and even essential stage of problem solving. At some point, (usually too early!) we conclude we have enough information, that we understand opposing arguments, and it is time to draw conclusions. This is the second step, and it is as essential as the first.

Empiricism comes next

Once we have gathered our information, or in empirical terms, formed our hypothesis, now it is time to employ the empirical method, which is widely known and which Wilber himself describes and subscribes to. As he points out, it boils down to three steps: 1) learn the instructions for the research protocol; 2) follow them; 3) submit your findings to knowledgeable peers in the field. These steps assume knowledge, discipline, and accountability. It is important to note that phenomenology, in its information-gathering work, is also empirical and emphasizes the importance of following these steps in the employment of phenomenology.

In the second stage of the problem-solving process a decision is reached and there is a commitment to it that is long enough to test its credibility. It is fine for that commitment to be “provisional,” or a “hypothesis,” both of which are better than descending into dogmatic certainty. Nevertheless, one moves out of the relativism demanded by a phenomenological perspective into a phase of commitment, discipline, and accountability. Where in the first, phenomenalistic phase, we are likely to be accused of moral ambiguity, in the second empirical phase, we are likely to be accused of rigidity.

Which phase of problem-solving are we in?

The ability to discriminate between these two phases is important, because if we don't we will either falsely accuse others or hold ourselves guilty of charges due to misperception of what stage of the problem solving process we are in. For example, in the realm of geopolitics, on any issue there is a time for suspension of judgment and information gathering, on the one hand, and a time for focused commitment to a stance on the other. Think about the hot topics of the day: Trump, the status of the EU, BRICS, Russia/Ukraine, Israel/Gaza-Iran. On all of these issues, during the first phase, it makes sense to err on the side of too much relativism in the interest of collecting information. During the second phase, it makes sense to err on the side of too much certainty, not only to test your position against reality, but for reasons of morality and personal integrity.

During the first phase there is no harm in leaning say, 90% to the relativistic side. In fact, to really take a phenomenalistic stance I think we need to. However, the percentage is different during the second, committed phase. It is important to stay 20-30% uncertain and humble and no more than 60-70% committed, because time and events will almost certainly uncover important information and perspectives we missed or were blind to. Those are my approximations; they could well be wrong.

Personal integrity demands of all of us that we choose a hill to die on. If we are lucky, we will only be wounded, lick our wounds, learn a lesson, and then choose our next hill more carefully. But to not choose a hill, right or wrong, good or bad, is worse than not doing phase two problem solving at all. Therefore I can understand and even appreciate dogmatists like Wilber, Trump, Netanyahu, Zelensky, and now, it would seem, Mertz of Germany. You know where they stand. It is easier to gain clear and accurate information about them so as to move with confidence into stage two of the problem-solving process.

For example, the way I apply the process to Wilber's “spirit-as-Eros-in-action” metaphysics is to first gather as much information as I can about it, suspending judgment as best I can. Then, in the second phase, I ask questions. “Does Wilber explain how his formulation of spiritual purpose/teleology is not human projection onto life? If he does not explain, why not?” “Is Wilber's divine purpose theory more parsimonious than that of EES (Extended Evolutionary Synthesis)?” Since Wilber flunks both those tests for me, I conclude his position is bad metaphysics.

The non-falsifiability of metaphysical assumptions

It is also important to underline that empiricism really does rely on metaphysical assumptions, as we shall see. Metaphysical assumptions are inherently non-falsifiable. If so, how do you employ empiricism to determine the superiority of a metaphysical assumption? If that is the case, then Visser's criteria of what are good and bad metaphysics must be based on something other than empiricism.

Now that may sound like a move toward relativism, because it can be argued, “If metaphysical claims are inherently non-falsifiable, and empiricists at foundation are basing their work on metaphysical assumptions, how can we say what is good and what is bad metaphysics? And if that is the case, then who is to say Wilber's metaphysics are worse than anyone else's?”

However, I am not making that argument. Wilber's metaphysics ARE worse than those of your average empiricist, for reasons Visser points out.

