Duncan Rinehart


In the Spring of 1988, as a still na�ve graduate student, I began teaching Sociology of Peacemaking at the University of Colorado. After the usual introductory description of the course, I moved the class right into a discussion about what peace is. "After all," I reasoned, "how we make peace can be reasonably assumed to follow from what we think peace is." With all of my mediation, facilitation, and arbitration training and experience, I was confident in my ability to lead a class discussion into a definition of peace that would serve as a baseline to guide our studies for the semester. I had read Kenneth Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, Johan Galtung, and company. I knew that the leading thinkers generally saw peace in terms of the resolution or absence of war, violence, or conflict, or at least as conflict management. "Certainly," I thought, "an upper division class of undergraduates, interested in peacemaking would, when pushed to define peace, land in the same 'ball park' as our leading peace thinkers." I expected the class discussion to take one class period, most of which would be students presenting their individual definitions and working to agreement.

But I was wrong. After two classes of my best facilitation and communication efforts, there was no agreement in sight. Indeed it seemed clear that there were at least two very different and seemingly irreconcilable notions of peace among the definitions written on the chalkboard. Some were in the "ball park" with Boulding and Galtung. These saw peace as the absence of war, violence and conflict, or at least as conflict management, and peacemaking in terms of international relations. Others were in an altogether different place. They saw peace in terms of harmony within the individual or between individuals, and peacemaking as a mode of relating to others based on some internal emotional or cognitive state. The former was mostly external; the latter, mostly internal. And the peace literature concentrated largely on the former.

As a result I become convinced that there are concepts of peace "in society" that are not adequately addressed in the main stream scholarly literature on peace. I became concerned, as a consequence, that our peacemaking efforts, to the extent that they are informed by our peace intellectuals, may be limited and impoverished and perhaps even doomed to failure by their own built in limitations. Galtung (1981) makes a similar point about the impoverishment of peace concepts based on Western cosmology that ignores Eastern cosmology. But peace research appears slow to respond.

It is the purpose of this paper is to look for possible common factors among concepts of peace, and the different approaches to peace, that might lead to some broader agreement on what to work for. This paper also attempts to grapple with the contradictions, implicit assumptions, and limitations of our current concepts of peace, with the aim of not only better understanding what peace is or can be, but also of finding more successful ways to realize it.

With these issues and problems in mind, I began my study of the conceptualizations of peace. I found two different orientations in the literature, similar to those of my students, and have subsequently classified peace concepts into two paradigms, the Popular and the Numinar. Popular paradigm conceptions of peace include the absence definitions mentioned above�the absence of war, violence, and conflict (or at least conflict management). This paradigm is truly popular in the sense of being common and wide spread. It is these meanings of peace that Presidents, Prime Ministers, Secretary Generals, Kings and TV anchor-people use when they speak of peace in the Middle East, for example. On the other hand, Numinar paradigm concepts of peace include peace as harmony, and peace as oneness with nature, others or God. This paradigm derives its unusual name from the numinous (i.e., spiritual, holy, supernatural) individuals who seem to have articulated it best: Lao Tzu, Buddha, Gandhi, Jesus, to name a few of the better known.

My gradual realization of these two very different peace paradigms lead to many questions. Is there a larger theoretical structure that can subsume the full range of peace concepts or paradigms? While the Popular paradigm has received considerable sociological attention, especially in the social conflict literature, what is the sociological basis for the Numinar paradigm? What is the relationship between the paradigms themselves? What is the relationship between our underlying beliefs and assumptions or worldviews and our concepts of peace in these paradigms?

In considering answers to these questions, I was introduced to the work of Ken Wilber. Drawing in part on the Perennial Philosophy, modern developmental biology and psychology, Wilber's theory of developmental holism offers a coherent explanation of human and social growth and development. His theory presents the advantages of providing a framework for analyzing, classifying and integrating peace concepts and paradigms. Wilber's approach is to posit holistic levels of human capacity, to explain historical development in those terms, and to predict future development as well. Consequently there is not one "right" definition of peace just as there is not one "right" concept of God. But peace concepts, like God concepts, reflect the capacities, or structures of consciousness, of different levels of human development. To understand peace concepts, I believe one must understand developmental holism.

First I will describe the peace paradigms in greater detail. Then, in order to respond to my first question, "What larger theoretical structure embodies peace concepts or paradigms?," I will describe some of the germane aspects of Wilber's work, especially as presented in A Sociable God. Finally I will discuss some implication of this for peace research.


I began my study with computerized and manual database searches for books and articles on peace concepts and conceptual schemes. Much of our historical texts and most of our leading thinkers and mystics have dealt with peace either directly or indirectly in the contexts of war, preservation of the social order, and proper conduct of social and political life. It seems that peace has truly been one of humanity's greatest interests throughout history. Yet as Reardon (1989:15) has recently pointed out, "�the search for a new paradigm of peace to replace our present paradigm of war� is the great intellectual adventure of our time."

What I found in the literature was basically the same two general peace orientations that I found in my class: the Popular and the Numinar. These paradigms are ideal types or abstract descriptions drawn from peace concepts literature to reveal their essential features.

The Popular Paradigm

The Popular paradigm concepts of peace are largely materialistic, international, and external. Peace is materialistic in the sense that peace is associated with prosperity which is threatened by war and violence. Peace is international in that the appropriate starting point for peace is at the level of relations between nations. Peace is external in the sense that peace, if it is possible, must exist outside the individual or relationship of individuals to others; peace is more the product of social systems (i.e. institutions) than of interactional patterns or subjective states. The problem of obtaining peace is the problem of controlling war or violence (physical and structural).

The Popular paradigm can be divided into two camps: those that see peace in "negative" terms as the abolition of war (K. Boulding, 1978; Rapoport, 1988) and those that see peace in "positive" terms as the creation of social justice (Galtung, 1969). The negative camp sees peace "not in terms of any attributes of its own but in terms of what is taken to be its opposite, war. When newspaper accounts report on prospects for a Middle East 'peace settlement' they are referring to the termination of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops" (Johnson, 1976:5). On the other hand, the positive camp sees peace as a product of underlying social and political factors. Structural violence is seen as more pervasive than physical violence (of which the negative camp is mostly concerned). Structural violence is where social structures influence human beings "so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (Galtung, 1969:168). For example, social systems which keep women uneducated, which economically and politically suppress ethnic groups, which prohibit adequate health care to anyone (e.g., denial of health insurance), where it is possible not to do so, are structurally violent. Peace then is the reduction or elimination of structural violence, a reduction commonly called social justice. This is still an absence definition of peace, as Cox (1986) points out. Peace is the absence of structural violence.

Both camps take a macro-social approach to peace. To make peace, government and economic institutions must be restructured to deinstitutionalize war and our dependence on the military-industrial complex. This is presumed to free resources of governments for domestic programs and for healthier economies, which makes life for individuals more peaceful and prosperous. This is a "trickle down" peace (e.g., the peace dividend). Yet the perception is that this deinstitutionalization of war and structural violence must be done cautiously due to threat from a hostile international environment of aggressive nations.

The worldview of the Popular paradigm seems to be fear-based and views human nature as aggressive, conflictual, and competitive. Rapoport (1988) sees "peace through strength" (a Popular paradigm, negative camp concept) as based on the perception of threat and subsequent fear. Additionally, human nature is seen as fundamentally aggressive and conflictual, although humans can choose to behave non-conflictually. The world is seen as full of threat and competition over the scarce resources that are required for maintaining or increasing prosperity.

The positive camp of the Popular paradigm is also responding to threat, but this threat includes the dominance and oppression caused by unjust social structures. It is implied that human nature is fundamentally a drive for full realization of mental and spiritual potential (Fromm, 1961). But human nature is also social, and through the creation of our present social systems we have created structures that suppress our potential. This too is a fearful worldview and view of human nature. It fears the monster of oppressive social structures that we create in spite of our potential. Yet it seems to hold faith, however weakly, in our eventual ability to transform the monster, to create just social structures.

The Popular paradigm worldviews appear more commonly as "pessimistic pragmatism" than as overtly fearful. The perception of terrorists, murderers, and brutally repressive regimes is combined with a sort of Hobbesian (1934) view of humanity as motivated primarily by self-interest into a pessimism to which we must pragmatically respond with defensive and threat capability of our own. This worldview has dominated the foreign policy of the superpowers and their allies throughout the Cold War era.

Numinar Paradigm

The Numinar paradigm includes concepts of peace that are more idealistic, intra- and inter-personal, and both internal and external. Peace is idealistic in that non-material goals and processes are valued in the achievement of peace; peace is not necessarily related to material prosperity. Peace is idealistic in that, like other aspects of social reality, it is constructed and maintained through social processes (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and can be revised through those same processes. Peace is intra- and inter-personal in that the best level at which to begin peacemaking is seen as developing internal peace with which one then interacts more peacefully with others. Peace is internal in the sense that peace must first exist within the individual in relationship to others; peace is more the product of interactional patterns or subjective states than of social structures. Yet external concepts of peace are not excluded. Social systems must also be changed to institutionalize changes in interactional patterns or subjective states. The problem of peace is the problem of the internal, but shared, subjective states of people--the interpretations we make of other's actions and the value preferences that underlie our own actions. "To make peace with people, we need to understand them. To understand them, we need to engage in a holistic and participatory research which treats social reality as structures in purposive, value-laden, institutional and non-axiomizable ways" (Cox, 1986:94).

