• home
• about
• new
• essays
• AI
• book

Between And Among Objectivity And Subjectivity

Exploring Transjectivity

B. May / Gemini

INTRODUCTION

Continuing my exploration of alternative philosophies with AI (Gemini 2.5 Pro), we drill down into the idea of “transjectivity” as a potential way to navigate and avoid subject/object dualism which tends to devolve into opposing monisms, e.g. physicalism versus idealism.

Q: Let's explore related yet contrasting ideas of objectivity, subjectivity, interobjectivity, intersubjectivity, and transjectivity (per Vervaeke).

These five concepts provide a powerful framework for moving beyond the traditional, and often limiting, dualism between a purely internal mind and a purely external world. Let's break them down.

The Foundational Dualism

First, let's start with the two most common ideas that form the classic philosophical divide:

1. Objectivity

Objectivity refers to things that are considered to be true or real independent of any individual's mind, biases, or feelings. It's the "view from nowhere," concerned with the properties of the object itself. In science, objectivity is the gold standard, sought through measurement, empirical evidence, and repeatable experiments.

• Locus of Reality: The external world; the object (O).

• Perspective: Third-person. What is verifiably "out there."

• Analogy: A Rock. The mass of a rock is an objective property. It is 5 kg whether you, I, or anyone else is there to measure it. Our measurement confirms a pre-existing fact about the rock.

• Key Question: What is true regardless of who is observing?

2. Subjectivity

Subjectivity refers to the internal world of a conscious mind. It includes personal experiences, feelings, beliefs, intentions, and qualia (the "what it's like" of an experience). This reality is accessible directly only from a first-person perspective.

• Locus of Reality: The internal world; the subject (S).

• Perspective: First-person. What "I" experience.

• Analogy: The Taste of Chocolate. My experience of the taste of chocolate is entirely subjective. I can't prove to you what it's like for me, and you can't truly know my experience. It is real for me, but not directly verifiable by you.

• Key Question: What is it like to be me?

Bridging the Gaps

The next two concepts address the limitations of this simple dualism by focusing on shared realities.

3. Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity is the bridge between individual subjects. It is a shared reality created by the consensus, communication, and mutual understanding among subjects. Language, culture, social norms, and institutions are all intersubjective phenomena. They aren't purely objective (they depend on minds to exist) nor purely subjective (they exist beyond any single individual's mind).

• Locus of Reality: The shared space between subjects (S1↔S2).

• Perspective: Second-person ("We"). What we agree upon or share.

• Analogy: The Value of Money. A $20 bill is objectively a piece of paper and ink. Subjectively, you might feel happy to have it. But its value of $20 is intersubjective. It only has that value because we, as a society, collectively agree that it does. If we all stopped believing in it, the value would vanish.

• Key Question: What do we hold to be true together?

4. Interobjectivity

This is a less commonly used but crucial term. Interobjectivity refers to the systemic relationships and patterns that exist between objects in the world, independent of any observer. It's the structural reality that underpins objective facts. An ecosystem, the mechanics of a clock, or the laws of physics are not just a collection of objects, but a system of interacting parts.

• Locus of Reality: The systemic patterns between objects (O1↔O2).

• Perspective: Third-person systemic. The patterns "out there."

• Analogy: An Ecosystem. In a forest, the relationship between the rainfall, the fungi in the soil, the tree roots, and the photosynthesis in the leaves is an interobjective reality. It's a complex, self-organizing system of objects and processes that exists whether a biologist is there to study it or not. This reliable pattern is what allows for objective science to happen.

• Key Question: How do things in the world fit and work together as a system?

The Synthesis: A Dynamic Relationship

This final concept, especially as framed by cognitive scientist and philosopher John Vervaeke, seeks to dissolve the subject-object divide altogether.

