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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

Power, War, and the Fate of Small Nations

From Yalta to the Present

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

History reveals a persistent pattern: when great powers wage war or negotiate peace, the resulting political order is rarely shaped by the wishes of smaller nations. Instead, borders, alliances, and security frameworks are forged at diplomatic tables where only the most powerful actors sit. The world has witnessed this dynamic repeatedly—in Vienna after Napoleon, at Versailles after World War I, and most famously at Yalta in 1945, where Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin divided Europe into spheres of influence that remained frozen for nearly half a century.

The Yalta settlement delivered stability but denied self-determination to millions. For states such as Poland, the Baltic nations, Hungary, East Germany, and others, Yalta became synonymous with abandonment—proof that small nations are bargaining chips in the logic of geopolitics.

Today, with Russia's war in Ukraine and escalating U.S.-Russia rivalry, the question inevitably arises: Could there be a “Yalta II”—a negotiated settlement between Washington and Moscow that determines the fate of Ukraine and neighboring states? And if so, would such an arrangement be an unacceptable moral failure—or a lesser evil compared to a direct clash between nuclear powers?

Why Great Powers Shape Post-War Orders

The tendency of great powers to dictate global outcomes is not ideological—it is structural. Several forces drive this:

Power Asymmetry: Military and economic might enable large states to enforce preferred outcomes.

Risk Management: Direct great-power confrontation is dangerous; negotiated dominance is safer.

Spheres of Influence: Major powers seek buffers—Russia in Eastern Europe, the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, China in East Asia.

Cost Avoidance: Total victory is rarely worth the human and economic price; bargaining is cheaper.

The international system has never operated like a democracy. Its architecture is based on power, not fairness.

Could a “Yalta II” Happen? A Deeper Analysis

A modern Yalta would not be a triumphant wartime conference but a pragmatic negotiation shaped by exhaustion, shifting power balances, and nuclear risk.

A new settlement—formal or tacit—would likely center on three pillars:

Territorial arrangements: changes to borders, recognition or acceptance of de facto control.

Security architecture: limits on NATO expansion, demilitarized zones, or neutrality frameworks.

Economic conditions: sanctions relief, energy agreements, or reconstruction financing.

Unlike in 1945, today's global environment is multipolar. China is now a silent third chair. Any settlement involving Russia inherently intersects with Beijing's interests—energy routes, Eurasian stability, and the Russia-China partnership. This makes the scenario not purely bilateral: a modern Yalta would resemble a triangular negotiation shaped by cooperation and rivalry among the U.S., Russia, and China.

The Role of Nuclear Deterrence

A defining difference between 1945 and now is the presence of nuclear parity. Russia's nuclear doctrine, including implicit threats and deployments in Belarus, has created psychological pressure: escalation is conceivable, unintended or otherwise. Western leaders may eventually determine that preventing the unthinkable—nuclear confrontation—outweighs defending every principle or parcel of land.

In this sense, a Yalta II might emerge not from ambition but from fear of catastrophe.

Domestic Fatigue and Political Will

War fatigue also matters. Democracies operate with electoral cycles and public opinion; autocracies do not. Western political unity is contingent, and support for Ukraine—military, financial, and moral—is increasingly contested. Russia, having reorganized its economy and society toward long-term conflict, appears more able to endure a drawn-out war.

If Western support weakens, Ukraine may find itself negotiating from a position it did not choose.

Possible Forms of Settlement

A Yalta II could take several shapes:

Each outcome balances power considerations, not justice.

Is This Always a Bad Thing?

Morally, such settlements are hard to defend. They violate sovereignty and the right of nations to determine their own fates. For populations caught in the middle, diplomacy becomes a form of abandonment.

Yet there is a grim counterargument: sometimes these arrangements prevent something far worse.

Yalta froze Europe into blocs and condemned millions to authoritarian rule, but it also prevented a U.S.-Soviet war. During the Cold War, informal respect for spheres of influence helped avoid nuclear escalation.

The dilemma is stark:

The most just outcome—full sovereignty for all nations—is often the least stable when it collides with great-power interests.

Conclusion: Between Ideal and Reality

The question is not simply whether a Yalta II should happen. It is whether the logic of power makes it likely.

History suggests great powers eventually negotiate outcomes when prolonged conflict threatens their interests. Whether Ukraine remains a sovereign actor in such a settlement—or becomes the subject of geopolitical bargaining—will depend less on international law and more on endurance, alliances, and military realities.

The tragedy is that the international order remains torn between justice and stability—between the rights of nations and the fears of empires.

What remains uncertain is whether humanity is repeating old patterns—or finally learning how to transcend them.