A few peace concepts will help illustrate this paradigm. Peck (1987) sees peace as the by product of a group becoming and operating as a community, where community is characterized by inclusivity, consensus, commitment, realism, being a safe place for personal growth, being a group of all leaders, etc. This concept includes the Popular concepts of not doing violence to others yet goes beyond them to include a whole range of social relations that contribute to peace. Macquarrie (1973) defines peace as "healing fractures." This is a process of bringing people together by reducing estrangement, alienation, bitter division and war that exists either within us as indecision, conflicting emotion, and mental illness; or between us as in Durkeheim's narcissistic individualism (Mestrovic, 1988), where people are relatively unrestrained by society and thereby pursue their own self interest, unresponsive to the will of others. Macquarrie's concept requires focus on the intra- and inter-personal level for healing fractures but also acknowledges the importance of healing fractures at all levels of society, including the international. His concept is also both internal and external in that the healing begins within each of us as we interact with others, yet social structures will also have to be changed to facilitate more wide spread healing of fractures.

The many "oneness," "harmony," and "tranquility" concepts of peace illustrate well this paradigm. These concepts view the nature of relations between an individual and a larger Other (e.g., God, Society, Nature, Tao, Goddess, Buddha Nature, the Cosmos). The consequence of this relationship is tranquility either within the individual or between individuals (in society) or both, where tranquility is taken to mean a range of things from the near elimination of disagreement to the harmony or even merger of wills and identity between the individual and the larger Other (e.g., Buddha's enlightenment).

This paradigm usually takes a micro-social approach to peace. As more individuals develop and maintain internal tranquility, they are better able to interact in non-judging, more harmonious ways with others, and they are presumed to increasingly value shared interests (e.g., Durkheim's collective individualism, where the individual freely chooses to be controlled by society). As more individuals develop more peaceful relations, society is gradually reconstructed along more peaceful lines to the level of the nation state and its international relations. Peace begins at the "grass-roots," and social systems are transformed as a critical mass of more peaceful interpersonal relations is reached (Ferguson, 1980; Capra, 1982). Social reality is literally reconstructed.

In this paradigm, peace concepts seem to come out of worldviews that are based relatively more on faith than fear. The existence of the goal of Peace as some sort of Ultimate existential end is taken as a matter of faith. Faith, which is sometimes based on transcendental experience, underlies not only the grass-roots approach to social transformation for peace, and the vision of ultimate Peace, but it also plays a role in the resilience of Numinar worldviews against the compelling, ubiquitous onslaught of the dominant Popular worldviews. "The reality of everyday life [which includes dominant worldviews] is taken for granted as reality.� Other realities [e.g., non-dominant worldviews] appear as finite provinces of meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and modes of experience" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:23-25). Holding Numinar worldviews requires faith in something other than the taken-for-granted, dominant reality which appears as fact.

Elements of fear may still be present in these worldviews but fear is not the basic orientation. Consequently, human nature is not seen as fundamentally aggressive and conflictual, and the world need not necessarily be a threatening, competitive, and hostile place. The world is seen more as a place of opportunity for growth, and human nature is seen as more cooperative than aggressive and competitive. Griffin (1988:146) presents an essentially Numinar worldview of peace as "the fundamental relationships of life as noncoercive, and �that cooperation is more basic in the nature of things than competition. Coercive relations and competition do exist, but they are derivative, secondary."

These Numinar worldviews can be characterized as "optimistic humanism." They see a fundamental good in humanity that we are constrained from expressing. Yet, optimistically, they see us as overcoming those constraints, and thus ushering in peace.

For example, the Gandhian approach to peace is a mostly Numinar one with its emphasis on the high moral development of the individual that is required by satyagraha which would be the basis for a new, just world order (Puri, 1987:179).

"War will never be terminated by any agency until men and nations become more spiritual and adopt the principle of brotherhood and concord rather than antagonism, competition and brute force" (Gandhi in Puri, 1987:173).

I see Gandhi's approach as focusing on intra- inter-personal peace which transforms social structures through satyagraha in the grass-roots approach of the Numinar paradigm. Gandhi calls for personal transformation in relationship to others (e.g., brotherhood) first. Gandhi's view seems grounded in an idealistic vision of what humanity can become.

While I have shown two paradigms that fairly well categorize most of our peace concepts, it is helpful to see these concepts as more of a continuum that can be divided into the paradigms for analytical purposes. The continuum of peace concepts is evident not only in concepts such as "peace as conflict resolution" that do not fit well into the paradigms but also in the Popular paradigm concepts that contain some Numinar aspects and Numinar concepts that in some ways appear to be Popular ones.

In a more general sense, the continuum of peace concepts seems to be a continuum of impulses to remove successively subtler layers of barriers to Peace. The "not war" concept focuses on the removal of a potentially cataclysmic social system that prohibits material well being. It looks for an international peace. The "social justice" orientation focuses on removal of all social structures that constrain "somatic and mental realizations." It looks for a more intra-national peace. Gandhi's approach can be viewed as an effort to remove the moral barriers to peace. It looks for a more inter-personal peace. The "harmony" and "oneness" orientations (of the spiritual variety) focus on the removal of spiritual barriers that perpetuate the separate-self sense. Such peace orientations focus on intra-personal peace. In short all our peace concepts are approaching merely different aspects of the same problem, along a spectrum of barriers. This is an important element of the common ground among our various ideas and approaches to peace; and, as we will see, this is where developmental holism can shed much light.


To provide a sociologically theoretical basis for the peace paradigms, as well as a sociological basis for the relationship between the paradigms themselves, and between peace concepts and worldviews, I have employed Wilber's developmental holism.


Wilber sees the process of development as the gradual unfolding or emergence of a nested hierarchy of stages where the higher stages differentiate from and integrate the lower. Each stage is a qualitatively greater cognitive capacity that results in expanded perspectivism and further development of Self. Increased differentiation occurs when, as the higher emerges through the lower, it adds its own structures or capacities to those of the lower. Barring pathology, each higher level represents increased differentiation-and-integration; it has increased access to and organization of the structures and capacities of the lower. In other words, each senior level "transcends but includes" its juniors.

Development begins at a stage of undifferentiated potential and moves from body through mind and soul to ultimate unity as Spirit. Development is increasingly holistic and encompassing (although specific pathologies can disrupt integration at any stage). Each level is actually a multilayered totality including within itself all the lower levels (Wilber, 1983:26). In Wilber's view, development progresses as the higher differentiates from the lower then subsumes and integrates the lower, retaining lower levels as relatively autonomous units of the higher. Each whole level becomes part of the whole of the next.

Levels of Analysis

Wilber traces development or evolution in both the individual and the species/societal, or ontogeny and phylogeny. For Wilber, ontogeny and phylogeny are linked through (and point to) the same generalized basic structures of developmental unfolding.

Ontogeny is facilitated by phylogeny. Individual development to a given level is fairly well assured by the prevalence of social structures at that level. Because the species has developed to a given structural level, individual development to that same level is nearly assured by the "massive and compelling" nature of social reality at that level (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:29). Indeed species development (phylogeny) is the mode of individual development (ontogeny). For example, Wilber hypothesizes that humanity has evolved to Piaget's formal-operational stage which thus assures that most individuals will reach that stage due to the prevalence of social structures (e.g., education) appropriate to it. But beyond this level, individuals are mostly on their own (Wilber, 1983:284-285).

Yet ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. In the sense of a phylogenetic heritage, the experiences of the whole human race (phylogeny) are reproduced in the individual (ontogeny). In the sense of Mead's development of the self,

only in so far as [the individual] takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs�does he develop a complete self.� On the other had,�society [is] possible in so far as every individual involved in [it] can take the general attitude of all other such individuals� (Mead, 1934:155).

The key point is that Wilber is looking developmentally at the same relationship between the individual and society that sociology sees. The individual is a social product in which "society" is reproduced (e.g., the generalized other). And society is the sui generis interaction of all individuals. From the point of view of development, species/social development precedes yet corresponds with and facilitates individual development. This is possible in Wilber's view because of the deep structural capacities of humanity which are expressed and institutionalized in society (surface structures) that largely produce the development of the individuals within society.

Given that each level in the developmental hierarchy transcends yet includes--envelopes, enfolds, comprehends--the previous stages, we can say that human beings, both collectively and individually, are compounded of all past levels of development plus the present level (and the still undifferentiated, unmanifested, potential higher levels).

The human being is compounded of matter, prana [breath, libido, elan vital], mind, soul and spirit. The material body is exercised in labor with the physical-natural environment; the pranic (emotional) body is exercised in breath, sex, and feeling with other pranic bodies; the mind is exercised in linguistic communication with other minds; the soul, in psychic and subtle relationships; the spirit, in absolute relation to and as Godhead (or God-communion and God-identity). That is, each level of the compound human individual is exercised in a complex system of ideally unobstructed relationships with the corresponding levels of structural organization in the world process at large (Wilber, 1983:36).

The compound individual links levels of analysis in Wilber's nested hierarchy and his stages/levels of development (see below). Each level of the compound individual is developed and sustained in level-specific relationship with others and with social institutions.