Defending science's non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions on the basis of pragmatism

What do you do if your underlying commitment is metaphysical, that is, not falsifiable and therefore not testable? This is Visser's basic beef with Wilber, as I hear it.

For myself—and I cannot say this is true for you, much less that it is a universal principle—I opt for a pragmatic standard of truth. How useful is the metaphysical assumption?

Now this is “tricksy,” as Gollum would say. Anything that supports and defends our identity is useful in a psychologically geocentric way. That truncated variety of usefulness doesn't generate tetra-mesh because it only defines use in terms of the individual quadrants. If we subscribe to a holonic model and to the principle of tetra-mesh, which I do, then we have to show functionality in all four quadrants. This can be done with metaphysical as well as falsifiable principles. For example, here are four basic metaphysical concepts that empiricists generally subscribe to: causation, uniformity of nature, objectivity of observation, and existence of external reality. They can be defended on the basis of pragmatism across all eight zones of Wilber's Integral Methodological Pluralism. Here's how.

Regarding causation

1. In UL “I” Zone 1 of subjective experience and phenomenology, causation helps us trace emotional or cognitive states to prior experiences, such as anxiety from past trauma. We can use causation to link current stress to a childhood event, enabling therapeutic insight.
2. In UL “I” Zone 2 of the objective study of interiors and structuralism, researchers use causation to hypothesize links between interior states such as the effects of meditation on brain waves, and test them empirically. For example, studies on mindfulness attribute reduced anxiety to causal neural changes, guiding interventions.
3. In LL “We” Zone 3 of subjective culture and hermeneutics, cultural narratives use causation to explain traditions, such as harvest festivals caused by seasonal cycles, fostering identity and cohesion. For example, a community attributes a ritual's success to ancestral wisdom, reinforcing cultural bonds.
4. In LL “We” Zone 4 of the objective study of culture, anthropology and ethology, anthropologists trace cultural practices to historical causes, such as patriarchy from agricultural shifts, enhancing cross-cultural understanding. Studies link gender roles to economic structures, informing social equity policies.
5. In UR “It” Zone 5 of subjective behavior, self-organization/autopoiesis, we interpret our actions as caused by intentions or habits, aiding self-regulation, such as exercising due to health goals. For example, a runner attributes improved stamina to consistent training, using causation to adjust effort.
6. In UR “It” Zone 6 of empiricism, scientists apply causation to predict behavioral outcomes, such as smoking causes cancer, informing public policy. Another example are behavioral studies link screen time to attention deficits, guiding educational reforms.
7. In LR “Its” Zone 7 of social autopoiesis and subjective systems we look at group, national, or global trends, such as economic success or failure caused by market trends, relying on system dynamics, to guide our personal decisions. An entrepreneur might attribute profit to supply chain efficiency, adjusting investment strategies accordingly.
8. In LR “Its” Zone 8 of objective systems, causation underpins systemic models of all sorts, such as CO₂ causes climate change, enabling predictive simulations and mitigation. Ecologists use causal models to predict deforestation impacts, to shape conservation efforts.

Uniformity of Nature

This is the metaphysical assumption that the laws of nature are consistent across space and time, such as gravity operates uniformly on Earth and Mars. It is non-falsifiable because relies on induction from past observations.

1. In phenomenological Zone 1 “I”, we assume consistent mental patterns, such as meditation benefits persist, guiding our personal growth.
2. In structuralist Zone 2 “I”, psychologists rely on uniform cognitive processes to develop therapies.
3. In hermeneutic Zone 3 “We”, cultures assume stable traditions, such as seasonal rituals, reinforcing identity.
4. In ethnological Zone 4 “We”, anthropologists use uniform cultural evolution models, such as degree of kinship shift.
5. In autopoietic Zone 5 “It”,we expect consistent behavioral outcomes, such as exercise improving our health, shaping our habits.
6. In empirical Zone 6 “It”, neuroscience assumes uniform neural responses, such as dopamine causality, enabling brain studies.
7. In social autopoiesis Zone 7 “Its”, our decisions are informed by statistics regarding consistent system dynamics, such as economic cycles.
8. In systems Zone 8 “Its”, physics and ecology depend on uniform laws, such as 95% climate model accuracy, for predictions.

