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Integral World: Exploring Theories of Everything
An independent forum for a critical discussion of the integral philosophy of Ken Wilber
SEE MORE ESSAYS WRITTEN BY ANDY SMITH
DIFFERENT VIEWS
Intersubjectivity, Interobjectivity
and the Collapse of the Four-Quadrant
Model
A recent review of Ken Wilber's work published by Christian deQuincey in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies (deQuincey 2000) has evoked a detailed
response in defense of Wilber by the latter himself (Wilber 2001) and by
Sean Hargens (2001). Hargens's article is a very thorough discussion of
Wilber's thinking on intersubjectivity, all the more valuable because as,
Hargens explains to us, Wilber's treatment of this subject is highly
scattered throughout a number of his books (much like the distributed nature
of intersubjectivity itself, one is tempted to say). Just to hunt down the
dozens of passages and sections in which Wilber discusses this subject,
explaining the context of each, is a formidable task, and enough to earn
Hargens our gratitude. But Hargens, it seems to me, has gone beyond simply
organizing Wilber’s writings on this issue and begun unpacking, interpreting
or clarifying these claims, creating a very original contribution to the
discussion of intersubjectivity in his own right.
Nevertheless, Hargens's interpretation of Wilber is made while remaining
faithfully within the perspective of Wilber’s four quadrant model, and thus
is open to criticisms based on weaknesses in this model. As many visitors to
this site will be aware, I have proposed an alternative, single-scale model
of holarchy (Smith 2000), and spent some time and effort contrasting it with
the four-quadrant model (Smith 2001a-h). The issue of intersubjectivity is a
central one in our differences, because one of my major criticisms of the
Wilber model is that it views societies of holons as existing on the same
level as their individual members (but in a different quadrant). In
contrast, I have insisted, based on a large amount of evidence as well as
logical arguments (see, e.g., Smith 2001a, c, h), that societies must be
understood as holarchically higher than their members. Since I take
intersubjectivity to be the glue or the matrix holding societies together,
it should come as no surprise that this concept is viewed a little
differently from the perspective of my model from the way Wilber, Hargens
and even deQuincey view it.
I want to flesh out some of these differences here. Though I have discussed
my views on intersubjectivity before, particularly in a recent exchange with
Gerry Goddard (Smith 2001b,f,h), Sean Hargens’s clear and detailed
discussion of this issue has opened up new areas that need to be addressed
by my model. Specifically, I will argue here that
- there is both some
confusion (or at the very least vagueness) as well as inconsistency in the
way intersubjectivity fits into the four quadrant model, with respect to its
relationship to social interiors and to what Wilber calls the "social
dimension" of holons;
- intersubjectivity is not as universal as Wilber and
Hargens make it out to be, i.e., it does not shape or "create" all interior
experience;
- there is an important distinction to be made, which I believe
Wilber/Hargens fail to make, between interpretation and intersubjectivity;
and
- intersubjectivity, as understood not only by Wilber/Hargens but by
postmodern thought in general, clearly is a higher-order phenomenon or
process than individual experience, rather than simply a different-quadrant
aspect of the latter.
Taken together, these points emphasize that while
Wilber’s treatment of intersubjectivity has enriched our understanding of
our own level of existence, concepts valid at this level can't be
uncritically applied to other levels. I believe that the Wilber
four-quadrant model contributes significantly to this problem, and the paper
closes by showing, using Wilber's own rules, why this model fails as an
adequate representation of holarchy.
What is intersubjectivity?
Let’s begin with a description of intersubjectivity, in Hargen’s (or
Wilber’s) own words. They variously describe it as a "structure" or "space"
or "matrix" or "background" which is "ontologically prior" to individual
subjectivities. It clearly plays a vital role, in their view, in the shaping
of consciousness or interiority, for "all direct experience (subjectivity)
takes place in intersubjective structures." Indeed, "these structures
constitute the subject before they [it?] even interact[s] with another
subject [and] determine what can and cannot be experienced."
Though I accept the notion of intersubjectivity and its importance in
shaping our experience, I believe the above account of it raises some
problems for the four quadrant model. The problems begin, for me, when I try
to understand a little more precisely the relationship between
intersubjectivity, on the one hand, and consciousness or interiority, on the
other. Hargens makes it abundantly clear that intersubjectivity is located
in the lower left quadrant of the Wilber model, the social interior aspect
of a holon. If intersubjectivity is on the left side of the quadrant model,
it should represent some kind of interior experience or consciousness. That
is, it should be not simply a "background" for experience, but some kind of
experience itself. Wilber has in fact described the social interior as a
"distributed consciousness". This raises two questions for me: first, who or
what is experiencing this consciousness? And second, what is the
relationship of this consciousness to the intersubjective structure or
matrix?
With regard to who is experiencing the distributed consciousness, it clearly
can’t be any of the individual holons, because their experience is supposed
to be represented by the upper left quadrant, and also because, as Hargens
emphasizes, this intersubjective space or background can’t be experienced by
individuals.[1] It would seem, therefore, that there must be a group or
collective consciousness. However Hargens, at least, implies that he doesn’t
see it this way. Thus he questions that two intersubjectively interacting
holons have a self, and emphasizes that our understanding of
intersubjectivity "must not confine itself to a subject’s ‘sense of self’."
Granted that self and consciousness do not mean exactly the same thing, I
take this to mean that Hargens does not view socially interacting holons,
including whole societies in the limit, as having their own consciousness,
in the sense that they have the experience of being a unified self. This is
consistent with Wilber's "distributed consciousness", which in fact sounds
very much to me like a simple sum of the individual interiorities—or maybe
not so simple, seeing as how these interiorities are constantly interacting
with each other. But in any case, the social interior does not seem to be
more than a sum of some kind of its individual interiors, and in fact, since
the social is according to Wilber no higher than the individual, I don’t see
how it could be any more than this. But if this is the case, how is it
different from all these individual interiorities? Why make the
individual/social distinction?
The quote of Hargens on self is also relevant to the second question, the
relationship of consciousness to intersubjective structures. Regardless of
whether or not he believes that social holons have their own consciousness,
Hargens seems to regard intersubjectivity as more than just consciousness..
When I say "more than", I don’t just mean that intersubjectivity extends
beyond the experience of any single individual consciousness, but that it
has this property of creating individual interiorities which our own
individual interiorities do not. I’m not really sure—I’m frankly guessing
here—but I think he regards these structures as some kind of field, perhaps
like those postulated by Sheldrake (1981). But in any case, I’m left with
considerable doubt as to how to understand both what these structures or
fields are, and the relationship they have to consciousness in the LL.
In addition to these problems, which may reflect to some extent my lack of
total familiarity with everything Wilber has written, there is another
problem associated with intersubjectivity which is not a matter of
insufficient specificity, but a fairly clear cut logical fallacy. According
to Wilber, the four quadrants represent different aspects or dimensions of a
holon. Thus every holon has an individual interior, but also a social
interior. Therefore, every holon has both an individual subjectivity and an
intersubjectivity. How can this be? For example, if my thoughts, feelings
and other experiences constitute my individual interiority (or perhaps more
precisely, if they constitute the individual interiority of some holon),
then what is the intersubjectivity of that holon? Intersubjectivity by
definition involves more than one holon. If I interact with you, there are
two holons involved, each of which has its own interiority or subjectivity,
but there is only one intersubjective space. Is that space the social
interior of both holons? Are we to say that while every holon has a unique
individual interior, they all (at a given level) share the same social
interior?