Stages of Development

Wilber proposes at least eight major stages of development (1983), although he recognizes many subdivisions. For the earlier stages, he draws on the developmental studies of several dozen researchers, including Piaget (cognitive), Arieti (intrapsychic), Maslow (needs), Kohlberg (morality), and Lovinger (ego needs). Wilber also relies on various Eastern and Western mystical systems, such as Advaita Hinduism, Buddhism, Sufism, and Kabbalah, especially for description of the higher stages of mental and spiritual development where Western developmental science "thins out." Wilber builds an extensive correspondence between Eastern and Western systems to show that there is not as large gap between them as is often supposed, and that they share many deep structural similarities. Wilber's stages of development take into account cognitive structures, worldviews, needs, moral sense, self-identity, modes of space and time, death-seizure, among other elements. Here is a brief outline of the major stages, focusing on their worldviews.

Archaic. The first stage, which Wilber calls Archaic (really a collapse of three stages--the Physical, Sensoriperceptual, and Emotional-Sexual) consists of the simple physical substratum of the organism, similar to Piaget's sensorimotor cognition, the first and second chakras, Freud's libido, and so on. Ontogenetically, this stage begins between birth and 12 months (while it is possible to indicate a beginning point for each stage, it is not possible to indicate an end point, because some types of "horizontal developments" on that level can continue indefinitely). In terms of our species evolution, this was the stage of our pre-human ancestors.

Magical. The second general stage is the Magical or Representational Mind which begins ontogenetically between 15 months and 2 years. For the species it began in the paleolithic period of early "non-verbal" hunting and gathering (Wilber, 1981:194). This stage is "magical" in that it contains the first and simplest images, symbols, concepts, representations, etc. These images and symbols are often confused and fused with their object so that by manipulating one, people believe they can manipulate the other. Eating the eyes of a cat, for example, is believed to make you more able to see like one. This stage displays confusion of subject and object, displacement, animism, and has a limited ability to take the role of the other (Wilber, 1990:286-287). It is indicated by Piaget's pre-operational thinking, Arieti's paleologic, Kohlberg's preconventional morality, Maslow's safety needs, and Lovinger's impulsive and self-protective stages. Cognitively, the general emergent structure of the stage is the beginning of the mental capacities, as distinct from the primarily bodily capacities of the Archaic. The mind can form symbols or concepts and thus represent things, but it cannot yet operate on or coordinate those representations. "The rep-mind can count objects but it cannot easily multiply or divide them--it lacks such rule coordination" (Wilber, 1990:286). Although Wilber does not make this connection, this is where Mead's "play" stage appears, and the beginnings of self awareness via the awakening in the self of the attitudes aroused in others through taking the role of others in play (i.e., increasing perspectivism). The ability to take the role of others in this "play" stage is limited to a few others and to specific social settings (e.g., the players and the ball park in the game of baseball).

Mythic. The third general stage is the Mythical or Rule-Role Mind which begins ontogenetically around 5 to 7 years of age. Here the beginnings of concrete operational thinking (Piaget) and perspectivism as in communal role taking (Mead's "game" self which results in the beginnings of the generalized other) occur. Since this stage can perform rule operations in the concrete world but cannot yet operate on thought itself, it is incapable of hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Wilber, 1990:287). It is indicated by Lovinger's conformist stages, Maslow's belongingness needs, and Kohlberg's early conventional morality. Species development is indicated not only by Mead's game self wherein the attitudes of many others are organized into a generalized other, but also by mechanical solidarity. Due to its overall conformity (Wilber also calls it "Mythic Membership") this stage seems to correspond to Durkheim's mechanical solidarity where society is held together by the similarities of its (conforming) members. Historically, Wilber sees this mythic-membership stage as being especially prominent between c.9500-2500 BCE. It was during this time that people developed permanent settlements, based on farming, that grew into towns and the great civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia (Wilber, 1981:102-181). The major feature of this stage is the emergence of the structure of the mind as embodied in language and communication, where language, as a system of shared sentiments, descriptive realities, and perceptions defines reality itself and contains the largely unconscious controls that support a coherent society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

Rational-Egoic. The fourth generalized level is the Rational-Egoic or Formal-Reflexive Mind. Ontogenetically this level begins to appear around 11-15 years of age. It corresponds to Piaget's formal-operational thinking, hypothetico-deductive reasoning, and clearly self-reflexive, introspective thinking. "It is the first structure that can not only think about the world but think about thinking" (Wilber, 1983:20). This structure displays an advanced capacity for perspectivism including, in Meadian terms, a completed generalized other consisting of the internalized attitudes of a multitude of individual others as well as many large and different groups. It is indicated by Lovinger's conscientious and individualistic stages, Kohlberg's post-conventional morality, and Maslow's self-esteem needs. Historically this stage began around the time of ancient Greece and continues to the present. In terms of social development, it is marked by the gradual shift from communal, agricultural based societies to industrial and now post-industrial societies with an attendant shift from mechanical to organic solidarity where society is held together by the interdependence of its differentiated members (Durkheim, 1964). In Weberian terms, this stage is indicated by the increasing rationalization of society (Nisbet, 1966; and especially Schluchter, 1981). The major features of this developmental stage are the emergence of the capacity of mind to go beyond the confines of linguistic communication to the consideration of purely noetic (mental, intuitive) relationships (Wilber, 1983:20) (e.g., thinking about how we formulate our concepts of peace from our beliefs about human nature), and the fully individualized ego. This is the first stage in which one is capable of becoming a "dreamer," imaging possibilities not given to mere sensory evidence or sensory-concrete operations. (Wilber, 1990:288)

Vision-Logic. The fifth general level is that of Vision-Logic. It is indicated by the capacity for synthetic thinking, or operations on the results of formal (propositional) thought. It places each truth alongside numerous others in order to gain a panoramic view or "big picture," a vision of multiplex, reticulated, networked relationships. The capacity to consider a mass network of ideas, how they influence each other, and what their relationships are, is the beginning of synthesis--making connections, relating truths, coordinating ideas, integrating concepts (Wilber, 1983:27). This stage is indicated by Lovinger's integrated and autonomous stages and Maslow's self-actualization needs. By extending the logic of Mead's generalized other, we could say that at this stage the generalized other "expands" to the internalization of the vast complex network of attitudes of whole nations and peoples, of society. It is a "big picture" or panoramic awareness. It also underlies global and worldcentric moral aspirations, higher democratic social contracts, the bodhisattva vow (to help all beings), and so on.

Psychic. As this panoramic awareness increases, people may experience intense insight and even illumination, or a kind of cosmic consciousness, wherein reality appears as a vast sea of interconnections that on occasion flood the conscious mind in their totality. When this happens the identity of the self as an individual is temporarily washed away. This is often experienced as a dramatic removal of perceptual boundaries resulting in a broadening of perspective. Wilber refers to this level as shamanic, yogic, or panenhenic. It is indicated by the beginning of Maslow's self-transcendence needs.

Subtle. The seventh general level occurs among a few individuals who Wilber refers to as "saints" (although all of us can attain this and higher levels, according to Wilber and other transpersonalists). Here Wilber particularly draws on various Eastern as well as Western mystic systems for some idea of the deep structural capacity of this level. It is truly a trans-rational structure in that intuition in its highest sense and direct knowing or gnosis (soul-God communion) occurs, although some form of the subject-object duality is still present. It is the seat of actual archetypes, of Platonic forms, of subtle sounds and audible illuminations, of transcendent insight and absorption (Wilber, 1983:29).

Ultimate. The final stage is the Ultimate (really a collapse of two stages--the Causal and the Nondual). "The Causal/Ultimate level does not involve any particular experiences but rather the dissolution or transcendence of the experiencer, the death of the watcher principle" (Wilber, 1983:31). In this level, subject-object duality, begun with differentiation of the body from the environment (Archaic), the mind from the body (Mythic), and soul from the mind (Vision-Logic), finally ceases as the soul no longer contemplates divinity but recognizes that it is Divinity. The odyssey of the identity of the self, first with body, then with mind, then with soul, and finally as universal, cosmic Spirit, is completed, but a completion that is endlessly unfolding to embrace new forms.

Types of Structures

Each level or stage in the developmental hierarchy is distinguished by a set of defining structures (elements, capacities). "Structures" to the Sociologist, are variously: a) patterns of interaction that persist over time and are independent of the individuals in them, such as roles; b) the social institutions present at different levels of social organization, such as the University of Colorado, higher education, and the education system; or c) the patterns of ideas or collective representations that constrain the individual, such as norms, values and beliefs. The primary element in all of these is the aspect of persistent, repetitive patterns.

Another type of structuralism looks for largely universal, invariant forms for cultural, linguistic, social, and psychological patterns. This usage comes from Jung's archetypes as forms devoid of content, bolstered by cross-cultural work of Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, Habermas, and others.

Wilber's usage of "structures" is a combination of all of the above: both persistent patterns and innate potentials. Each level or stage in Wilber's developmental hierarchy (magic, mythic, rational, etc.) has a deep structure. These deep structures are the defining patterns that research suggests are relatively similar wherever we find them (e.g., the human body universally has 208 bones, two kidneys, one heart, etc.). The specific and culturally relative forms they take in any given society are the surface structures, such as specific languages, ideology, beliefs, roles, and institutions. "Unlike deep structures, which are original and universal, surface structures are derivative and variable, differing widely in cultural form and focus" (Washburn, 1988:26).

Wilber analyses several different types of structures�moral, linguistic, self, basic, transitional, enduring�but in each case he also looks for the deep features that appear to be similar wherever they appear (and are thus "quasi-universal"), and the surface features, which are everywhere culturally contingent and relative. Wilber calls them the warp and woof of cultures. In this way, he strikes a balance between universalism (deep structures) and pluralism/relativism/contextualism (surface structures).