Objectivity of Observation

This metaphysical assumption involves the belief that observations can be made independently of the observer's subjective state, enabling intersubjective agreement. The objectivity of observation cannot be proven and therefore is non-falsifiable, as all observation is mediated by perception (Kant's noumenal-phenomenal distinction).

1. In phenomenological Zone 1 “I”, we assume our self-reflection is somewhat objective, aiding self-awareness, such as journal insights.
2. In structuralist Zone 2 “I”, psychologists rely on objective interior data, such as EEG consistency, for research.
3. In hermeneutic Zone 3 “We”, cultural narratives assume shared perceptions, such as myth consistency, fostering cohesion.
4. In ethnological Zone 4 “We”, anthropologists depend on objective cultural data, such as artifact analysis, for historical insights.
5. In autopoietic Zone 5 “It”, we assume our behavioral self-reports are reliable, guiding personal adjustments.
6. In empirical Zone 6 “It”, neuroscience uses objective behavioral metrics, such as reaction times, to study cognition.
7. In social autopoiesis Zone 7 “Its”, we use objective behavioral metrics, such as reaction times, to study cognition.
8. In systems Zone 8 “Its”, sciences of various sorts use objective measurements, such as temperature data, to model systems like climate.

Existence of an External Reality

This is the assumption that there is a mind-independent reality that science investigates. It cannot be verified, as all evidence is filtered through perception.

1. In UL “I” Zone 1 of subjective experience and phenomenology, we assume an external world affects our inner life, such as nature inspires peace, guiding reflection.
2. In UL “I” Zone 2 of the objective study of interiors and structuralism, psychologists study how external reality shapes interiors, such as trauma studies.
3. In LL “We” Zone 3 of subjective culture and hermeneutics, we attribute behaviors to external triggers, such as social pressure, informing choices.
4. In LL “We” Zone 4 of the objective study of culture, anthropology and ethology, cultures assume an external world shapes traditions, such as land-based rituals, reinforcing values.
5. In UR “It” Zone 5 of subjective behavior, self-organization/autopoiesis, we attribute behaviors to external triggers (e.g., social pressure), informing choices.
6. In UR “It” Zone 6 of empiricism, neurologists explores how external stimuli, such as light, cause brain responses.
7. In LR “Its” Zone 7 of social autopoiesis and subjective systems, we see systems, such as economy, as external forces, guiding navigation.
8. In LR “Its” Zone 8 of objective systems, sciences assume an external physical world, such as planetary orbits) for modeling and intervention.

What are implications for science if these non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions are wrong?

If these metaphysical assumptions are wrong or contextually relative, science's foundational reliability and predictive power could be undermined, necessitating a reevaluation of its methods and conclusions. The implications span epistemological limits, methodological adjustments, and practical applications across diverse contexts.

Epistemological Limits

Science's claim to universal truth would be jeopardized, reducing it to a context-specific tool rather than an absolute arbiter. The implication would be that knowledge is contingent on perspective. For example, if uniformity of nature fails in extreme conditions, such as quantum singularities, physics models may mispredict black hole behavior, requiring new frameworks.

Methodological Adjustments

Science would need to incorporate contextual qualifiers, blending empirical methods with alternative approaches, such as phenomenology, and indigenous knowledge, reflecting emergent adaptation. If objectivity of observation varies culturally, neuroscience studies might adjust for observer bias, using cross-cultural validation.

Practical Applications

Technologies and policies based on these assumptions could fail in untested contexts, demanding flexible, pluralistic strategies. If external reality is context-dependent, climate models might overestimate CO2 impacts in non-Western ecosystems, necessitating localized adaptations.

If any of science's non-falsifiable metaphysical assumptions are contextually untrue, it risks dogmatism, necessitating humility and pluralism. Science could adopt a hybrid approach, integrating falsifiable data with non-falsifiable contextual insights. This would obviously not be the end of the world for science; it would simply use its cybernetic self-correction to revise its predictions, methods, and worldview.