Clearly they don't. The individual interiorities are, according to Hargens,
constituted by the intersubjective space, or situated in it, but we can't
say that this space is just one aspect or dimension of both these holons.
It's something that extends beyond either of them, and to repeat, is
something they can't directly experience. So it seems very clear, to me at
least, that this intersubjective space can't be viewed as just a different
aspect or dimension of a holon.
What I'm getting at is a problem I have discussed at length earlier (Smith
2001f) [2]: there seems to be a conflation, in the Wilber model, between the
so-called social aspect of a holon, on the one hand, and intersubjectivity,
a space or structure that includes this holon along with many other holons.
Wilber is trying to put both of these quite different concepts into the same
quadrant (LL). This conflation is even clearer if we consider the exterior
half of the quadrant model. The exterior individual aspect of a holon is
represented by a particular organism, let's say a particular person, while
the exterior social is represented by a large group of individuals. To say
that this large group is just another aspect or dimension of the same holon
which in its individual aspect manifests as a particular individual makes no
sense.[3] Societies are organizations of individual holons, not just a
different way of looking at any any particular individual holon.
To summarize this section, I find that despite the very detailed discussion
of intersubjectivity provided by Hargens, including his articulation of many
different meanings of the term depending on context, there is still some
mystery as to exactly what it is. Is it just a form of social consciousness,
not experienceable by individuals, or is it something other than
consciousness? If the former, who is experiencing it? If the latter, what is
its relationship to consciousness? How does it create individual interiors?
And finally, whatever intersubjectivity may be, one thing it can’t be is the
social aspect of some holon. Therefore, while it may be located in the LL,
something is missing from the four quadrant model.
I have previously argued that my one-scale model of holarchy can handle the
problem of intersubjectivity more coherently, and in particular, avoids the
conflation problem (Smith 2001e). I won't review this diiscussion here, but
just make the point that in my view the key problem lies in Wilber's refusal
to recognize that that societies, and intersubjectivity, are higher than
their individual members or individual interioriites. I will return to this
point later.
The limits of intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity, according to Hargens/Wilber, is a universal phenomenon,
found in "every corner and level of the Kosmos", and "true... for all
sentient beings". Indeed, their view of intersubjectivity is so sweeping
that they define some types of it as involving relationships with objects,
as well as subjects. Thus in addition to I-I relationships, we have I-it and
it-it relationships. Furthermore, "both subjects and objects arise out of
[the intersubjective] field".
The notion of intersubjectivity, as Hargens points out, is not Wilber’s
creation, but a concept he has taken from the work of certain postmodern
philosophers. They in turn developed this idea through observing and
thinking about human beings and their social arrangements. A very long
philosophical tradition, which these thinkers, despite the radical way in
which many view them, strictly followed, is to consider philosophy only
relevant to, and derivable from, human beings. Thus until Ken Wilber came
along, I think it’s fair to say, the notion of intersubjectivity was applied
fairly seriously only to our species.
Wilber's four quadrant model has changed all this. It purports to represent
not simply human beings, but all forms of life, indeed, all forms of
existence. Applying so sweepingly an idea that was originally restricted
solely to our rather unique species can’t be done without a great deal of
care; it should be obvious that a notion that seems to have great relevance
to our experience might have much less relevance to the experience of other
forms of life. In fact, it’s fairly easy for us to overestimate the
importance of intersubjectivity, because as humans, we are, I would say, the
most intersubjective holons on earth. Intersubjectivity, obviously, implies
a group of interacting subjects, and so is very closely correlated with
social development. Humans are the most social animals on earth, so one
would expect that intersubjectivity would be an especially important feature
of our lives.
Hargens is not totally unaware of such criticism, for he makes passing
reference to dogs and wolves, noting that they, too, can behave
intersubjectively with themselves or with us. Canines, however, are fairly
evolved vertebrates which have some social organization (in the case of
dogs, of course, their social partners are us). When we consider other
animals, the situation is not as clear. Many lower vertebrates as well as
lower invertebrates live in the absence of significant social organization.
No organism, of course, lives totally independent of others. Some
interactions with other organisms are generally necessary, as in feeding,
mating and in self-defense. However, these interactions don’t necessarily
involve intersubjectivity as described by Hargens and Wilber. I doubt very
much that a crayfish, for example, has to enter into "empathic resonance" to
capture its prey—which is generally dead, anyway. It has to recognize its
prey, which definitely involves interpretation, an important part of
intersubjectivity according to Wilber and Hargens. But whatever the interior
experience of a crayfish and its prey, I don’t think they have much of a
relationship to each other. The crayfish sees an object, moving or still,
and acts according to the exterior form of that object. Anyone who doubts
this should be reminded that most lower organisms can be rather easily
fooled into thinking a lifeless object is their prey. (As a fisherman, I run
this kind of experiment all the time). In such a situation, there can be no
question at all of interacting interiorities.
Now Hargens and Wilber, as noted above, view even relationships with objects
as a manifestation of intersubjectivity. I think they would look at the
example of the crayfish and say that the crayfish and its prey, even if the
latter is lifeless, share a physical worldspace. I can agree that the
crayfish inhabits a worldspace, and that its prey is within that worldspace,
but the concept of "sharing" that worldspace with the prey is problematical
for me, if sharing is meant to involve interiorities. It’s not that I don’t
accept that the crayfish has an interiority and is therefore a subject in
this encounter. Where I disagree is that there is an intersubjectivity
involved—an interaction between two or more subjects.
Let’s back up a minute by going "back up"—to our level. When we have an
encounter with an object, is that a form of intersubjectivity? For example,
when I recognize a tree (or climb it, or pick fruit from it, or whatever),
is there a sense in which two or more interiors are interacting? I would say
yes, because even though the tree’s interior in this interaction is
irrelevant (regardless of how sentient it is, I’m treating it purely as an
exterior; I’m not trying to interpret its experience), my understanding of a
tree depends on a complex network of interactions with other subjects,
namely, other people in the society in which I live. So I agree with
Wilber/Hargens that my interaction with a tree, or a rock, or any for all
practical purposes lifeless form of matter is an intersubjective process.
Simply by looking at a tree, I am in a very real and profound sense entering
into an intersubjective structure (actually, Wilber and Hargens would
presumably say I was already in it. I can’t get out of it).
However, the case of the crayfish is a little different. When a crayfish
looks at an inanimate object, or even many animate ones that it is familiar
with, its perception is not determined by its membership in a complex
network of other crayfish. Crayfish, unlike people, don't communicate their
experiences with inanimate objects with one another, so when they encounter
such objects, their experience of them is not situated in an intersubjective
structure. This does not mean, to reiterate an earlier point that I will
expand on in the next section, that crayfish don’t interpret their
experiences. What it does mean, I contend, is that their interpretation is
free of the influences of the interpretations of other members of their
species. So I would deny that the crayfish is engaged in intersubjective
behavior, or that its interiority is shaped by an intersubjective structure
involving other members of its species, even while retaining the notion of
interpretation.[4]
In conclusion, then, while our own species is highly intersubjective, and we
are all immersed in what Hargens calls intersubjective structures, I think
there is good reason for questioning how universal these structures are.