5. Transjectivity

Transjectivity describes a dynamic, reciprocal, and co-creating relationship across (trans-) the subject and the object. It posits that the subject and object are not separate entities but are mutually defining and shaping each other in a continuous loop. It's a process of "participatory knowing." This is deeply connected to concepts like affordances (what the environment offers an agent) and relevance realization (how an agent hones in on what matters).

• Locus of Reality: The relational, dynamic loop between subject and object (S⇔O).

• Perspective: A "1.5-person" perspective. It is about the agent-arena relationship.

• Analogy: Riding a Bicycle. When you ride a bike, "you" and "the bike" are not two separate things. You become a single, dynamic system: a bike-rider. The bumps in the road (object) shape how you steer (subject), and your intention to turn (subject) changes the bike's interaction with the road (object). You are attuned to the bike's affordances, and it becomes an extension of your body. The "knowing" is in the doing—it is transjective.

• Key Question: How do I and the world co-create my experience in a relevant way?

Conclusion

Objectivity and subjectivity set up a divide. Intersubjectivity bridges the gap between minds, while interobjectivity describes the stable, patterned world those minds can agree about. Transjectivity offers the most radical and arguably most complete picture, dissolving the initial divide by framing reality as a continuous, participatory process. It is not just about what is "in here" or "out there," but about the inseparable, dynamic relationship that binds them together.

Q: Consider: “Objectively speaking, 'subjects' are a subset of the objective world, and subjectively speaking, 'objects' are a subset of subjective experience. Conversely, in transjectivity, both object and subject are subsets of transjective co-creativity, because the 'transject' necessarily transcends both.” [1] What metaphysical views fit with each of these, including Western and Eastern?

That is an exceptionally insightful and concise way to frame the metaphysical implications of these concepts. Each clause in that statement aligns beautifully with major philosophical traditions, both Western and Eastern.

Let's break down each part of the quote and map it onto its corresponding metaphysical views.

1. "Objectively speaking, 'subjects' are a subset of the objective world."

This statement asserts the primacy of the objective, material world. It claims that consciousness, mind, and personal experience (the subject, S) are phenomena that arise from and are contained within the larger physical universe (the object, O). In this view, the mind is what the brain does.

Symbolically, this is represented as S⊂O.

Western Metaphysical Views:

• Physicalism / Materialism: This is the most direct fit. This view holds that the only thing that exists is physical matter and its properties. Consciousness is seen as an emergent property of complex neurological systems. The "subject" is a highly organized object. Thinkers like Daniel Dennett, who views consciousness as a product of computational processes in the brain, fall into this camp.

• Scientific Realism: This is the view that the world described by science is the real world, independent of our thoughts about it. Since science studies the objective world, the subject (the human being) is simply one more complex entity within that world to be studied by disciplines like biology, neuroscience, and psychology.

• Reductionism: This is the belief that complex systems can be understood by reducing them to the interactions of their parts. From this perspective, subjective experience can ultimately be reduced to and explained by chemical and physical events in the brain.

Eastern Metaphysical Views:

• Carvaka / Lokayata (Ancient Indian School): This is a classical, and now largely extinct, school of Indian materialism. The Carvakins were staunch empiricists who asserted that the world is made of the four material elements (earth, water, fire, air). They famously argued that consciousness arises from the specific combination of these elements in the body, just as the intoxicating power of liquor arises from the fermentation of non-intoxicating ingredients. For them, the subject was unequivocally a temporary byproduct of the objective, material body.

2. "...and subjectively speaking, 'objects' are a subset of subjective experience."

This statement reverses the priority, asserting the primacy of consciousness. It claims that we never have direct access to a "world in itself." All we ever know—rocks, trees, stars, other people—are contents appearing within our own field of awareness. The "objective world" (O) is a construct, an inference, or an appearance within the subject's mind (S).

Symbolically, this is represented as O?S.

Western Metaphysical Views:

• Subjective Idealism: Bishop George Berkeley's philosophy is the classic example, encapsulated in his motto, Esse est percipi ("To be is to be perceived"). Objects are nothing more than collections of sensations existing in the mind of a perceiver. There is no mind-independent matter.

