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Frank Visser, graduated as a psychologist of culture and religion, founded IntegralWorld in 1997. He worked as production manager for various publishing houses and as service manager for various internet companies and lives in Amsterdam. Books: Ken Wilber: Thought as Passion (SUNY, 2003), and The Corona Conspiracy: Combatting Disinformation about the Coronavirus (Kindle, 2020).

Beyond 'Imperialism' or 'Security'

Why Russia Wants Eastern and Southern Ukraine

Frank Visser / ChatGPT

A False Choice

The debate over Russia's objectives in Ukraine is often framed as a simple choice. Either Russia is pursuing a traditional imperial conquest, or it is responding to legitimate security concerns about NATO expansion. Reality is considerably more complex. States almost never act from a single motive. Strategic, historical, political, economic, and ideological factors reinforce one another.

Understanding Russia's objectives requires moving beyond slogans. Security concerns undoubtedly exist. So do imperial ambitions. The question is not which explanation is entirely correct, but how much weight each deserves.

The war itself has also transformed Russia's strategic calculations. Objectives that may have been secondary in 2022 have become central by 2026.

The Security Argument

Russia has consistently argued that NATO's eastward expansion threatens its national security. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded from Central Europe to Russia's immediate borders.

From Moscow's perspective, Ukraine joining NATO would eliminate the strategic buffer that historically protected Russia from invasion. Russian military planners think in terms of geography. Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler—all invaded across the North European Plain. Distance remains a military asset.

Whether Western governments intended aggression is almost beside the point. Security policy is driven by capabilities rather than intentions. Governments change; military infrastructure can remain.

This concern is not entirely irrational. Great powers have historically resisted hostile military alliances near their borders. The United States reacted similarly during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Yet security concerns alone cannot explain everything that followed.

The Limits of the NATO Explanation

Several facts complicate the security narrative.

Finland joined NATO in 2023, more than doubling Russia's direct border with the alliance. Sweden soon followed. Instead of preventing NATO expansion, the invasion dramatically accelerated it.

Moreover, NATO already bordered Russia through Norway, the Baltic states, and Poland's connection to Kaliningrad.

If preventing NATO borders were the overriding objective, the invasion appears strategically counterproductive.

The argument also assumes that Ukraine would inevitably host offensive NATO forces. Before 2022, several NATO members were themselves reluctant to offer Ukraine membership precisely because doing so risked confrontation with Russia.

Why the Donbas Matters

The Donbas offers several concrete military and economic advantages.

It contains extensive industrial infrastructure, energy resources, transportation networks, and heavy industry developed during the Soviet era.

Control of the Donbas also shortens defensive lines and removes what Russia sees as a hostile military presence close to its own territory.

After eight years of conflict between Kyiv and Russian-backed separatists, Moscow also claimed a political obligation to protect Russian-speaking populations. Whether one accepts this justification or not, it became central to Russia's domestic narrative.

Once Russia formally annexed the territories, retreat became politically far more difficult. Any withdrawal could now be portrayed internally as surrendering "Russian territory."

Why Southern Ukraine Is Even More Important

If the Donbas provides industrial value, southern Ukraine provides strategic geography.

Control of the coastline creates a continuous land bridge from Russia to Crimea.

It secures water supplies through the North Crimean Canal, whose closure after 2014 created serious problems for Crimea.

It largely transforms the Sea of Azov into a Russian-controlled body of water.

It places pressure on Ukraine's remaining access to the Black Sea.

Should Russia ever capture Odesa, Ukraine would become effectively landlocked—a catastrophic economic outcome for Kyiv.

These are enduring strategic advantages independent of NATO.

Crimea Changed Everything

Crimea occupies a unique place in Russian military planning.

The headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol provides Russia's principal naval access to the Mediterranean.

Following the 2014 annexation, protecting Crimea became inseparable from protecting Russia's broader strategic position.

Much of southern Ukraine serves as a defensive buffer around Crimea itself.

This partly explains Russia's determination to retain occupied territories even after failing to overthrow the Ukrainian government.

Ukraine Changed the Military Balance

Ironically, many Russian assumptions have been undermined by the war.

Ukraine, despite possessing only a limited conventional navy after 2014, has inflicted severe damage on Russia's Black Sea Fleet using anti-ship missiles, naval drones, special operations, and long-range precision strikes.

Russian warships have increasingly relocated away from Sevastopol.

Ukraine has also demonstrated an ability to strike airfields, logistics hubs, ammunition depots, bridges, command centers, and military industries hundreds of kilometers inside Russia.

Long-range drones have become a persistent feature of the conflict.

These developments challenge traditional notions of strategic depth.

Territorial buffers matter less when inexpensive drones and precision missiles can travel hundreds or thousands of kilometers.

Geography Still Matters—but Less Than Before

Russia traditionally relied upon strategic depth.

Modern warfare reduces—but does not eliminate—the value of geography.

Ground forces still require space to maneuver.

Supply lines still matter.

Artillery still depends upon positioning.

Occupation still creates defensive belts.

However, technology increasingly allows smaller powers to threaten much larger ones without occupying territory.

The Ukraine war may become a case study showing that twenty-first-century security depends as much upon intelligence, drones, satellites, electronic warfare, and air defense as upon geographical buffers.

The Political Logic of Annexation

Annexation also serves domestic political purposes.

By incorporating occupied territories into the Russian constitution, the Kremlin raises the political cost of compromise.

Any future negotiations become framed not as giving away conquered land but as surrendering part of Russia itself.

This strengthens domestic legitimacy while making diplomatic settlements considerably harder.

Is This Imperialism?

Many historians describe Russia's objectives as neo-imperial.

President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly questioned the historical legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state and emphasized the unity of Russians and Ukrainians.

Such rhetoric extends beyond conventional security concerns.

Empires typically seek influence over neighboring states rather than merely defensive borders.

The initial 2022 attempt to seize Kyiv and replace Ukraine's government strongly suggests ambitions extending well beyond the Donbas.

If Russia's only concern had been protecting separatist regions, the opening phase of the invasion would likely have looked very different.

Security and Imperial Ambition Can Coexist

The strongest explanation combines both perspectives.

Russia almost certainly has genuine security concerns about NATO's military expansion.

At the same time, the Kremlin also seeks to restore influence over territories it regards as historically, culturally, and strategically inseparable from Russia.

These motives reinforce one another rather than compete.

Security concerns make territorial expansion appear necessary.

Territorial expansion, in turn, reflects broader historical and ideological ambitions.

The Strategic Paradox

The greatest irony is that the war has undermined several of Russia's original objectives.

Ukraine is now more militarily capable than before 2022.

NATO has expanded rather than contracted.

European defense spending has risen sharply.

Finland and Sweden abandoned decades of military non-alignment.

The Black Sea Fleet has suffered unprecedented losses against an opponent with virtually no traditional navy.

Long-range drones have erased much of the protection once provided by geography.

Russia may ultimately retain significant territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. Yet those territorial gains could come alongside a permanently strengthened NATO, a heavily armed Ukraine, and a transformed European security architecture.

The conflict therefore illustrates an enduring truth of international politics: wars launched to improve security often produce precisely the insecurity they were intended to prevent.