Many lower organisms are largely free of them. We can perhaps argue over
whether they are totally free of them, but certainly they play a vastly
smaller role in the lives of these organisms than they play in our own. So
the earlier quote "all direct experience (subjectivity) takes place in
intersubjective structures" simply is not a universal rule, if we understand
these structures as Hargens/Wilber describe them (the reason for this
qualification will become clear in a following section). Whether this
assertion is even true for our own species is debateable, though I don’t
wish to argue that point here.[5] It certainly is not true for many other
species.
The Relationship of Intersubjectivity to Interobjectivity
What, then, is going on when a lower organism perceives or otherwise
interacts with something in the environment? Previously, I have
characterized such interactions as "interobjective" (Smith 2001f). If
intersubjectivity is a structure or space that defines individual
interiorities operating within that area, then interobjectivity plays
essentially the same role with individual exteriors. When organisms that
exhibit very little social interaction do interact with each other, or with
some other aspect of their envrronment, they do so largely through their
exteriors. This means not only that they are aware of and respond to largely
exteriors—the sight of another organism, for example—but that their
response is determined largely by their own exterior, such as hard-wired
programs in the nervous system, rather than their interior,. So even though
such organisms do have an interiority, and presumably some experience of the
interaction, this interaction does not involve the interiority in a
structure or space with other interiorities.
Indeed, my model of holarchy (Smith 2000) very explicitly tells us where we
find intersubjectivity, and where we find interobjectivity. The former is
most influential in the highest reaches—what I call stages—of any level.
In my model, every level is composed of several stages, which themselves
have a holarchical relationship to each other. That is, these stages are
like levels within levels, each including the one below it (though not truly
transcending it, but rather transforming it). These stages are formed by
social structure. Thus our level of existence, composed of all organisms,
begins with the lowest invertebrates, and includes not only higher
organisms, but various forms of human and animal societies, culminating in
the most complex modern societies.
The lowest invertebrates, generally having the least developed social
structure[6], have the least intersubjectivity and the most interobjectivity.
But on the level below them, which begins with cells and culminates in
organisms, we again encounter holons that live in a highly intersubjective
environment. These are cells that interact with one another within
organisms, and particularly the most extensively interacting of these
cells—those found in the brain. Neurons have exceedingly complex
interactions with one another, just as people do, and if one believe that
cells have interiority, as both Wilber and I do, these interactions are
highly intersubjective. That is, to whatever extent neurons experience
themselves and their environment, this interaction is shaped to a large
degree by their interactions. Conversely, the least intersubjective and most
interobjective cells are those that exist outside organisms, including
unicellular eukaryotes as well as prokaryotes like bacteria. As with lower
organisms, these largely autonomous cells interact with their environment
largely through their exteriors.
If we drop down to a still lower level, that of atoms and molecules, we find
an analogous situation. This level begins with atoms, proceeds through
increasingly complex forms of molecules, and culminates in cells. Again, the
highest stages of these levels are composd of holons, atoms, which have
entered into highly complex interactions with one another. And as with
neurons, and as with people, I contend that intersubjectivity is at a
maximum at these stages. Again, the least intersubjectivity and the most
interobjectivity is found at the bottom of the level, in atoms that exist
outside of cells, or very simple molecules composed of these atoms. The
behavior of molecules in a gas, for example, which are independent of each
other except when they collide, is highly interobjective. I'm not denying
that these atoms have interiors, but I am claiming that they are influenced
only slightly by the interactions occurring among the atoms.
So while I agree with Wilber/Hargens that intersubjectivity is found in all
levels of the Kosmos, it is not in every corner, that is, in every part of
those levels. It shares the holarchy with interobjectivity, with the latter
predominating at the bottom, which is to say the beginning, of any level,
while intersubjectivity becomes increasingly more important at higher stages
of the level.[7]
Intersubjectivity and Interpretation
A very important part of Wilber’s view of intersubjectivity, as articulated
by Hargens, is what he calls interpretation. The sense of this term is given
in this quote from Wilber:
It is not that there is experience on the one hand and contextual molding on
the other. Every experience is a context; every experience, even simple
sensory experience, is always already situated, is always already a context
I agree with this statement, but it becomes problematical to me when
interpretation and intersubjectivity are assumed to be inseparable. That
Hargens seems to make this assumption is suggested by a closely succeeding
quote: "the interior of a holon can only be accessed by interpretation."
Again, I have no quarrel with this point, either, but put together with the
first, it implies that all interpretation takes place within an
intersubjective structure. For us, this may possibly be true, though it’s
debateable. For other forms of life, I contend it isn’t true, unless we
understand intersubjectivity in a somewhat differ way.
Let’s go back to the example of a crayfish feeding on a piece of carrion.
It’s presumably having an interior experience as it uses its pincers to hold
its prize and tear off little chunks on which to feed. Does this experience
involve interpretation? Most certainly; the organism has to be able to
recognize something as food, and understand how to react to this food. In
fact, interpretation begins as soon as sensory stimulation contacts the
organism. In the case of vision, for example, as soon as light rays or
photons impact the retina and are transduced into nervous signals,
interpretation has occurred. When these signals enter the higher portions of
the creature’s nervous system—certain collections of nerve cells called
ganglia—further interpretation occurs.
None of this interpretation, however, requires intersubjectivity as I
believe Wilber and Hargens understand it. It’s not necessary that the
crayfish be connected in any way to other members of its species in order to
interpret its sensory stimuli.[8] The interpretive apparatus is all hard-wired
into its nervous system, and becomes available after the newborn organism
develops So there is no process by which one subject interacts with another.
At least there is no such process if we understand subjects to be the
interiorities of the organism. But intersubjectivity can be understand to
occur here in a different sense. In the previous section, I argued that
intersubjectivity is a phenomenon concentrated in the highest stages of any
level of existence. Because crayfish exist near the bottom of our level,
intersubjectivity—understood as involving the interiorities of these
organisms—does not play a very large role in their behavior. But as I also
pointed out, nerve cells are among the highest form of existence on the
level below ours, and for them, intersubjectivity is very important. So
there is an important sense in which intersubjectivity plays a role even in
lower organisms. Theexperience of the crayfish is shaped by intersubjective
events among neurons. But this is a very different kind of intersubjectivity
from that shaping the interiors of higher organisms like ourselves.
To conclude, interpretation does appear to be involved in all experience,
because all experience is preceded by some kind of manipulation of sensory
inputs. Furthermore, since all holons, at least down to atoms, are composed
of several levels of lower-order holons, there are always intersubjective
events occurring during the act of experience. However, I feel it’s critical
to make distinctions about the location of these events. In ourselves,
intersubjectivity occurs at the level of our interiority, as well as at
lower levels in our bodies. In lower organisms, intersubjectivity only
occurs, or largely occurs, in the lower levels, not in the interiority
associated with the organism. Furthermore, everything that has been said
about intersubjectivity also applies to interobjectivity. Since it prevails
in the lower stages of any level, it too plays an important role in the
events occurring in any multi-level holon such as an organism or cell.