Horizontal and Vertical Development

A change in deep structures Wilber calls "transformation." A change in surface structures he calls "translation." The relation between deep structures and surfaces structures he calls "transcription."

Wilber sees development occurring along two axes. Horizontal development occurs through the process of translation which is the "fleshing out" of the deep structures of any level. It is the growth within a given level. It is the gradual development of level-specific capacities, perspectives, organization, and structuration; and the integration of the individual, the species, and society that is possible at a given level. Vertical development, on the other hand, is the qualitative episodic shift from one level, say the Rational-Egoic, to the next higher, the Vision-Logic. It involves the process of transformation. Vertical growth generally involves differentiation of the emerging higher stage from the lower, then integration of the lower into the higher as a constituent, prerequisite element of the higher. As vertical growth proceeds at the deep level, new surface structures are created to utilize the emerging capacities.

The processes of transcription allow the potentials of the deep structures to be filled out with various surface structures in the process of socialization. Deep structural capacity for "seeing" leads to an interpretive matrix of "the way the world looks," which leads to surface structural characteristics or "the way things are" of taken-for-granted social reality. The "rules" of transcription operate from the specific capacities of each deep structure, as the interpretive matrix that constitute the bases of the shared meanings out of which surface structural reality is created.

The Forces of Development

Wilber recognizes four major forces in development. The two horizontal or translative forces are preservation and negation, or mana and taboo. The two vertical forces are transcendence (Atman telos) and regression (dissolution)�a move to a higher or lower level in the developmental hierarchy. Although many other forces may also come into play, Wilber summarizes the overall situation as: when mana outweighs taboo, translation proceeds relatively normally; but when taboo significantly outweighs mana, then translation fails and transformation ensues (which can either be evolutionary transformation-upward or regressive transformation-downward, depending on various factors).

Mana. From the very nature of the developmental hierarchy, where each successive level envelopes or compounds the previous ones, both individually and collectively, we humans are compounded of matter, prana/libido, mind, soul, and spirit (to use the simplified version of the eight major stages). Each of these aspects are "exercised in a complex system of� relationships with the corresponding levels of structural organization in the world process at large" (Wilber, 1983:36). Each of these aspects of the compound individual, which are really different capacities for organizing the world process, can be seen as expressing a need for those specific kinds of relationship, "�physical needs (food, water, air, shelter), emotional needs (feeling, touch-contact, sex), mental-egoic needs (interpersonal communication, reflexive self-esteem, meaning), and spiritual needs (God-communion, depth)" (Wilber, 1983:37). According to Wilber, these capacities are fulfilled by "truth-food" or mana. Without level-appropriate mana, the need goes unmet and that corresponding aspect of the compound individual withers and growth is stunted or distorted.

Each structural level requires mana appropriate to it. As development progresses and the compound individual unfolds or emerges higher levels, appropriate mana must become available to sustain development. "Growth and development is simply the process of adapting to, and learning to digest, subtler and subtler levels of food�physical food, emotional food, mental food, spiritual food" (Wilber, 1983:37). Horizontal growth is utilizing the level-specific food or mana available at a given level. Vertical growth is utilizing higher, more subtle mana specific to higher developmental stages. "Each progressively higher level of structural organization seems to have access to a progressively higher mana or higher truth-food" (Wilber, 1983:49).

According to Wilber's analysis, mana can be either integrative or disintegrative (actually, along a broad continuum from one to the other). But put simply, Is it good mana or bad mana? Good mana is "that which is integrative, healthy, legitimate, and intrinsically binding, both within the boundaries of the particular individual and between the boundaries of individuals in [society] at large. Bad mana, conversely, is less integrative or even disintegrative for the particular level" (Wilber, 1983:49).

Good mana is integrative because it enmeshes people in a network of reciprocal relationships. It is also structurally integrative in that it helps create coherence among surface structures and between surface and deep structures. It creates consistency among the components of a given level of development (e.g., subsumed lower structures and undifferentiated higher structures, self structures and worldviews, and the variety of surface structures) by facilitating the full utilization of the capacities of that level through the processes of healthy translation. "Breaking bread" or sharing food with others, the significance of marriage as an emotional/sexual relationship, participatory teaching such as discussion-based classes (dialogical), and participation in a contemplative community as the cultivation and sharing of intuitive insight are examples of the exchange of good mana for the Archaic, Magical, Rational-Egoic, and Psychic stages, respectively. Such exchange serves to bind us to networks of social interaction. Level-specific examples of bad or disintegrative mana might be: anorexia, "sleeping around," lecture-only teaching (monological), and spiritual materialism. This bad mana is not integrative; it does not bind us to networks of ongoing relationships. The potential for higher truth and higher integration attracts us to higher "good" mana as higher needs emerge in development (e.g., we sense that "Reality" contains more than our present "reality" does, so we seek it. This is the innate urge to grow, or Wilber's Atman telos, spiritual telos, Eros, etc.).

As noted above, for Wilber, the process of development of the compound individual involving exchange of mana, is a process of relational exchange (i.e., mana is acquired within relationship and therefore is social). Each of the hierarchic levels of the compound individual involves a process of relational exchange with similar levels in the world process at large.

�even the material body, the very lowest level, is a process of food intake, assimilation, and release, and is always bound not to but as the community of its exchange partners. Sexual reproduction is obviously relational exchange. As for the mental level, Levi-Strauss (among many others) has clearly established that "In mathematics, in logic, or in life, a symbol must be exchanged with another person; in the act of exchange the symbol creates and maintains relationship.�" And spiritual levels are not only exchanges with divinity, or communion-identity, but with divinity embodied as the spiritual master and the community of contemplative partners. Each level is a society [network] of relationships or exchange occasions, with the human compound individual being a society of those societies, hopelessly interlocked with other humans in societies of those (Wilber, 1983:36-37).

Society is both reproduced in the compound individual (e.g., Mead's "me") and the compound individual is (socially) reproduced (e.g., Mead's "I") via relational exchange.

Taboo. The second translative force of development, taboo, is essentially the fundamental fear of annihilation that is a result of the apprehension, by the separate self, of its own mortality. It is the fear of death. To the extent that the self is identified with, thus separated from, anything other than the whole (at the Ultimate stage), to the extent that subject/object, knower/known, self/other duality is exclusively maintained, the separate self faces its finititude and mortality. This possibility gives rise to existential terror which must somehow be controlled or it would immobilize us. "There is simply but absolutely no way to avoid that terror [of the separate self] except by repression or some other defensive or compensatory mechanism" (Wilber, 1983:50). Lifton's (1967) concept of psychic numbing is, in my opinion, an example of our attempts to control or deny the terror of confronting our mortality.

Taboo is communicated and to some degree constructed socially. It is similar to Durkhein's anomie (1951; Parsons, 1941). Indeed Berger and Luckmann call it anomic terror. In discussing the need for symbolic universes, Berger and Luckmann state, "On the level of meaning, the institutional order represents a shield against terror.� The symbolic universe shelters the individual from ultimate terror by bestowing ultimate legitimation upon the protection structures of institutional order.� The primacy of the social objectivations of everyday life can retain its subjective plausibility only if it is constantly protected against terror" (1966:101-2). This terror is the deep fear of absolute aloneness or annihilation of the self through the loss of the social structures that protect against absolute death.

As Wilber, and Berger and Luckmann point out, we attempt to defend against taboo by constructing immortality symbols; things that can and will survive us, and thus vicariously continue us. Things such as children, houses, fame, fortune, can keep our memory alive. Even rational productions and purely logical beliefs are in part immortality projects. "They are productions that, in aspiring to some degree of truth, aspire to some degree of durability, and aspiring to durability claim hoped for immortality (my ideas will live on�)" (Wilber, 1983:51).

As Berger and Luckmann suggest, sociocultural productions, institutional order, the social objectivations of everyday life are shields against anomic terror, or, to use Wilber's language, they are immortality structures against taboo. For Wilber,

�culture--even rational culture--is what a separate self does with death: the self that is doomed only to die, and knows it, and spends its entire life (consciously or unconsciously) trying to deny it, both by manipulating its own subjective life and by erecting "permanent" and "timeless" cultural objects and conceptual principles as outward and visible signs of an inward and hoped for immortality (Wilber, 1983:51).

Taboo control has its level-specific forms as does mana acquisition. In Up from Eden, Wilber gives examples form the magic, mythic, rational, and subtle-soul levels:

�some of the phase specific forms of death-denial. It can be the immortality promised by magic ritual: "Where there is magic, there is no death" as Campbell summarized paleolithic religion. It can be the immortality promised by myth: "To be a favorite of the gods, to be immortal," as Becker would summarize classic mythic religion. It can be the immortality promised by reason: "The god of his own thought" said L.L. Whyte, "which as recompense promises immortality." [Or perhaps "I think therefore I am".] There even seems to be a very subtle form of immortality project in the soul realms: the last remnant of the separate self intuits timeless Being and then mistakes that timelessness for an everlasting duration or permanent self sense ("your immortal soul," which is no such thing�). The point is that, until there is final liberation--if such, indeed, exists--there remains some form of immortality project. Those projects become less and less compensatory at each higher level of structural organization, but they are never fully uprooted until the separate self sense is itself uprooted. Prior to that time life remains a battle of [obtaining and utilizing] mana [preferably good mana] verses [avoiding] taboo. (Wilber, 1983:52)

Mana and Taboo in Development. Adequate "supplies" of mana acquisition and taboo avoidance allow translative or horizontal growth to proceed normally. But with continued growth, the restrictions of each level become increasingly apparent. It is the limitations of each level, in the form of the inability to attain higher mana and the failure of the immortality structures of the level to control taboo (Wilber, 1980:100-111), that compels transformation.

