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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

When the Map Meets the Territory, and Still Doesn't Become the Territory

A Reply to John Abramson on Quantum Reality, No-Go Theorems, and the Two-Level Leap

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

John Abramson's latest response is a welcome improvement over the earlier exchange because he has now considerably narrowed the disagreement. More importantly, he makes two concessions that are genuinely significant. He acknowledges that his original five quantum examples were accommodations rather than predictions, and he explicitly admits that the quantum no-go theorems do not, by themselves, establish his preferred “two-level” ontology. Those concessions matter because they remove two possible sources of confusion. The question is no longer whether quantum mechanics is strange, whether classical intuitions fail, or whether Abramson's framework can be used to reinterpret familiar quantum puzzles. The question is much more precise: does anything in quantum physics actually require us to postulate two fundamentally different levels of reality?

I remain unconvinced. In fact, I think Abramson's own formulation shows rather clearly where the remaining problem lies.

No-Go Theorems Close Doors—They Do Not Specify the Room Beyond

Abramson invokes Kochen-Specker, Bell and related no-go results to establish that there is no consistent way of assigning jointly definite, locally resident values to all physical quantities. Fine. This is an important and profound result. But it is important to be precise about what such theorems actually accomplish. A no-go theorem tells us that certain assumptions cannot simultaneously be maintained. It does not, by itself, tell us what ontology must replace them. It closes doors; it does not necessarily tell us what lies beyond the doors.

Bell's theorem, for example, does not prove Copenhagen, Everett, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse, relational quantum mechanics, or any other particular interpretation. Kochen-Specker does not prove them either. These results constrain the space of possible theories. They demonstrate that certain classical assumptions cannot all survive together. That is already revolutionary enough. But moving from “the classical picture is inadequate” to “therefore reality consists of two ontological levels” requires an additional argument.

And Abramson now explicitly acknowledges this. He writes that the theorems “force non-classicality” but do not “by themselves, force the two-level description over ‘one non-classical whole.'” I agree completely. That sentence should really be regarded as the central proposition around which the entire debate now turns.

PBR Does Not Establish Abramson's Two-Level Ontology

The same problem appears with the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem. Abramson argues that PBR establishes that the quantum state must be regarded as a feature of reality rather than merely as a state of knowledge. PBR is indeed an important result in the foundations of quantum mechanics. But even granting its strongest ontological interpretation, it does not establish the particular ontology Abramson wants.

The question “Is the quantum state real?” is itself insufficiently precise. What kind of reality are we talking about? Is the quantum state a physical field? An object? A property? A relation? A disposition? A law-like structure? Something existing in configuration space? Something fundamentally non-spatial? Different interpretations of quantum mechanics answer these questions differently.

Even if we grant Abramson the claim that the quantum state is ontologically real, we still have not arrived at the conclusion that reality therefore has two levels. That is the crucial logical gap.

“Real” Does Not Mean “A Second Realm”

Abramson's argument seems to assume that there are only two alternatives. Either reality consists of definite local facts, or there must be a second level containing a real, non-spatial global quantum object. But why should these be the only possibilities?

There is an obvious third option: reality itself may simply be fundamentally non-classical.

That is not a philosophical evasion. It is precisely the starting point of much of the foundational work surrounding quantum mechanics. If the quantum world cannot be understood in classical terms, we should be cautious about assuming that the categories of “level,” “realm,” “object,” “inside” and “outside” retain their classical meanings at the fundamental level.

This is where Abramson's characterization of the “one strange world” alternative as merely an unspecified placeholder becomes misleading. I am not proposing an alternative physical theory called “one strange world.” I am resisting the claim that the failure of classical ontology automatically establishes a particular replacement ontology.

If the quantum state is real but does not fit comfortably into the classical conception of a local object, perhaps the appropriate conclusion is simply that our conception of physical reality has to be revised. We should not prematurely turn that revision into a second cosmic realm.

The Map-Territory Analogy Cuts Both Ways

There is an important irony in Abramson's title, “Where the Map Must Meet the Territory.” I agree with the underlying principle. Scientific descriptions ultimately have to answer to reality. But it does not follow that every mathematically indispensable component of a scientific description must therefore be an independently existing object in the territory.