The Relationship of Intersubjectivity to Subjectivity
As I noted earlier, intersubjectivity according to Hargens/Wilber is
ontologically prior to subjectivity. Hargens describes it as a "primary
matrix" which enables individual subjects "to create each other before the
interaction." Furthermore, it is invisible to its created products; they
can’t actually see the profound influence this structure has on their
existence, at least not "phenomenologically".
All of this makes the relationship of the intersubjective structure to the
individual interiority sound, to me, very much like that of a higher level
(or stage) to its component lower holons. An organism is ontologically prior
to its cells, in the sense that the roles and relationships of these cells
don’t come into existence until the organism emerges. Likewise with the
relationship of a cell to its atoms and molecules. Furthermore, organisms
and cells come into existence, like Wilber’s intersubjective structures,
through a process of "mutual recognition" of their component holons. And the
organism, as a higher form of existence, is invisible to the cell, and the
cell, we can presume, is invisible to atoms and molecules.
The foregoing analogies are couched in the terms of exteriors, but the
holarchical relationship of intersubjective structures to individual
interiors becomes clearer if we drop the analogies and consider interiors
directly. A protein molecule consists of a very large number of atoms, each
of them interacting with some of the others in various ways. In Wilber's
view, which I share, these atoms have some interiority or experience,
rudimentary and primitive compared to our own that it may be. I further
claim—and I think this is pretty obvious—that the nature or content of
this experience is closely related to the interactions the atoms have with
one another. Whenever such interactions occur, they affect the distribution
of electrons associated with the atoms, as well as the quality and the
amount of space that the atom exists in. So, for example, if a particular
atom in the protein has interactions with a great many other atoms, not
simply those physically adjacent to it, but also with some distant from it,
its interiority will be different from an atom that interacts only with
neighbors. Likewise, the interiority or experience of either of these atoms
will be different from that of a free atom, one not existing within a
molecule.
In other words, the intersubjective space is created, or at least to a large
degree shaped by, the structure of the molecule. This structure determines
the kind of possible relationships, and therefore interior experiences, that
each atom within it may have. The interiority of atoms within molecules, on
this view, is always more complex than that of atoms not within molecules,
precisely because they exist within a more complex intersubjective matrix.
And most important, this matrix, the molecule, is a higher form of
existence, a higher holon, than the component atoms. Precisely because it is
higher can it shape the experiences of its component members.
>From this account, it may seem that I'm equating an exterior structure, a
molecule, with an intersubjective space. Yes and no. When we look at
molecules, we see only their exteriors, because we are situated above them
in the holarchy. But when the atom "looks at" or experiences the molecule,
it is looking from below, and experiences an interior. So in my view, the
exterior structure and intersubjective space are both aspects of the
molecule, or if one prefers, of a holon that can appear as either a molecule
or an intersubjective space. Which is perceived depends on one's holarchical
relationship to it.
The same relationships are evident at the next level of existence, involving
cells and tissues. In the brain, individual neurons are connected in very
large networks, sustained by activity patterns that pass through some or all
of the neurons and reverberate throughout the loop. Each of the neurons in
such a network has an interiority, an experience, and this interiority is
determined by its relationships with other neurons, which is to say, by the
network as a whole. Again, the network is clearly a higher-order holon than
any of its individual members. It has properties that none of them have,
though the cells do share or participate in these properties. Thus the
ability of a particular neuron to recognize or discriminate a particular
pattern is a property that could only arise as a result of the existence of
a very complex, interconnected network of neurons. It could not realize this
property as an isolated cell. So like the complex molecule, this complex
multicellular holon is the intersubjective space within which the cells
exist.
In my holarchical model, societies have the same kind of relationship to
their individual members that complex tissues have to their component cells,
or complex molecules to their component atoms. Thus intersubjectivity as
understood Wilber and Hargens is just the higher level analog of the same
shaping process that occurs within these lower levels holons. We can't "see"
the intersubjectivity because we are below it, but a higher form of
existence could see its exterior aspect, just as we can see molecules or
tissues.
Note that I use the term "shaping"—a somewhat weaker view of the
relationship than the "creating" used by Wilber/Hargens—because in my
holarchy model, genuine experience or interiority is outside or beyond any
holon. Consciousness is considered an all-pervading phenomenon that is
experienced by different holons to a degree correlated with how high in the
holarchy they exist. It’s this feature that allows me to place not simply
social holons, but some of what Wilber calls interiority, on a single scale.
I don't claim that our experience within societies, nor that of cells within
tissues or atoms within molecules, is actually created by the societies.
However, the form that the experience takes is determined by the
relationships we have with one another within societies, and it is in this
important sense that interior relationships can be represented on the same
scale as exterior structures. To repeat, the exterior aspect of a holon is
what is seen when perceiving it from above; the interior aspect when
perceived from below.
Breaking Symmetry
Ken Wilber's four-quadrant model is a map of all of existence, from the
most basic forms of matter to the highest levels of consciousness. A key
feature of holarchy, I think he and Sean Hargens would agree, is the
presence of universal principles that apply not simply to one level but all
levels. Intersubjectivity as described by Wilber is supposed to be such a
principle, one that determines "what can and cannot be experienced". Yet
even the quite superficial examination of lower level experience offered
here indicates that intersubjectivity, though indeed present on all levels,
does not determine all the experience of all holons.
Wilber's view of intersubjectivity, I think, is representative of his views
on other holarchical principles, in that all of them are derived almost
exclusively from observations and reflection on phenomena on our own level
of existence. Though Wilber's work has tremendous relevance for philosophy
and psychology, to apply this work rather uncritically to lower levels is
problematical. I'm a great believer in analogies between higher and lower
levels of existence, but as I have discussed elsewhere (Smith 2000), there
are several variables one has to consider before comparing higher and lower
level phenomena. One of these variables, of great relevance to this
discussion, is where on their respective levels these phenomena are
situated. As noted earlier, in my model, every level has several stages.
Phenomena occurring on different stages of even the same level, let alone of
different levels, will generally lack certain analogies that phenomena on
equivalent stages of different levels exhibit.
Wilber apparently does not accept this, and it's worthwhile exploring here
why not. Though I have devoted much space to pointing out weaknesses in his
model (Smith 2000; 2001a, c, e-h), some people, apparently, feel that many
of the differences between my model and his are arbitrary, depending on how
terms are defined (Goddard 2001b; as if that were an adequate defense of the
Wilber model, justifying its exclusive use!). What I want to do here is show
that how we define levels is not arbitrary, that if we begin with
agreed-upon rules and agreed-upon evidence, Wilber's four-quadrant model is
fatally flawed. I will in fact follow Wilber's own rules and definitions to
the letter, step by step, and show exactly how it is inconsistent, and why.