The inadequacy of immortality structures of a level to control taboo is due to their bases upon incomplete, partial, and inaccurate identity of self with body, mind, soul but not with Spirit. So as development within a level (horizontal growth) progresses, the inadequacy of taboo control becomes more apparent, until taboo becomes unavoidable. Then there are two ways out. One is to retreat back to earlier development, or at least attempt to stop development in its tracks, resulting in distortions (see "What can go wrong: Distortions in Development" below). The other is to go through taboo, at least partially, to higher levels (vertical growth) and more subtle taboo control. This going through taboo requires dying to that level which is often experienced as the death of the self.

I think this is exactly what we (a rational-egoic society) are experiencing now as we confront the possibility of annihilation at the hands of the very mechanisms we have built to sustain and improve our lives--nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and environmentally harmful technology. The very social system we seek to protect and maintain, that gives us our meaning, that in turn protects us from taboo, threatens us with taboo, with the termination of immortality structures. Our ways out are back (i.e., psychic numbing; the fundamentalism and reactionary-conservatism of mythic membership; or even further back, to foraging eco-fusion); or through, to perhaps true globalism (i.e., greater perspectivism, empathy, vision-logic, etc.), where networks of economic, sociopolitical, and environmental interdependence and interrelationship generate new, more sustainable forms of society.

But avoidance of taboo is not the only side of growth. The other is involves obtaining and utilizing mana. Horizontal development progresses through the improving ability to obtain and utilize the mana available to meet the needs expressed by the capacities and structural organization of a given stage. As horizontal development progresses, the mana available gets used, in a sense, as the capacities of the level are fully employed. As the mana available is utilized two things begin to happen. Mana from higher levels is sought, both for its own "nourishment" and for help with integrating lower levels. And new capacities in the compound individual begin to emerge, creating new, higher mana-needs (as in Maslow's needs hierarchy). This is how the innate urge to grow operates in Wilber's view. As those higher mana needs are met, vertical growth occurs.

For example, our present Rational-Egoic level of development, which began with the Ancient Greeks, has resulted in a progressively rationalized society that has become progressively alienated, individualistic, and anomic. The current "boom" in Eastern religions and "metaphysical" activities may indicate a search for higher mana as the limits of our "rational" mana are realized.

As the inadequacies of taboo control at a given level become apparent and better taboo control is sought, tension is created either within the level (as repression, see "What can go wrong: Distortions in Development" below) or between the old taboo control system and the new or higher one. Likewise, as the integrative mana of a given level is utilized and consequently new capacities begin to appear, tension is created within the level for the mana available in it and between the old and the emerging new levels for the higher integrative mana. Dialectical tension within and between levels for taboo control and mana acquisition is an important part of both horizontal and vertical development.

What Can Go Wrong: Distortion in Development

In Wilber's view, development is not a sure thing, nor is it predetermined; it is our potential. We can realize that potential or not; we can become fully aware of our true nature as Spirit, or our identities can be fixed elsewhere. At the individual level, there is some free will involved. Because Spirit is immanent and higher mana is always available (through individual self-transcendence), individuals can and sometimes do attain a higher level of development than the species. This higher, more subtle mana is always available, and we can each learn how to access it.

But, in Wilber's view, the individual is not entirely free. The individual, as a social product, is likewise constrained by society. Society can to some degree block the availability of higher mana, or the knowledge of it and therefore the search for it. For example, Berger and Luckmann's concept of legitimation is a process of supporting or sustaining one group's (the dominant one's) version of reality, often at the expense of other groups' versions. Legitimation (a concept Wilber often uses) is socially objectivated knowledge that serves to justify and explain the social order (1966:93). Other versions of reality are not legitimated. For example, in our current Rational-Egoic social reality, people who meditate for peace are considered weird, unrealistic, na�ve, etc. Consequently, it is generally accepted that meditation is not an effective way to produce anything more that a narcissistic peace. Knowledge of the possibilities of this kind of peacemaking is blocked. So it appears that while society cannot deny us higher mana, it can block our desire for it and our knowledge of it.

Nonetheless, in Wilber's view, society can and occasionally does produce individuals that obtain higher developmental levels. He refers to them as "trans-laws" (Wilber, 1983:98-99). Max Weber's view of the role of the prophet as rationalizing a break from tradition by creating another interpretation of reality and our approach to it, "as the initiator of a great process of rationalization in the interpretation of 'meaning' of the world and the attitudes of men should take towards it" (Parsons, 1941:567) is an example of a trans-law. In Wilber's view, at the species/society level, trans-laws function to orient our development by reminding us of the limitations of our current taboo control and the availability of higher mana. They help us find our way.

But in most cases, especially as regards the higher levels, individual development can be greatly constrained by society. Development can be blocked. Relational exchange of the compound individual can be distorted. The higher structural potentials can be imbalanced or distorted relative to the lower ones within the exchange system that produces, modifies and maintains them.

Distortion in relational exchange comes from at least three sources, in Wilber's view. First, it can occur when distortions in a lower level incline the higher levels to reproduce the distortions (e.g., distorted material exchanges can disturb emotional and mental exchanges). Since the higher emerges after the lower (cells emerge after molecules, which emerge after atoms, etc.), distortions in the lower can infect and distort the higher. Subsequent development "upon" this translational error can then be reproduced in distortions of higher levels since the higher comes through and then rests on lower development. For example, assume for a moment that we are beginning to move from Rational-egoic to Vision-logic stages, based on wider acceptance of the view that interdependence is the fundamental process shaping the world. Mis-translations of the Rational-Egoic structure, such as the narcissistic individualism that Durkheim feared (Mestrovic, 1988), can be reproduced as distorted, self-indulgent views of peace as individual, internal harmony only, without reference to community or society, and as a perversion of interdependence as a pretense that is acted out but for individual gain ("people need others to exploit").

In the first type, the higher is developmentally distorted by problems in the lower. In the second type, higher aspects of the compound individual repress the lower. For example, mind (superego, conscience) can repress emotional-sexual impulses. And in the third, distortions can occur when more powerful individuals or societal structures oppress the individual in relational exchange, as has been demonstrated, Wilber suggests, by "Marx for material exchange, Freud for emotional-sexual exchange, Socrates for mental communicative exchange, and Christ for spiritual exchange" (Wilber, 1983:41). "Internalized oppression is surplus repression" (Wilber, 1983:41).

These problems of distortion in development and relational exchanges give Wilber an argument for an emancipatory sociology that is both critical (to correct distortion) and normative (to facilitate human development). (See "The Purpose of Society" below). Since the higher is not solely caused by or constituted by the lower, the higher has some degree of "emergent freedom" by which it can correct distortions (Wilber, 1983:40). Thus both individual and social pathologies can be viewed as uncorrected distortions of development and relational exchange, and this allows for a truly emancipatory sociology, in Wilber's view.

Corrective Mechanism: Emancipatory Interests

There are several processes that compel development. The primary one is the mana/taboo process and its tension described above. This one appears to be in operation all the time. The secondary one is an "emancipatory interest" process and its tension, which operates to correct development when something goes wrong at any point. It "kicks in" only when needed. It is a "built in" mechanism to correct distortions when they occur, if we allow it to work. To explain it, Wilber uses Habermas's work on knowledge and cognitive interests, and extends it into a consideration of vertical and horizontal emancipatory interests.

Habermas' work on cognitive interests, in Wilber's view, is looking only horizontally at the domain of the mind. Two of Habermas' three modes of knowledge (empiric-analytical, hermeneutic-historical) and their corresponding cognitive interests (technical, practical) are located in the structure of the mind. The third, critical-reflexive knowledge and its corresponding emancipatory interest, is not located in a specific structure of development but across the whole hierarchy. There are two reasons for this, according to Wilber. First, emancipatory interests seem to operate at all levels, as Marx (material), Freud (emotional-sexual), and Habermas (mental) demonstrate. Second, emancipatory interests are not necessarily operative but operate only when distortions demand clarification. In other words, tension caused by distortion stimulates emancipatory interests. The critical reflexive mode subjects past cognitive operations to insight, and employs emancipatory interests to release them from distortion (Wilber, 1983:111-112).

Wilber differentiates between horizontal emancipatory interest (Habermas' main focus) and vertical emancipatory interest. Horizontal (or translative) emancipatory interests are concerned with "�'clearing up' the distortions in relational exchange on each major level" (1983:114). For example,

Marxist material-economic critique operates in a similar fashion [to Freudian psychoanalysis]--past (historical) economic oppressions give rise to societal tensions. These tensions (class struggle, false consciousness, alienated labor, opaque ideology) can be resolved only by a critical analysis of their historical (developmental) genesis, with an interest in the emancipation from such oppressive economic distortions (Wilber, 1983:115).

Once the distortions (in material exchange�Marx; emotional-sexual exchange�Freud; and mental-communicative exchange�Habermas) are cleared, the need for critical-reflexive analysis and interest in emancipation weaken.

Vertical (or transformative) emancipatory interests are likewise stimulated by tension. But in this case it is not tension within levels but between levels. When the inherent limitations (obtaining good mana and avoiding taboo) of a level become increasingly evident, the need for emancipation from (not within) that level also increases. Vertical emancipatory interests "kick in" to free awareness, not from distortion per se, but from the limited perspective of the level by opening awareness to the next higher level. Vertical emancipatory interests are ultimately driven by Atman telos, and they are the major force of transcendence and transformation.