Down the rabbit hole

If metaphysical assumptions cannot be validated empirically because they are not falsifiable, but they can be validated by the truth criteria of pragmatism, we have now fallen down the rabbit hole and entered the Wonderland of values. Last time I checked, “good” and “bad” were values. For example, “Who decides what is vague and what is not? And how do you do that?” Is vagueness something objective that you can empirically measure or is it a value judgment? To make vagueness empirically measurable there has to be agreement on what constitutes vagueness. Do we think we are going to get agreement on that? Who decides what is universalizing and whether universalizing is a “good” or “bad” thing? Who gets to decide who is dismissing what? I can imagine metaphysicians confidently throwing that claim back at skeptics.

On the other side of the ledger, “good” metaphysics are transparent. I have already expressed my skepticism regarding the interest or ability of both metaphysicians and empiricists to surface their metaphysical assumptions. Therefore, just who can claim the mantle of transparency? Regarding good metaphysics being empirical, if metaphysical assumptions are by definition non-falsifiable, how can they be empirical? Regarding good metaphysics being revisable, I can hear Wilber arguing that he has revised his metaphysics over the years, and indeed he has.

Most basically, who gets to decide what is useful and what is not? This is why the pragmatic determination of truth, while important, boils down to a determination of value, not truth.

Our saving grace here is that values are not a hodge-podge of egalitarianism and pluralism. Values are the foundation of both morality and law. Values may not be falsifiable, but like Justice Stewart, we know porn when we see it.

Personally, I have criteria by which I make value judgments, which in turn determine whether my metaphysics are “good” or “bad.” My contention is that we all do the same, whether we have surfaced those criteria or not. The soundness of those value judgments underlie our determinations of what makes a metaphysics—or empirical claim—valid.

Fundamentally, we all ask, “Is this theory, opinion, or behavior consistent with my worldview, which supports my identity, or does it threaten it?” If it does neither, or we don't know or care, then we may be open to new information.

In our relationships with information and others, what are we attempting to determine? My underlying value assumptions include, “Is there respect?” “Is there reciprocity?” “Is there trustworthiness?” “Is there empathy?”

There are many normal circumstances where some or most of these criteria are irrelevant or unimportant. For instance, when you check out at the market, you don't care so much about empathy and respect, but if you are like me you care a great deal about trustworthiness and reciprocity in the exchange of money for goods. We get to define our values in our interpersonal relationships unless we have an incentive, like a boss or a spouse, to allow them to define our values for us. However, with law, there is a codification regarding what constitutes respect, reciprocity, and trustworthiness. Justice is about the vague, subjective arena of values, and truth typically gets sidelined in the process.

However, if Wilber passes value sniff tests for someone, whatever their values may be, then they are unlikely to care how bad his metaphysics are. They won't care much whether his arguments make sense or not. They are inspirational! They are poetic! They are mythical! They sound scientific! Similarly, if a scientist doesn't pass those sniff tests for us, then we are unlikely to accept his findings, regardless of his credentials or the sophistication of his studies. If you don't conclude I am arguing in good faith, why should you believe anything I say?

In conclusion…

Empiricism, logic, and reason are methods we can use to help us make value judgments. Are they being used in the service of a hidden or undisclosed metaphysic or not? I happen to believe that they are very good methods and I also subscribe to Wilber's Pre/Trans Fallacy: If I don't use empiricism, logic, and reason or can't validate my position with them, then my position is probably prepersonal, regardless of whether my third eye is open or not.

And this brings us to a very disturbing conclusion: because metaphysical assumptions underlie our methods and worldviews and metaphysical assumptions are not falsifiable, we are almost certainly overestimating our knowledge, competence, and control. This overestimation is reinforced by the stability of everyday life. Our knowledge, competence, and control work until they don't. That is an argument for humility; it's not an argument to stop using value judgments to determine whether to trust the Mad Hatter or the White Rabbit, if we find we have fallen down the rabbit hole into value Wonderland. It still matters what is good metaphysics and what is not. I'll drink to that.