Let's begin at the top, with the relationship of individuals to societies,
since that is such a key difference between our models. Most people evaluate
holarchical relationships by the presence of emergence, new properties in
holons not found in their individual component holons. By this criterion,
societies are clearly higher than their members, for they unquestionably
have properties the latter do not.[9] How, then, can Wilber claim that
societies are on the same level as their members, just a social aspect of
the same holon that is also viewed as an individual?
Wilber's own suggested criterion for distinguishing higher from lower is a
relationship of asymmetry (Wilber 1995). If we eliminate all holons on any
one level, then according to this rule, all holons on higher levels will
also be eliminated, but not all holons on lower levels. Thus if we eliminate
all atoms, we eliminate all molecules, but the reverse is not true. So
molecules are higher than atoms. If we eliminate all molecules, we eliminate
all cells, but the reverse is not true. So cells are higher than molecules.
If we eliminate all cells, we eliminate all organisms, but the reverse is
not true. So organisms are higher than cells.
This is the criterion Wilber uses, apparently, in coming to the conclusion
that societies are no higher than their individual members. If we eliminate
all humans, we eliminate all human societies. But if we were to eliminate
all human societies, the argument must go, we eliminate all humans. This
reasoning is obviously based on a very broad definition of "society",
including not simply any group or band of human beings, no matter how
primitive, but even a family—even a mother and child. Wilber's definition
of animal society must be broader still, since there are many organisms that
live almost completely independently of one another, even to the point of
reproducing asexually. One could thus very reasonably argue that Wilber is
stretching his definition of sociality too far, that in fact many animals if
not also human beings could survive in the absence of anything justifiably
regarded as a society, and that therefore there is no universal symmetry
between organisms and societies.[10] However, I will not make this argument,
because I would not want my criticism of Wilber's model to hinge on quibbles
over a definition. I do emphasize this point now, though, for we will see
later that Wilber's definition of society is inconsistent, in that he does
not apply the same logic to social interactions on lower levels.
So let's continue our examination of the four-quadrant model. When
considering the relationship between individuals and societies, Wilber
actually makes a distinction among several different kinds of humans and
their societies, as well as among several other kinds of organisms and their
societies. Each type of human/society relationship—for example, modern
humans and their societies and earlier societies and their members—as well
as various kinds of organisms and their societies, constitutes a different
level of existence in the four-quadrant model. The rule of symmetry actually
applies to each level. Thus if we eliminate all modern humans, we eliminate
all modern societies, and vice-versa; if we eliminate all members of some
earlier society, we eliminate their society, and vice-versa. If we eliminate
all organisms with a limbic brain, we eliminate their kind of society, and
vice-versa. The more general rule that I noted earlier—eliminate all humans
and we eliminate all human societies, and vice-versa—applies because if we
eliminate the lowest level of humans and their societies, this will ensure
the elimination of all other humans and their societies.
What is Wilber's justification for this ranking, for claiming that there are
different levels of not only organisms and their societies, but even of
human beings and their societies? He uses the same rule of symmetry, in this
case demonstrating an asymmetric relationship between different types of
holon. Thus if we eliminate all humans of earlier societies, we eliminate
all modern humans, but not vice-versa. If we eliminate all higher
vertebrates, we eliminate all humans, but not vice-versa. Stated in this
way, the symmetry principle may seem to be completely inapplicable, for how,
for example, can the elimination of all members of earlier societies result
in the elimination of all modern people? The relationship can't be a purely
historical one—that if earlier societies did not precede us, we would not
be here—because Wilber recognizes that some "earlier" or holarchically
lower societies may be present contemporaneously with our modern ones.
In order to understand how Wilber can apply the rule here, we have to
appreciate that in his model, it's not actually the individual person or
organism that is represented, but a particular type of brain. Thus one of
his levels represents organisms with only a reptilian or motor brain,
another level with a limbic or emotional brain, another with a cerebral
cortex, and still others with more complex forms of cerebral cortex. I think
this is a rather odd way to view these levels—and definitely a weakness of
the model that has been commented upon little if at all—for it leaves out
the actual organisms, which of course are more than just a brain. But since
there is a very strong holarchical relationship among brains, with more
highly evolved organisms having brains that include most of the structures
that are found in the brains of lower animals, Wilber's approach does have
the advantage of allowing him to develop a ranking system among organisms
based purely on the rule of symmetry. If we eliminate all reptilian brains,
for example, we eliminate not only all the organisms with this kind of brain
but also all organisms with limbic brains, which contain the reptilian
brain; but the reverse is not true, since eliminating all limbic brains
would not eliminate organisms that possess only the reptilian brain.
Similarly, if we eliminate all limbic brains, we eliminate all brains with a
cerebral cortex, which contain the limbic brain, but the reverse is not
true. Thus a brain with a cortex can be ranked above that with only a limbic
system, which in turn is ranked above that with only the reptilian or motor
centers. Wilber extends this ranking to several levels of humans by
postulating different brain structures associated with different types of
person.[11]
To summarize, Wilber's model presents a series of levels of humans and
organisms and their societies. The levels are holarchically arranged, but on
any single level, the organisms and their society are found together,
neither higher than the other. On this basis, it seems clear that the
relationship between humans and their societies—or between any other
organisms and their societies—is different from that between cells and
organisms, or between atoms, molecules and cells. As noted above, the latter
relationships are asymmetric.[12]
However, there are other holons that seem to exist somewhere between cells
and organisms, namely tissues. Where in the holarchy do they belong? Wilber
seems to represent tissues on the same level that he represents organisms.
As just discussed, he distinguishes all of these levels according to the
type of nervous system present. Cortical tissue is at one level, limbic
tissue at another level, reptilian tissue at another level, and so on.
Furthermore, if we continue to apply Wilber's symmetry rule, we can generate
other, non-nervous types of tissue. All but the simplest forms of nervous
organization are higher than other tissues, because if we eliminate all
these other tissues—that is to say, if we eliminate all organisms that have
these tissues—we eliminate all nervous tissue, but the converse is not
true. There are organisms with these non-nervous tissues that have no
brains, for example, or no spinal cords or no nervous ganglia. So still
following Wilber's logic very strictly, we can generate, using the symmetry
rule, a rough ranking of at least some other tissues.[13]
So now we find that there are levels of tissues, just like levels of
organisms, and that these levels seem to correspond to the levels of
organisms, to be identical to them. Using the symmetry rule, it's very easy
to show that they are in fact identical. If we eliminate all cortical
tissue, we eliminate all organisms with a cortex; and conversely, if we
eliminate all organisms with a cortex, we eliminate all cortical tissue. So
Wilber's symmetry rule leads to the conclusion that his levels of organisms
and their societies also contain tissues corresponding to the evolutionary
development of these organisms.
Now let's consider the relationship of cells to tissues. Just as there are
different kinds of tissues—cortical, limbic, reptilian, as well as
non-nervous tissue such as heart, lung, and so forth—there are different
kinds of cells associated with these tissues. The cerebral cortex, for
example, has several cell types not found in the limbic brain, the latter
has neurons not found in the reptilian brain, and so forth. Using Wilber's
symmetry rule, we can immediately see that each cell type or small group of
cell types has a symmetric relationship with its tissue. If we eliminate all
cortical neurons, we eliminate all cortical tissue; if we eliminate all
cortical tissue, we eliminate all cortical neurons. So now we must conclude
that not only is there a ranking system of tissues, which is identical to
the ranking system of organisms, but that there is also a ranking system of
cell types, which is also identical to these levels. In other words, every
one (or in any case, most) of Wilber's organism/society levels, from humans
to the lowest organisms, simultaneously must represent a certain kind of
tissue, and a certain kind of cell associated with that tissue.