Wilber's developmental holism is profoundly sociological, resting as it does on the concepts of the compound individual and relational exchange at every structural level, which express the fundamental sociological perception that we are social beings and are governed to a large degree by social processes (Charron, 1990). The compound individual is what we as separate selves are, shaped and governed at our various levels through exchange with others and with social institutions. The compound individual is also a generic type--what we all are--the sum of all past development encapsulated in our social reality. The compound individual reflects the view that the individual is shaped by social forces. "Not without reason has it been said that the self is itself a society" (Durkheim, 1938:111). Yet it is the subjective meanings of the individual when communicated and shared that shape society (Weber, 1964; Berger and Luckmann, 1966). The development of the compound individual reflects the development of the self in the work of Mead (1934), where the attitude of the social "other" is gradually internalized into the self as the "me" through a series of stages of internalizing the roles or others (play, game, generalized other). This occurs only through relationship in Mead's view, or relational exchange, in Wilber's terms. As the self develops through these stages, it gains an expanding perspective just as in Wilber's developmental stages.

Not only is Wilber's view of the compound individual as shaped through relational exchange fundamentally sociological, his theory of developmental holism incorporates the sociological concern with the origins and consequences of social structures. Wilber's transpersonal sociology is in fact a combination of sociological structural-functionalism, phenomenological-hermeneutics, and critical theory framed in the context of the perennial philosophy. The approach of developmental holism is to use phenomenological-hermeneutics to overcome the reductionism of structural-functionalism, and to use structural-functionalism to overcome the uncritical nature of the intersubjective circle of phenomenological-hermeneutics in order to analyze what is wrong with human development and what should go right, assuming the validity of the perennial philosophy and biological and psychological developmental theories.

Wilber indicts Functionalism on two counts. First it reduces the subjective intentionality of actors to some latent-empirical function. It finds no empirical (sensory) referent for the manifest intent of Lao Tzu, Buddha, Krishna, and Christ of intuiting a transcendental ground of being, which is what they said they were doing. So functionalism, in Wilber's view, attributes the efforts of these sages to some latent function unknown to them (Wilber, 1983:11). The second and more orthodox indictment of functionalism is that it misses the intersubjective dimension of human interaction. Human interaction contains meaning, values, goals, and interests that are more truly intersubjective than objective. An empirical-analytic functionalism either just ignores this dimension or reduces it to some empirical-objective function (e.g., Merton's Hopi rain dance and its latent function of maintaining social solidarity instead of appeasing the gods to produce rain). This is the point that peace philosopher Gray Cox makes when he says that social reality is shot through with intentionality (1986:67) and any attempts to understand social reality that do not incorporate intentionality will fail.

On the other hand, Wilber's main indictment of hermeneutics is that it "has no teeth" (1983:16). Hermeneutics views the mental act as something real, not reducible to objective, sensory, or other terms. Mental events are real in that they refer to other things. Meanings and concepts refer to other meanings, concepts, objects in a circle or network of shared subjective interpretations, meanings, values. This is the intersubjective or hermeneutic circle. To understand a meaning or a concept, a mental event, one must attempt to enter the intersubjective circle, the historical-social context in which the actor's shared subjectivity is embedded. Hermeneutics, as an isolated technique, is problematic for Wilber in that it allows no external standard to evaluate the validity of the meaning or concept. "If you are in the hermeneutic circle, consensual interpretive agreement is validation; if you are outside the circle you are not allowed a judgment" (1983:15). This follows Parsons' critique of social gestalt that it must be checked by reference to a critically consistent system of concepts (1941:588).

Wilber's developmental holism offers a structural-functional external corrective or scheme of developmental levels of narrative competence (i.e., an external way of evaluating the "truth" of a text in the context of the intersubjective circle) that is part of the phenomenological-hermeneutics intersubjective circle in its historical-social context (its surface structures). A specific "psychosocial production" (e.g., meaning, value, belief) can be critically evaluated in its own terms by comparison to the deep structural capacities it claims to express. This is done through the application of critical-reflective knowledge and its attendant emancipatory interests to uncover and correct distortions expressed in the "psychosocial production." Wilber's integration of these approaches attempts to overcome the limitations of both structural-functionalism and phenomenological-hermeneutics without throwing out the advantages of either (objective-positivistic modes of analysis and critical inquiry, and incorporating the subjective intentionality of human social behavior).

The Purpose of Society. Although he does not explicitly state it, Wilber sees two purposes of society. First, as has already been mentioned, society is the home of an originator of the compound individual. Second, society is the surface structural setting of both individual and collective deep structural development. Society is the forum in which distortion, oppression, repression, relational exchange of mana, and the avoidance of taboo, is conducted. The purpose of Sociology then, as the science of society, is to promote a normative, critical, and thereby emancipatory understanding of humanity, so as to facilitate the development and unfolding of our deeper and higher potentials. Sociology should aim to be a critical discipline in understanding what went wrong (e.g., distortion) in the dynamic processes that result in and change social structures and processes (e.g., translation, transcription, transformation, acquisition of good mana, avoidance of bad mana, taboo control, and intra- and inter-level tension). Sociology should aim to be normative in prescribing what should go right, what "better" social structures and processes would be. Sociology should aim at being emancipatory by helping us see how to change those social structures and processes (via freeing emancipatory interests) toward what they should be (normative). While Wilber sees development as not predetermined, the self-correcting emancipatory-interest process of development slightly stacks the deck in our (development's) favor, provided we allow it to operate. I think it is fair to say that Wilber sees the purpose of emancipatory sociology as facilitating the operation of emancipatory interests, not in a social engineering sense, but as an open inquiry and invitation.


At the beginning of this paper, I raised four questions. They are:

1) What larger theoretical structure embodies the range of peace concepts and the two paradigms?

2) What is the sociological basis for the Popular and Numinar paradigms?

3) What is the relationship between the paradigms?

4) What is the relationship between worldviews and peace concepts?

Drawing on Wilber's developmental holism, I shall attempt to answer these. I begin by suggesting that here is a strong association between the Rational-Egoic level and the Popular paradigm, and between the Vision-logic level and the Numinar paradigm.

Summary of the paradigms. The Popular paradigm contains concepts that are materialistic, international, have a macro-social view of changing social structures, and are external. These concepts appear to be based on worldviews that are fundamentally fear oriented. The Numinar paradigm contains peace concepts that are idealistic, intra- and inter-personal, have a micro-social grass-roots based social transformation orientation to changing social structures, and are internal and external. These concepts appear to be based on worldviews that are fundamentally faith oriented.

Answers and evidence. In my opinion, developmental holism explains peace concepts and paradigms nicely. Peace concepts are surface structures which reflect worldviews that stem from a particular level of structural development. The Popular and Numinar paradigms are deep structurally different categories of peace concepts and worldviews. I think the Popular paradigm reflects our present modal level of development, the Rational-Egoic. Circumstantially, the Rational-Egoic mode and the Popular paradigm both appear dominant at this time (as an average mode). According to developmental holism, if the Rational-Egoic deep structure is the prevalent one, then the dominant surface structures (e.g., bureaucracy) should reflect that deep structure. Cox (1986:28) argues well, in my opinion, that we live in a culture of conflict that consists of a network of conflict centered views of human life embodied in the dominant concepts of rationality, social knowledge, and human action in our culture as well as in the institutions which elaborate and reflect those conceptions (e.g., bureaucracy elaborating and reflecting instrumental rationality). And he traces many of these dominant conceptions back to the Ancient Greeks, as Wilber does the Rational-Egoic structure.

I think that the Numinar paradigm reflects an increasing emergence of the Vision-Logic structure and its psychosocial relational exchanges (whose "panoramic awareness" is a major gateway to transpersonal and spiritual domains). But by definition, evidence of current deep structural change is hard to see. Nevertheless, it seems that we are living in a time of weakening taboo control and increasing realization of the limitations of current mana. For example,

The largest study reported in the literature is a six-year study involving 15,000 students in 130 high schools across 48 states in the United States [Beardslee and Mack, 1986 cited in Stillion, et. al. 1988]. This study documented a consistent rise in agreement with the statement that "nuclear or biological annihilation will probably be the fate of all mankind within my lifetime" (Stillion, et. al., 1988:230).

More broadly, Lifton, (1974:685) proposes a theory of symbolic immortality "�a sense of immortality�as man's symbolization of his ties both with his biological fellows and his history, past and future." He sees five general modes of immortality symbolization: 1) the biological mode, the sense of living through and in one's children; 2) the theological idea of life after death or release from profane life to existence on a higher plane; 3) creativity or immortality achieved through works, one's human influence will live on; 4) the idea of eternal nature of which we are a part and which survives us; and 5) the psychic state of experiential transcendence in which time and death disappear. This theory can be used to illustrate cultural change from one historical period to another. "The Darwinian revolution of the 19th century, for example, can be seen as entailing a shift from a predominantly theological mode to a more natural and biological one�. [However] we exist now in a time of doubt about modes of continuity and connection�" (Lifton, 1974:687). As a result of widespread threat to our immortality symbols (e.g., children, groups and organization, works, religion, nature) "posed by nuclear weapons, environmental destruction, and the press of rising population against limited resources" (Lifton, 1974:687), Lifton sees a general turn, especially among the young, to the mode of experiential transcendence.