Consider temperature. Temperature is not merely arbitrary bookkeeping. It is a real, measurable and scientifically indispensable property. Yet its ontological status is not identical to that of an individual molecule. It is a higher-level property realized by an underlying physical system. Likewise, the center of mass of a physical system can be mathematically indispensable and experimentally measurable without being a separate physical object sitting somewhere in space.

The point is not that the quantum state is “merely information.” The point is that there are more ontological possibilities than the simple opposition between “mere bookkeeping” and “a second realm of reality.” Abramson's argument moves too rapidly between these categories.

The map must meet the territory, certainly. But the fact that the map contains a mathematically indispensable structure does not tell us, without further argument, what ontological category that structure belongs to.

Gran Sasso Falsified a Collapse Model—not Abramson's Rivals

The Gran Sasso experiment illustrates the problem particularly well. Abramson points out that the experiment by Donadi and colleagues ruled out the radiation predicted by the parameter-free Diósi-Penrose collapse model, while his own framework predicts no such radiation. He is careful to admit that he cannot claim to have predicted the Gran Sasso result in advance. That honesty is welcome.

But it also means that the experiment cannot reasonably be presented as empirical confirmation of his two-level framework.

The null result is entirely compatible with standard quantum mechanics without objective collapse. It is compatible with Everettian quantum mechanics. It is compatible with numerous other non-collapse approaches. What Gran Sasso did was constrain a particular collapse model. It did not discriminate in favor of Abramson's ontology.

This distinction is essential. A theory surviving an experiment that falsifies a rival theory is not the same as a theory making a distinctive successful prediction. If Abramson's framework says that there will be no collapse radiation, while standard quantum mechanics and several competing interpretations say exactly the same thing, then the absence of radiation does not constitute evidence specifically for Abramson's framework. It simply places Abramson in the large class of theories that do not predict that radiation.

The Everett Test Is More Interesting

The second experimental proposal is therefore much more interesting. Abramson argues that, on his interpretation, genuine registration is a real completed event. Once such a registration has occurred, interference across it can never be restored. Everett, by contrast, maintains unitary evolution and therefore allows the possibility, in principle, of reversing a measurement under sufficiently controlled conditions.

Now we have something potentially substantive. Here, at least, Abramson is proposing a difference between physical possibilities rather than merely redescribing established facts.

But there is a very serious problem, and Abramson himself recognizes it.

What exactly counts as a “genuine registration”?

That is not a minor technical detail. It is the entire test.

If an experiment successfully restores interference after what we thought was a measurement, Abramson cannot simply reply that the measurement was not “genuine.” That would make the theory immune to falsification. He explicitly acknowledges this danger, saying that such a move would be the very immunizing strategy I have criticized. He therefore promises that the registration criterion will be specified in advance.

Good. But until that criterion actually exists, the proposed empirical distinction remains incomplete.

Decoherence Is Not Fundamental Collapse

This issue becomes especially important because ordinary quantum theory already gives us a powerful account of why measurements become effectively irreversible. Through decoherence, macroscopic systems become entangled with enormous numbers of environmental degrees of freedom, making interference extraordinarily difficult to recover in ordinary circumstances.

But “effectively irreversible” and “fundamentally irreversible” are not the same proposition.

That distinction is precisely where interpretations of quantum mechanics begin to diverge. Everettian quantum mechanics does not claim that reversing a macroscopic measurement would be easy, practical, or technologically foreseeable. It claims that the underlying quantum dynamics remain unitary. Objective-collapse theories, by contrast, introduce an actual physical modification of that dynamics.

Abramson appears to occupy an intermediate position: quantum evolution is maintained until a genuine registration occurs, at which point a real and irreversible transition takes place, but that transition is not itself a mechanism operating within spacetime.

That is an interesting proposal. But it immediately generates the decisive question: what physical or mathematical criterion determines when the transition occurs?

Is it size? Complexity? Entanglement? Information amplification? Environmental decoherence? Some threshold of irreversibility? A particular physical interaction? Conscious observation? Or something else entirely?

Until that criterion is specified, “registration” risks becoming a new name for the very measurement problem that the framework is supposed to solve.

The Missing Criterion Is the Theory's Central Problem

Abramson calls the registration criterion “the framework's central research task.” I would put the point even more strongly. It is not merely the framework's next research task. It is the condition for the framework becoming a scientific theory rather than remaining a philosophical interpretation.