I pointed out earlier that in addition to the fact that every one of
Wilber's organism/society levels is symmetric, with elimination of the
organism eliminating the society, and vice-versa, there is also a more
general rule. If we eliminate all societies of any kind, we eliminate all
organisms, as well as vice-versa; or if we eliminate all human societies of
any kind, we eliminate all humans, as well as vice-versa. Following Wilber's
logic, we can conclude that there is a similar general rule governing cells
and tissues: if we eliminate all cells of any kind, we eliminate all tissues
of any kind; and if we eliminate all tissues of any kind, we eliminate all
cells of any kind. The general cell/tissue relationship might be thought to
be asymmetric, because even if we eliminate all tissues within organisms,
there remain unicellular organisms that live outside of multicellular
organisms. But recall that earlier I pointed out that the existence of
symmetry between organisms and their societies hinges on a very broad
definition of society, one that includes virtually any kind of interactions
between organisms. If we are going to accept such a broad definition of
society, then to be consistent, we have to stretch the definition of tissue
as well. We have to recognize that a tissue is not simply an organized group
of cells within an organism, but any set of interactions among cells. What
biologists call tissues are interacting cells within a higher holon, namely,
an organism, but the location is not the relevant point here, the
interaction is.14 So if we are justified in regarding the interactions of
highly autonomous organisms as societies, we are equally justified as
regarding the interactions of highly autonomous cells—unicellular
eukaryotes and bacteria—as tissues. (Or, if one does not want to use that
word, simply say cell societies. The essential point is that the
interactions of cells occur over a spectrum or continuum, from the very weak
interactions of bacteria and unicellular eukaryotes to the very strong
interactions of cells in the brain, just as societies are defined by Wilber
as anything ranging from the weak interactions of autonomous organisms to
the most complex human societies.)
The result is a complete ranking system of eukaryotic cells, extending all
the way down to unicellular organisms. This lowest level perhaps also
includes prokaryotes (and should also include archaebacteria, a recently
discovered third group), because although Wilber represents prokaryotes and
eukaryotes on different levels, they do not have a true asymmetric
relationship. The elimination of either would not eliminate the other
(which, it should be noted, is not a genuinely symmetric relationship,
either. See footnote 13). Though it's widely accepted that the organelles in
eukaryotic cells originated from prokaryotes, not all eukaryotes have these
organelles. So I would put the two kinds of cells on the same level, though
this is an arguable, and minor, point.
To summarize, if we apply Wilber's symmetry principle to cells and tissues,
we come to the conclusion that these exist on a series of holarchical levels
that are coincidental with those representing organisms. This raises an
obvious problem: what is the relationship of these different holons to one
another? The relationship between an organism and its society is
represented, in Wilber's model, by the division between upper and lower
quadrants. But how can this model represent the distinction between an
organism and some tissue, and between those two kinds of holons and a
specific cell type? It would seem that additional quadrants are necessary.
Nor is this the end of this exercise in applying the symmetry rule
consistently. Suppose we consider holons lower than cells, such as molecules
and atoms. I noted earlier that there is an asymmetric relationship between
cells and molecules. If all molecules are eliminated, so are all cells; but
if all cells are eliminated, some molecules remain. However, if we are
justified in making distinctions between different kinds of organisms,
different kinds of societies, different kinds of tissues and different kinds
of cells, then surely we are also justified in distinguishing among
different kinds of molecules. The kinds of molecules found in cells can be
distinguished from those not found in cells by a simple rule: they contain
carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen atoms. If all cells were eliminated,
all molecules of this kind would be eliminated. Therefore, using the
symmetry rule, we can claim that these kinds of molecules are at the same
level as the cell.[15]
Finally, consider the relationship of the remaining molecules to atoms.
Wilber would say this is asymmetric, because if we eliminate all atoms, we
eliminate all molecules, but if we eliminate all molecules, some atoms would
remain. But is this really true? Consider first the kind of atoms found in
molecules, those which form chemical bonds with other atoms, such as carbon,
hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. One might think these atoms could exist in an
unbonded state in the absence of molecules. But if such atoms exist, some of
them will interact and form molecules—just as if all human societies were
eliminated, the individual humans remaining would form some social
interactions among themselves. So we have a symmetry relationship between
simple molecules and reactive atoms.
What about "inert" atoms like helium, that do not form molecules? Surely
they could exist in the absence of any molecules? But even inert atoms form
weak chemical bonds, such as hydrophobic interactions with other atoms. If
we stretch the definition of molecules to include such interactions, there
is a complete symmetry relationship between atoms and molecules, and they
must be considered to exist on the same level.
Of course, most people will object to my unconventional definition of a
molecule. But like the definition of a tissue as any set of interactions
among cells, it's quite consistent with Wilber's definition of societies as
any set of interactions among organisms. Just as no chemist would call the
interactions of helium atoms a molecule, and no biologist would call the
interactions of bacteria a tissue, no animal behaviorist would call the
interactions of a solitary insect or marine organism with other organisms a
society.16 In all three cases, a more stable, permanent relationship is
implied by the term. In the case of societies, Wilber has stretched the
definition of the term to include all social interactions, which he is
perfectly justified in doing. In fact, I think the definition should be
stretched, to make the point that sociality is not a black-and-white affair,
but exists over a very large spectrum. But to be consistent, Wilber must
recognize the analogously expanded definitions of tissue and molecule. I
pointed out earlier that we might better call such cell interactions cell
societies; likewise, we have atomic societies.[17]
What, then, is the end result of this exercise in following the rule of
symmetry faithfully? Considering just the upper right quadrant, or exterior
individual structures, and ignoring the highest human levels, Wilber's model
now looks like this:
- Neocortex/cortical neurons
- Limbic system/limbic neurons
- Reptilian brain/central motor neurons
- Spinal cord/spinal neurons
- Ganglionic system/ganglionic neurons/non-neural cells
- Nerve Net/primitive neurons/non-neural cells
- Unicellular organisms/organic molecules
- Small molecules/atoms
Note that in addition to the changes implied by the previous discussion, I
have added an additional level to distinguish between nervous systems based
on ganglionic organization (e.g., insects, crustacea, molluscs) and even
simpler systems based on a nerve net (Hydra).
From a comparison of this revised UR quadrant with that in Wilber's current
four-quadrant model, what can we conclude about how well he has followed his
own rule of symmetry? He certainly hasn't followed it completely faithfully
on the lowest levels, which are organized significantly differently in the
revised version. But for parts of these levels, and for all the upper
levels, above unicellular organisms (which actually account for nine of his
thirteen levels), it's difficult for me to tell, because many of the holons
just discussed are not found in his four-quadrant model, at least are not
specifically identified as such. When he lists "molecules" as a separate
level, does he mean all the wide variety of molecules found within living
cells, or just the simple ones found outside of them? When he lists
"eukaryotic cells", does he mean just unicellular eukaryotes, or all cells
within organisms as well? Perhaps he has explained his position in some
footnote I haven't read, but it's not in any presentation of his
four-quadrant model I'm aware of.