Wilber would interpret Lifton's shift towards experiential transcendence as both a search for better (higher) taboo control and for higher mana (truth, relevance, meaning) brought on by a near catastrophic failure of current taboo control and the increasingly obvious limitations of current mana (e.g., rationalization of society, instrumental technology). Under such conditions of weakening taboo control and the search for higher mana, developmental holism "predicts" deep structural change. I see the Popular and Numinar paradigms as indicators (as is Lifton's shift in immortality symbolization) of pending deep psychosocial structural change. I hypothesize that Numinar concepts and worldviews will become more widespread in the next century.

The Numinar paradigm, with its emphasis on networks of personally transformed individuals transforming social systems, corresponds will with Vision-Logic's capacity to consider a mass network of ideas to form a "big-picture" panoramic awareness. Indeed the globalization of economies, cultures via globalized communication systems and worker migrations, and environmental crises and management systems indicates to me that we are increasingly being forced to think in such panoramic terms and may be developing a more globalized generalized other.

Thus, as globalization proceeds, are seeing an increasing emphasis on our fundamental interdependence and a broader concern for humanity than for our own small in-groups or political jurisdictions, forcing us to think beyond our National borders, to see things more in terms of world systems than of national interests. This capacity for expanded perspectivism seems to be growing, and I think the Numinar paradigm reflects this perspectivism as well. To the extent that the Numinar paradigm is a surface structural indicator of the (higher) worldview of Vision-logic, the sociological basis for the Numinar is that of developmental holism.


I think that the Numinar paradigm is the alternative paradigm that Reardon (1989) is calling for. First, I think conflict and peace researchers need to recognize the limitations of the Popular paradigm approaches to peace. These limitations include a) ambiguous and limited definitions of peace are leading to obvious difficulties in making peace, and b) over emphasis on macro-systems (strategies to make a more peaceful society probably need to be implemented at all levels of social aggregation to be successful).

Second, the Numinar paradigm, as an analytical construct, needs further articulation. Here I have suggested developmental holism as a useful vehicle for that articulation. Empirical studies could be undertaken to test a) how widespread Numinar type concepts and worldviews really are, b) whether Numinar concepts correlate with Numinar worldviews, and c) changes in Numinar and Popular concepts and worldviews over time.

Critical-reflective knowledge and its attendant emancipatory interests are not limited to academic disciplines, although they should be a primary concern of academia. From the perspective of developmental holism, it is the function of peace and conflict research, as the main locus of critical-reflective knowledge of peace, to be sure that both horizontal and vertical emancipatory interests are operating, in research, public discourse, political debate, and popular ideology. It is the function of peace and conflict research to look for and identify distortions in both translation and transformation that adversely affect peace.

The third implication for peace and conflict research is that better peacemaking may be possible from a better understanding of what "peace" can be. The two paradigms I have found represent a wide range of peace concepts and peacemaking approaches. Yet in my opinion, these paradigms focus on a fairly narrow but critical range of human development (i.e., rational-egoic and vision-logic). A more complete consideration of the entire developmental spectrum of consciousness�and the correlative spectrum of peace�would enrich our understanding of what we are trying to accomplish and also give us a vast repertoire of approaches. Good mana at all of the general stages of psychosocial development would be expected to contribute to an overall peace, and, much as with Maslow's needs hierarchy, providing adequate mana at every stage, individually and collectively, would be an integral part of any enduring peace. Developmental holism gives us some of the tools to begin such an extended analysis.

Additionally, we need to be structurally clear in our conflict and peace studies so that we do not confuse what is higher with what is lower (or vice versa). For example, people who devote their lives to meditation or prayer to make the world more peaceful, or like Gandhi insist that peacemakers first undergo internal transformation, should not be dismissed as indulging in some Magical belief system. Conversely, many New-Age magical beliefs, which claim to be peace-promoting, might be not much more than narcissistic self-absorption. Developmental holism helps us make these types of clarifications, in the context of emancipatory interests.

At the same time, specific work at any of the lower levels�including the Popular paradigm�can be seen as phase-specifically appropriate, even necessary, but are not themselves sufficient for higher, more enduring peace.


I think there is a common basis for understanding and communication among the seemingly disparate approaches to peace. I see a common ground. The tension created by the failure of the Rational-Egoic social system to protect us from nuclear or biological annihilation, and its failure to adequately maintain an integrated society (e.g., alienation, anomie, narcissistic individualism) and provide meaning (as evidenced by the growing human potential movement, self-help and 12-step groups; increasing interest in "eastern" religions and spiritual traditions; the "new age movement"; and new social movements such as "the greens") is the force that has compelled the search for a common ground (in this context also "higher"), where all those committed to peace might stand.

This common ground is to a large extent contained within the Numinar paradigm. The Numinar includes the Popular, as higher subsumes lower in developmental holism. Materialism, international relations, external macro-structural approaches to peace are all fine so long as they are viewed in the proper context and are not the exclusive focus of peace. Indeed the Numinar "allows" that international macro-systems must be changed and the material conditions need to be improved for many. But such efforts will not really achieve an enduring, meaningful peace by themselves. They must be done in concert with other efforts (e.g., inter-personal, grass-roots transformation). The Numinar, which corresponds closest to the Vision-logic stage of structural development, thus contextualizes�transcends and includes� the Popular paradigm peace efforts.

Secondly, common ground can, as this paper has attempted to show, be found in the view that all approaches to peace, all peace concepts, can be seen as focused, useful, and complimentary efforts to progressively remove more subtle barriers to Peace. All are working at different points along the continuum of peace. Further, all peace thinkers share a noblesse oblige to work to remove distortions of material, mental and spiritual exchange that impede our understanding of Peace and our visions of how to allow society, via emancipatory interests, to self-organize more peacefully.

The stages of developmental holism are, in a sense, the stages of the overall peace process. On the basis of this common ground (i.e. unifying paradigm, continuum of peace, shared obligation) peace researchers, theorists, activists, and professionals can obtain a constructive and sustained interaction that is respectful of differences yet is effective in human betterment.


1. This literature was used as reference to help me develop my understanding of the paradigms. For historical works see Murty and Bouquet, 1960; Zampaglione, 1973; Kende, 1989; Northedge, 1967; Marvin, 1921; Wright, 1942; Parrington, 1930; Randle, 1973; Ferguson, 1977; Gandhi, 1960; Fischer, 1950; Puri, 1987. For philosophical works see Rousseau, 1761; Kant, 1795; Gallie, 1978; Nietzsche, 1917; Augustine, 1958; Grotius, 1901; Russell, 1945; Huxley, 1945; Thoreau, 1966.

2. Yet Gandhi's approach seems based on the pragmatic need to change society now as opposed to waiting for human nature to develop and change society apace and the need to address macro-social systems (e.g., war, British colonialism). I see this as suggestive of the optimistic humanism of the Numinar worldview but with a strong element of the Popular pessimistic pragmatism.

3. Wilber's argument for the acceptability of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, is essentially an evolutionary one. "The same force that produced humans from amoebas [phylogeny] produces adults from infants [ontogeny]. That is, a person's growth from infancy to adulthood is simply a miniature version of cosmic evolution" (Wilber, 1990:84). Wilber views evolution teleologically; we are compelled toward a higher Estate--Spirit. Biologists see evolution more as a process of randomness: development towards adaptation to a changing environment. Wilber believes both are true, with the latter subsuming the former. I agree with Wilber.

4. While Sociology does not usually deal with this and higher stages of development, I believe some sociologists have glimpsed these higher levels. Durkheim's explorations of the collective conscience is a good example. "The collective consciousness is the highest form of psychic life, since it is the consciousness of consciousnesses. Being placed outside of and above individual and local contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent and essential aspects, which it crystalizes into communicable ideas. At the same time that it sees from above, it sees farther; at every moment of time, it embraces all known reality; that is why it can furnish the mind with the moulds which are applicable to the totality of things and which make it possible to think of them. It does not create these moulds artificially; it finds them within itself; it does nothing but become conscious of them. They translate the ways of being which are found in all stages of reality but which appear in their full clarity only at the summit, because the extreme complexity of psychic life which passes there necessitates a greater development of consciousness" (Durkheim, 1965:492-493).

5. For Wilber, legitimacy is the social process of promoting translation, whereas authenticity is the social process of promoting transformation. When taboo outweighs mana of a given worldview and its translations, a legitimation crisis ensues, which can lead either to transformation upward to increasing levels of holistic capacity, or regressive dissolution to lower, more fragmented modes.

6. Cox (1986:81) proposes that peace researchers and peacemakers engage their subjects in "critical participatory research" where by we can cultivate understanding with others by engaging them in better understanding their own meanings and actions. "People's own understandings of their activity is typically flawed in five sorts of ways. It is vague, implicit, inconsistent, incomplete, and inaccurate. So as social researchers, we must seek to remedy these flaws in order to adequately understand what people are doing and why". Cox is calling for the employment of emancipatory interests in his critical participatory research, albeit in a very applied way, through cultivating and maintaining agreement. This cultivation of agreement is Cox's concept of peace.


Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins "From Symbolic Realism to Structuralism: Critique of Reductionism" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1975. 13:4 403-414.

Richard A. Apostle, Charles Y. Glock, Thomas Piazza, Marijean Suelzle The Anatomy of Racial Attitudes. 1983. Univ. of California Press.

Saint Augustine The City of God. Vernon J. Bourke, ed. 1958. Image.

Yuri Bagsegov and Rustem Khairov. "A Study of the Problems of Peace" Co-existence. 1973. 10 1-11

Michael Banks "Four Conceptions of Peace" in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, eds. 1987. New York Univ Press.