This distinction is important because I have no objection to interpretations as such. Interpretations of quantum mechanics are legitimate philosophical and conceptual enterprises. They can clarify what the formalism might mean, expose hidden assumptions, and suggest new theoretical directions. The problem arises when an interpretation's preferred metaphysical vocabulary is presented as though it had already been established by the physics.

At present, Abramson has an ontology and a promise of a future criterion. What he does not yet have is the criterion itself.

That is precisely where the scientific burden lies.

“One Strange World” Is Not a Theory—and Neither Is “Two Levels” Yet

Abramson argues that my “one strange world” alternative must be specified at the same level of detail as his proposal. I think this reverses the burden of proof.

I am not proposing a new physical theory. I am questioning an inference from established physics to a particular metaphysical ontology. If Abramson wants to introduce an additional level of reality, he has to show why the physics requires it.

The fact that an alternative resembles an existing interpretation is not a defect. If Everett, Bohmian mechanics, relational approaches, QBism, objective-collapse theories and other interpretations demonstrate that the same formalism admits multiple ontological readings, that is evidence for a fundamental point: the formalism does not uniquely determine its metaphysics.

That is precisely the difficulty Abramson has to overcome.

He must show not merely that his two-level ontology is coherent or possible, but that it is required—or at least strongly preferred—by something beyond his own interpretive commitments.

Ontological Economy Does Not Mean Classical Realism

Abramson characterizes my position as an appeal to ontological economy. That is fair, but it needs clarification.

Ontological economy does not mean that reality must remain classical. I am perfectly willing to accept that reality is profoundly non-classical. I am perfectly willing to accept that quantum mechanics forces us to abandon naive notions of locality, separability, predetermined values and perhaps even ordinary spatial ontology.

Ontological economy simply says that we should not multiply fundamental entities or levels of reality beyond what the evidence requires.

The burden therefore lies with the person introducing the additional level.

And this is where Abramson's argument has become much clearer. He is no longer claiming that Bell, Kochen-Specker or PBR straightforwardly prove his ontology. He now acknowledges that an additional premise is required: namely, that a mathematically indispensable global object that cannot be reduced to definite local facts should be treated as real and as belonging to its own level.

But that is precisely the premise I dispute.

What Would Actually Change My Mind?

Abramson's position has now become sufficiently clear that the burden of proof can be stated very precisely.

First, he needs to identify what theorem or experimentally established fact requires two ontological levels rather than merely a non-classical ontology.

Second, he needs to formulate the registration criterion in advance, in mathematically or operationally precise terms.

Third, he needs to demonstrate that the criterion generates an experimentally distinguishable consequence not already shared by standard unitary quantum mechanics or an existing interpretation.

If he succeeds, the debate changes character. We would no longer be discussing an attractive metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics. We would have a concrete physical proposal that can be tested.

Until then, however, I think Abramson's own concessions point to the appropriate conclusion. The no-go theorems establish that classical ontology is inadequate. PBR constrains certain ways of treating the quantum state as merely epistemic. The Gran Sasso experiment constrains particular collapse theories. None of these results establishes a two-level ontology.

The only genuinely discriminating proposal currently on the table is the claim that a genuine registration creates a fundamentally irreversible boundary that cannot subsequently be crossed by restoring interference. That could become a real scientific prediction. But only after “genuine registration” ceases to be a philosophical label and becomes a precisely specified physical condition.

The Map Has Become More Detailed—but the Territory Has Not Yet Acquired a Second Level

Abramson has done something useful in narrowing the disagreement. We are no longer arguing about whether quantum mechanics is strange. It is. We are no longer arguing about whether the classical picture survives intact. It does not. We are no longer arguing about whether his original five examples were predictions. He has conceded that they were not.

The remaining question is remarkably simple:

What empirical or mathematical fact requires a two-level ontology?

The no-go theorems do not.

PBR does not.

The Gran Sasso experiment does not.

The absence of collapse radiation does not.

What remains is the proposed irreversibility of genuine registration.

That could be the decisive issue. I am quite happy to wait for the promised criterion.

But until that criterion exists, the map has certainly become more elaborate.

It has not yet forced us to conclude that the territory contains two worlds.