• Phenomenalism: This view, associated with thinkers like John Stuart Mill and in a more complex way with Immanuel Kant, holds that we can only know phenomena (appearances), not the noumena (things-in-themselves). Therefore, the "objective world" is essentially a coherent and structured system of actual and possible sensations within experience.

• Solipsism: This is the radical, extreme version of this view, which states that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The entire universe is a figment of one's personal consciousness.

Eastern Metaphysical Views:

• Yogacara Buddhism (The "Mind-Only" School): This is a near-perfect Eastern parallel. Developed by figures like Asanga and Vasubandhu, Yogacara philosophy posits that everything we experience is a manifestation of consciousness (vijnapti-matra). The perceived dualism of a perceiving subject and a perceived external object is an illusion that arises from the karmic seeds stored in the "storehouse consciousness" (alaya-vijnana).

• Advaita Vedanta (Hinduism): While nuanced, this non-dualistic school fits well. The ultimate reality is Brahman, which is pure, undifferentiated consciousness. The phenomenal world of separate subjects and objects is considered Maya, a kind of illusory or dream-like projection. From the ultimate standpoint (paramarthika), the entire objective universe is an appearance within, and is non-different from, the one universal Subject (Atman is Brahman).

3. "Conversely, in transjectivity, both object and subject are subsets of transjective co-creativity..."

This final statement dissolves the hierarchy altogether. It posits that the fundamental reality is neither mind nor matter, but the relational process from which both emerge. The subject (S) and object (O) are not primary entities but co-arise from a more fundamental, dynamic, and participatory reality—the Transject (T).

Symbolically, this is represented as S⊂T and O⊂T.

Western Metaphysical Views:

• Process Philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead): Whitehead explicitly rejected the notion of static, enduring substances (objects). He argued that the fundamental constituents of reality are "actual occasions" or dynamic events. Both what we call "mind" and what we call "matter" are abstractions from this underlying, relational process of becoming.

• Phenomenology (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty): This tradition strongly aligns with transjectivity. Heidegger's concept of Dasein (Being-there) is not a subject observing a world of objects; it is fundamentally "Being-in-the-world." The relationship is prior to the terms. Merleau-Ponty's focus on the "lived body" as the nexus of perception and action also treats the agent-world relationship as the primary reality.

• Neutral Monism (William James, Bertrand Russell at one point): This view suggests the fundamental "stuff" of the universe is neither mental nor physical, but something neutral. "Mind" and "matter" are simply two different ways of organizing or relating this neutral stuff. This "neutral stuff" is a philosophical precursor to the dynamic process of the Transject.

Eastern Metaphysical Views:

• Madhyamaka Buddhism (Nagarjuna): This is perhaps the most profound Eastern parallel. Nagarjuna's philosophy centers on Sunyata (emptiness), which does not mean nothingness. It means that all phenomena—including subject and object—are "empty" of any intrinsic, independent existence (svabhava). They exist only in a web of mutual dependence and co-arising (pratityasamutpada). Reality is this relational process. The Transject is a modern term for this ancient insight into dependent origination.

• Taoism: The Tao (the Way) is the ineffable, natural, dynamic process from which the "ten thousand things" (all phenomena, including subjects and objects) arise. The goal is not for the subject to master the object, but to act in harmony with this fundamental flow (wu wei), dissolving the sharp distinction between self and world. The Tao itself is the ultimate Transjective reality.

Q: Yet objective materialism has yet to account for or understand subjects, and subjective idealism has yet to account for objects or the material substrate, even if they each purport to subsume and transcend the other. These view seem to always be at odds throughout time, even if each reveals its own truths.