But this much can be said. If Wilber applies his symmetry rule consistently,
he will generate a model very much like the one he has proposed, in which a)
all molecules except the very simplest are hidden, or collapsed, within
one-celled organisms; and b) all biological tissues and their component
cells are collapsed within organisms, with each tissue and cell type
represented on the same level of existence as the kind of organism in which
it first appears. Such a model would be strictly consistent with the rule of
symmetry—and lead to some conclusions that, by any other logic, are
breathtakingly inconsistent. For example:
1. the differences between cells in the cerebral cortex and cells in the
limbic system (which are on different levels) are greater than the
differences between cortex cells and human beings (same level).
2. The differences between a modern human being and a human being of several
centuries ago (different levels) are greater than the differences between a
modern human being and a cell in the cerebral cortex (same level).
3. the differences between any two cell types in any organism (different
levels) are greater than the differences between a unicellular organism and
an amino acid molecule (same level).
4. The differences between an amino acid molecule and a carbon dioxide
molecule (different levels) are greater than the differences between an
amino acid molecule and a unicellular organism (same level).
Let me be very clear about two points here. First, these comparisons aren't
between different aspects of a holon, such as a society of people versus an
individual person. All of these holons being compared are individual
exteriors, as Wilber defines them, so there can be no question of the above
relationships resulting from some kind of category error or other confusion
of social and individual dimensions. As I noted earlier, the existence of
these multiple holons on one level implies the need for additional
quadrants, but as the model stands, all of them are in the same quadrant.
Second, if Wilber wants to deny that his model implies such relationships,
he can only do so by repudiating the rule of symmetry as applied to cells,
tissues and molecules, and thus opening himself up to the charge that he is
applying it selectively and inconsistently to human beings and their
societies. The previous argument has simply used this rule and applied it to
lower holons in exactly the same way that he applies it to organisms and
societies.
Elsewhere, I have pointed out many other inconsistencies in the
four-quadrant model (Smith 2001a,c,e,f,h). Like the ones demonstrated here,
most of the others result from Wilber's selective application of the rule of
symmetry, allowing him to conclude that societies are no higher than their
individual members. This rule, as the foregoing discussion should have made
clear, has definite limitations as an indicator of holarchical
relationships. Wilber sees, correctly, that holons separated by a full level
of existence, such as atoms and cells or cells and organisms, have an
asymmetric relationship, and correctly concludes that individuals and
societies have a different kind of relationship. What he doesn't see is that
holons can be separated by less than a full level of existence and yet still
have a higher/lower relationship.[18] This point is expressed in my model by
the existence of several stages in every level. Holons on different stages
within the same level—individuals and societies, for example, or cells and
tissues—can have a symmetric relationship, while one type is still higher
than another. The same can also be true of holons on different stages in
adjacent levels, where the comparison is of a lower stage, higher level
holon with a higher stage, lower level holon—organisms and tissues, cells
and molecules.
Of course, the validity of this rule depends on accepting my classification
of levels, since Wilber and I differ significantly in this respect. In my
model, all organisms, including humans, are on the same level, along with
their societies. In addition, molecules are on the same level as atoms, and
tissues on the same level as cells. But my definitions allow the symmetry
rule to be used consistently to define the limits of every level. That is a
major point of this discussion: to demonstrate that my organization of
levels follows from a consistent application of rules and definitions. The
stages within each level, in turn, are made up of individual and social
holons, using certain criteria for defining each type (Smith 2000; 2001a).
As I have discussed elsewhere (Smith 2001c), there are some inconsistencies
in my use of these criteria, but for the most part they are not major ones.
So another way of stating the limitation to the rule of symmetry is to say
that it applies only to comparisons of individual holons with other
individual holons, or of social holons with other social holons.
As soon as we recognize that this limitation, we see that social holons are
higher than their individual components, and the inconsistencies just noted
are straightened out. The revised upper right quadrant depicted above can
now unfold, so that tissues, cells, molecules and atoms can be holarchically
arranged in stages as well as levels. The resulting model solves many other
problems or observations the Wilber model can't deal with: the clear-cut
emergent properties that human societies possess over their individual
members; the fact that many kinds of cells and organisms have virtually no
social organization; the analogies between the society/organism relationship
and the tissue/cell relationship, and even the molecule/atom relationship;
the great difference between the relationship of the next higher level of
consciousness to that of modern individuals, on the one hand, and that
between the latter and earlier modes of consciousness identified by Wilber,
on the other; and many more. That all these problems have festered for so
long in the Wilber model is reason enough to call for a serious revision.
That they all stem from the same single flaw should make this flaw very
obvious, and completely unacceptable.
Footnotes
[1] Hargens does delineate a sense of intersubjectivity as "felt-experience",
but as far as I can tell, this is still an upper quadrant phenomenon. If it
isn't, then it would seem that all felt experience, being located within
intersubjective structures, would be in the LL, and there would be nothing
in the UL.
[2] Gerry Goddard (2000) has come to a similar conclusion, though his
proposed remedy, an expansion of the four quadrants to six or even twelve,
is very different from mine.
[3] Unless, as Goddard (2001a) seriously suggests, we are to look at the
individual/social dynamic as like that between subatomic particles and
waves, where both an individual and a social aspect seem to be part of the
same entity. This claim was actually put forward in an attempt to address
another problem with the four quadrant model that I have discussed at
length, that societies have emergent properties not found in their members,
and therefore are holarchically higher than the latter. (See also the
discussion of this later in this article). Goddard suggests the
wave/particle duality as an example of how new properties can emerge without
the context of a higher/lower relationship. However, I have never heard
Wilber make that claim, and if he wishes to, he certainly needs to do so
very explicitly, considering how very radical it is.
[4] Let me emphasize that I’m not saying crayfish are totally free of
intersubjective structures. When two crayfish interact with each other, in
mating or in some territorial feud, for example, intersubjectivity may be
involved. I retain an open mind on this possibility. My point is just that
not all the experience and behavior of crayfish can be understood in this
manner.
[5] We are highly visual creatures, and thus our visual perception is highly
informed by intersubjectivity. But our experience through other the other
senses, it seems to me, is much less determined by intersubjective
relationships. It should also be emphasized that newborn babies are also
largely free of intersubjective relationships.
[6] Some invertebrates, of course, are highly social, like bees and ants, and
I assume intersubjectivity plays a somewhat larger role in their existence.
[7] As I have discussed elsewhere (Smith 2000; 2001e), intersubjectivity is
closely associated with the dimensionality of perceptions. Holons at or near
the bottom of any level perceive the world in zero dimensions, identifying
with everything in their worldspace, or in one-dimension, making a simple
self-other distinction. Higher stage holons perceive in a greater number of
dimensions. Indeed, in my model, interobjectivity can be defined as
0-3-dimensional perception, and intersubjectivity as 4- or 5-dimensional
perception.