Ernest Becker The Denial of Death. 1973. Free Press.

Howard S. Becker and Blanche Geer "Participant Observation and Interviewing: a Comparison" Human Organization. 1957. 16 28-32.

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. 1966. Doubleday.

Alfred Bonisch "Elements of the Modern Concept of Peace." Journal of Peace Research. 1981. 18:2 165-173.

Elise Boulding "Can Peace be Imagined?" in Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies. 1989. Praeger.

Elise Boulding and Raimo Vayrynen. "Peace Research: the Infant Discipline." In A Quarter Century of International Social Science. Stein Rokan, ed. For the International Social Science Council. Paris: UNESCO. 1980.

Kenneth Boulding Stable Peace. 1978. University of Texas Press.

Fritjof Capra The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. 1982. Simon and Schuster.

Joel M. Charon The Meaning of Sociology. 1982. Prentice Hall.

____________ The Meaning of Sociology. Third editions. 1990. Prentice Hall.

Noam Chomsky Problems of Knowledge and Freedom. 1971. Pantheon.

Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, eds. The Power of Human Needs in World Society. 1988. L. Rienner.

Lewis A. Coser The Functions of Social Conflict. 1956. Free Press.

Gray Cox The Ways of Peace: A Philosophy of Peace as Action. 1986 Paulist Press.

Geoffrey Darnton "The Concept of Peace." In Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Fourth General Conference. 1973. IPRA Secretariat, Oslo. 105-116.

Emile Durkheim The Division of Labor in Society. George Simpson, translator. (1893) 1964. Free Press.

____________ The Rules of Sociological Method. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller, tranlators. (1895) 1938. Free Press.

____________ Suicide: A Study in Sociology. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, Trans. George Simpson, ed. (1897) 1951. Free Press.

____________ The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. J. W. Swain, translator. (1912) 1965. Free Press.

John Ferguson War and Peace in the World's Religions. 1978. Oxford Univ. Press.

Marilyn Ferguson The Aquarian Conspiricy: Personal and Social Transformation in the 1980's. 1980. Tarcher.

Louis Fisher The Life of Mahatma Gandhi. 1950. Harper & Row.

Roger Fisher and William Ury Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. 1981. Houghton Mifflin.

Erich Fromm Marx's Concept of Man 1961. Frederick Ungar Publishing.

W.B. Gallie Philosophies of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engles and Tolstoy. 1978. Cambridge.

Johan Galtung "Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace." Journal of Peace Research. 19. 18:2 183-199.

____________ "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research. 1969. 3 167-191

M.K. Gandhi Gandhi's Autobiography. 1960. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.

Charles Y. Glock "The Way the World Works" Sociological Analysis 1988. 49:2 93-103.

Charles Y. Glock and Thomas Piazza "Explaining Reality Structures" in In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America. Thomas Robbins and Dick Anthony eds. 1983. Transaction, Inc.

Erving Goffman Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. 1974. Harvard Univ. Press.

Susan F. Greenwood "Emile Durkheim and C.G. Jung: Structuring a Transpersonal Sociology of Religion" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1990. 29:1 482-495.

____________ "Emile Durkheim and C.G. Jung: Renovating Irrationalism" paper presented at the American Sociological Association meeting, August 24, 1991. Cincinnati, Ohio.

David Ray Griffith "Peace and the Postmodern Paradigm" in Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions. David Ray Griffith, ed. 1988. SUNY press.

Hugo Grotius The Rights of War and Peace. A.C. Campbell, translator. (1625) 1901. M.W. Dunne.

B. Welling Hall "The Antinuclear Peace Movement: Toward an Evaluation of Effectiveness." Alternatives. 1984. 9 475-517.

Thomas Hobbes Leviathan. M. Oakeshatt, ed. (1651) 1934. Blackwell.

Aldous Huxley The Perennial Philosophy. 1945. Harper.

Takeshi Ishida "Beyond the Traditional Concepts of Peace in Different Cultures." Journal of Peace Research. 1969. 2 133-145.

Gunnar L. Johnson Conflicting Concepts of Peace in Contemporary Peace Studies. 1976. Sage Professional Paper in International Studies, Vol. 4, no. 02-246.

Mathew J. Kanjirathinkal A Sociological Critique of Theories of Cognitive Development: the Limitations of Piaget and Kohlberg. 1990. Edwin Mellen Press.

Immanuel Kant Prepetual Peace Translated by Benjamine F. Trueblood. (1795) 1897.

Istvan Kende "The History of Peace: Concept and Organizations from the Late Middle Ages to the 1870's" Journal of Peace Research. 1989. 26:3 233-247.

Ken Keyes The Hundreth Monkey. 1981. Vision Books

Lawrence Kohlberg "Stages and Aging in Moral Development--Some Speculations" The Gerontologist. 1973. 13 497-502.

Louis Kriesberg Sociology and Social Conflicts. 1973. Prentice Hall.

Thomas S. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1970. University of Chicago Press.

Robert J. Lifton Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. 1967. Random House.

____________ "On Death and the Continuity of Life: a "new" Paradigm" History of Childhood Quarterly. 1974. 1:4 681-696.

Jack London Before Adam. 1907. Macmillian.

John Macquarrie The Concept of Peace. 1973. SCM Press, London.

F.S. Marvin, ed. The Evolution of World Peace. 1921. Oxford Univ. Press.

Margaret Masterman "The Nature of a Paradigm" in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Irma Lakatos and Alan Musgrove eds. 1970.

George Herbert Mead Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Charles W. Morris, ed. 1934. Univ. of Chicago Press.

Stephan G. Mestrovic Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology. 1988. Rowan and Littlefield.

Frederich W. Nietzsche Thus Spake Zarathustra. Thomas Common, translator. (1892) 1917. Bonnie and Liveright, Inc.

Robert A. Nisbet The Sociological Tradition. 1966. Basic Books.

F.S. Northedge "Peace, War, and Philosophy." In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Paul Edwards, ed. 1967. V 6 Macmillian & Free Press.

C.E. Osgood An Alternative to War or Surrender. 1962. Univ. of Illinois Press.

____________ "The GRIT Strategy" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. 1980. 36 58-60.

Vernon Louis Parrington Main Currents in American Thought: an interpretation of American literature from the beginnings to 1920. 1930. Harcourt, Brace. NY.

Talcott Parsons The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. 1941. Free Press.

M. Scott Peck The Different Drum: community making and peace. 1987. Simon & Schuster.

Rashmi-Sudha Puri Gandhi on War and Peace. 1987. Praeger. NY.

Robert F. Randle The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements. 1973. Free Press.

Otto Rank Beyond Psychology. 1958. Dover.

____________ Psychology and the Soul. 1961. Perpetua.

Anatol Rapaport "Traditional Goals of International Cooperation" The Peace Keeping Role of International Cooperation and Its' Limitations. Unpublished, 1988.

Betty Reardon "Education for Negative Peace." And "Education for Positive Peace." Comprehensive Peace Education: Educating for Global Responsibility. 1988. 11-31.

____________ "Toward a Paradigm of Peace" in Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies. Linda Rennie Forcey, ed. 1989. Praeger.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau A Project of Perpetual Peace. Edith M. Nuttall, translator. (1761) 1927. London.

Rudolph J. Rummel Understanding Conflict and War Volume 5: The Just Peace. 1981. Sage.

Bertrand Russell A History of Western Philosophy. 1945. Simon & Schuster.

K. Satchidananda Murty and A.C. Bouquet Studies in the Problems of Peace. 1960. Asia publishing house, Bombay.

Wolfgang Schluchter The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History. Guenther Roth, translator. 1981 Univ. of California Press.

Georg Simmel Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations. Kurt H. Wolf and Reinhard Bendix, trans. 1955. The Free Press.

Miles Simpson "The Sociology of Cognitive Development" Annual Review of Sociology 1980. 287-313.

David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization" in International Social Movement Research. Vol 1. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriegi, Sidney Tarrow, eds. 1988.

J.M. Stillion, et.al. "Dimensions of the Shadow: children of six nations respond to the nuclear threat: Death Studies. 1988. 12:3 227-251.

Henry David Thoreau Walden and Civil Disobedience. Owen Thomes, ed. 1966. Norton.

Michael Washburn The Ego and the Dynamic Ground: A Transpersonal Theory of Human Development. 1988. SUNY Press.

____________ "Two Patterns of Transcendence" Revision. 1990. 13:1 3-15.

Max Weber Basic Concepts in Sociology. 1964. The Citadel Press.

William Foote Whyte Learning from the Field. 1984. Sage.

Ken Wilber Up From Eden: a Transpersonal View of Human Evolution. 1981. Anchor Press/Doubleday.

____________ A Sociable God: Toward a new Understanding of Religion. 1983. New Science Library, Boulder.

____________ The Atman Project: a Transpersonal View of Human Development. 1980. Quest

____________ "The Spectrum of Development" in Transformations of Consciousness. Ken Wilber, Jack Engler, Daniel Brown, eds. 1986.

____________ Eye to Eye: The Quest for the New Paradigm. Expanded edition. 1990. Shambala.

Quincy Wright A Study of War. 1942. Univ. of Chicago Press.

Robert Wuthnow The Consciousness Reformation. 1976. Univ. of California Press.

Gerardo Zampaglione The Idea of Peace in Antiquity. Richard Dunn, translator. 1973. Univ. of Notre Dame Press.