[8] One might argue that even though crayfish don’t exist in any ongoing
intersubjective structure with other members of their species, such a
structure exists over time. That is, the hard-wired capacity of the
crayfish’s nervous system to perceive and interpret its environment emerged
through a process of evolution involving a great many organisms over a great
length of time. In this sense, the crayfish’s experience is linked with that
of others of its species. However, I don’t think Wilber views
intersubjectivity in this way.
[9] Against this point, Goddard (2001b) argues that certain rare individuals
("leading edge holons") can have experiences or ideas unique among the
population. This is supposed to show that while society has properties not
found in its individual members, the converse is also true. As I have argued
elsewhere though (Smith 2001h), no individual "breakthrough" is made
completely independently of input from or relationships with other members
of society. Moreover, in any society, particularly advanced human societies,
there is a whole spectrum of individual qualities, ranging from those shared
by everyone to less common ones to exceedingly rare ones. The qualities at
the less common or rare end of the spectrum are not representative of the
"average" qualities found in the population, but that does not make them any
less properties of the society as much as of the individual. Societies are
not completely homogeneous, consisting only of "average" holons. In fact, as
I have discussed elsewhere (Smith 2001d), the higher and more complex the
social organization, the greater the differences in roles in that
organization that different individuals can play. This is not true just in
human societies, but also in tissues of cells and in complex molecules of
atoms.
[10] As discussed subsequently in the text, the four-quadrant model
represents different kinds of humans and organisms on different levels,
along with their corresponding societies. Each level has a symmetric
individual/society relationship. Wilber could thus claim that while there
may be some truly asocial organisms, the symmetry relationship always exists
wherever there actually is a social organization of organisms. However, this
would undercut his claim that all organisms have a social as well as
individual aspect, a central principle of his model.
It might also be argued that even asocial organisms exist in relationships
within ecosystems. This is true, but all ecosystems contain some plants,
which, though not represented in Wilber's model, surely must be considered
lower than organisms. Many if not most plants could survive the complete
elimination of all organisms, so the relationship of organisms with them is
asymmetric. See also Smith (2001h) for further discussion of this.
[11] All humans, of course, have a cerebral cortex. In order to justify his
ranking of different human societies and their members, Wilber therefore
must postulate additional differences in the brains of humans, differences
which are not actually detectable. The assumption underlying postulation of
these differences—that these different types of people have different forms
of consciousness or interiority—is a reasonable one, but the fact that the
structural differences, if present at all, are very minor, is important to
keep in mind when we subsequently consider ranking lower holons like cells
and atoms.
[12] But see the later discussion.
[13] There are limits to the use of this rule. The symmetry rule is
fundamentally grounded on a principle of evolution, that more highly evolved
holons transcend and include lesser evolved holons. But not all higher/lower
relationships are like this, because evolution, in addition to moving
upward, in transformation or transcendence, also moves outward, in
translation. Sometimes structures emerge which are lower than structures
that have evolved later, but which are not included in the latter. This may
be the case with certain societies (see Edwards 2001), and perhaps also with
plants. This illustrates a significant problem with attempting to use the
symmetry rule exclusively, in addition to the inconsistencies that we will
see later arise. I have previously suggested the use of complexity as a way
of ranking such systems (Smith 2001d). However, I have relied on the
symmetry principle as much as possible here, because this is Wilber's stated
criterion, and I want to draw out the consequences of using his logic.
[14] A strong implication of my model of holarchy is that a newly emerging
higher level system will eventually include societies in much the same way
that organisms include tissues.
[15] It's true that cells contain some simple molecules that would not be
eliminated by the elimination of cells—for example, carbon dioxide and
water. But by the same token, humans contain some tissues that would not be
eliminated by the elimination of all humans. Just as Wilber has defined
higher levels by the presence of one particular kind of tissue which is
always associated with a particular kind of organism (reptilian, limbic,
cortical brain), so we can define a lower level by a particular class of
molecules always associated with cells.
[16] One might argue that even solitary organisms exist is ecosystems, which
are a kind of society. But see footnote 10
[17] Wilber in fact calls the relatively weak interactions of atoms in
galaxies as societies in his model. So all I'm really doing here is showing
that these interactions belong on the same spectrum that includes molecules.
[18] How is it that holons can exist in a higher/lower relationship, but
still satisfy the rule of symmetry? Holons that are relatively close in the
holarchy have an intimate evolutionary relationship; they tend to be found
together always, and therefore will exhibit a symmetric relationship,
regardless of the nature of any other relationships they have with each
other. This means that where one finds symmetry depends on where one draws
distinctions. Wilber draws distinctions between different organisms—really,
different tissues—even though in some cases the structural basis of these
distinctions is purely hypothetical. This allows him to claim that each kind
of organism is symmetric with a certain social organization. He doesn't draw
distinctions between the different cell types associated with these
different tissues, even though every kind of tissue is by definition
composed of a unique cell type or types, nor does he draw distinctions
between different kinds of molecules or different kinds of atoms.
References
(Note: most of the online sources listed at my website (geocities) are
available in the Reading Room as well)
deQuincey, C. (2000) The Promise of Integralism J. Consciousness Studies
7,177-208
Edwards, M. (2001) Integral Sociocultural Studies and Cultural Evolution
www.integralworld.net/edwards4.html
Goddard, G. (2000) Holonic Logic and the Dialectics of Consciousness
www.integralworld.net/goddard2.html
Goddard, G. (2001a) Quadrants Re-instated
www.integralworld.net/goddard4.html
Goddard, G. (2000b) Concluding Unscientific Aferword
www.integralworld.net/goddard5.html
Hargens, S. (2001) Intersubjective Musings
(http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/042301_intro.cfm/
xid,47700/yid,29580659
Sheldrake, R. (1981) A New Science of Life (Los Angeles: Tarcher)
Smith, A.P. (2000) Worlds within Worlds
www.geocities.com/andybalik/chapter1.html
Smith, A.P. (2001a) The Spectrum of Holons
www.geocities.com/andybalik/kofman.html
Smith, A.P. (2001b) Quadrants Translated, Quadrants Transcended
www.geocities.com/andybalik/QT.html
Smith, A.P. (2001c) All Four One and One For All
www.geocities.com/andybalik/allfourone.html
Smith, A.P. (2001d) Excelsior
www.geocities.com/andybalik/excelsior.html
Smith, A.P. (2001e) Who's Conscious?
www.geocities.com/andybalik/wc.html
Smith, A.P. (2001f) Nothing Special
www.geocities.com/andybalik/Goddard2.html
Smith, A.P. (2001g) Up and In, Down and Out
www.geocities.com/andybalik/upandin.html
Smith, A.P. (2001h) Lateral Differences
www.geocities.com/andybalik/lateral.html
Wilber, K. (1995) Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (Boston: Shambhala)
Wilber, K. (2001) Do Critics Misrepresent my Position?
(http://wilber.shambhala.com /html/misc/critics_01.cfm
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Andrew P. Smith, who has a background in molecular biology, neuroscience and pharmacology, is author of e-books Worlds within Worlds and the novel Noosphere II, which are both available online. He has recently self-published "The Dimensions of Experience: A Natural History of Consciousness" (Xlibris, 2008).