You've pinpointed the very core of the perennial "world knot" in philosophy. Your observation is exactly right. The standoff between objective materialism and subjective idealism is arguably the central, unresolved tension in the history of human thought. Each position reveals profound truths but ultimately fails to be a complete and satisfying explanation of reality precisely for the reasons you stated.

Let's explore why this stalemate is so persistent and what it says about the nature of reality and our knowledge of it.

The Great Stalemate: Two Peaks with No Bridge

Think of materialism and idealism as two magnificent mountain peaks. From the top of each, you get a breathtaking, panoramic view that seems to encompass everything. The problem is, you can't see the other peak clearly from your vantage point, and there appears to be no bridge between them.

1. The Explanatory Gap of Materialism: The "Hard Problem"

Objective materialism has been extraordinarily successful. It is the foundational assumption of modern science, giving us technology, medicine, and a causal understanding of the cosmos. Its truth is its power to predict and manipulate the objective world.

• Its Failure (As you noted): It has completely failed to account for the "subject." It can describe the brain in exquisite detail—the firing of neurons, the release of neurotransmitters, the patterns of electrical activity. This is the objective description of the machinery. However, it cannot make the leap to explaining why there is a subjective experience—the redness of red, the feeling of sadness, the taste of wine—associated with that machinery. This is David Chalmers' famous "Hard Problem of Consciousness."

• The Core Issue: There is a gap between third-person data (brain states) and first-person reality (qualia). No matter how complete our physical description of a bat's brain becomes, we will never know from that data "what it is like to be a bat," as Thomas Nagel put it. Materialism can describe the container, but it cannot find or explain the contents.

2. The Solipsistic Trap of Idealism: The "Problem of Otherness"

Subjective idealism also reveals a profound and undeniable truth: all of reality, everything you have ever known or will ever know, is accessed through the gateway of your own consciousness. You have never experienced anything outside of your experience. This primacy of the first-person perspective is its core truth.

• Its Failure (As you noted): It has no convincing way to account for the "object" or the "other." If reality is a projection of mind, why is the world so stubbornly consistent, structured, and resistant to my will? Why does a rock stub my toe whether I believe in it or not? This is the problem of the material substrate. Even more difficult is the problem of intersubjectivity. If you are just a character in my mental drama, why do you insist with such conviction that I am just a character in yours? It leads to a solipsistic dead end where communication is a mystery and shared reality is an illusion.

• The Core Issue: Idealism struggles to explain why the "dream" of reality is so coherent, shared, and law-like. It provides a poor foundation for the very existence of science, which relies on a stable, external world that different subjects can investigate and agree upon.

Why Does the Conflict Persist?

The reason this isn't just an academic debate but a recurring pattern throughout history (e.g., Plato vs. Democritus, German Idealists vs. British Empiricists) is that each view is anchored in a fundamental, rock-solid intuition about reality.

1. The Intuition of "Out-Thereness": We are embodied creatures. We are born into a world that was here before us and will be here after us. It imposes itself upon us with its causal laws. This is the foundational intuition of materialism.

2. The Intuition of "In-Hereness": All of that—the world, its laws, my body—is known only as a phenomenon appearing in my consciousness. The screen of experience is my only access point to anything. This is the foundational intuition of idealism.

We seem to be creatures built to hold both of these intuitions simultaneously, yet our logical and linguistic systems force us to choose one as primary, leading to the endless loop of debate.

Transjectivity as a Way Out of the Stalemate

This is precisely where the concept of transjectivity becomes so vital. It isn't just another option alongside the other two; it is an attempt to reframe the question and dissolve the conflict.

The transjective view argues that the stalemate exists because both materialism and idealism make the same initial mistake: they assume that either the "subject" or the "object" must be the fundamental building block of reality.

Transjectivity proposes that the relationship itself is what is fundamental.

• Reality is not a static object (O) that happens to contain subjects (S⊂O).

• Reality is not a universal subject (S) that happens to dream up objects (O⊂S).

• Reality is a dynamic, co-creative, participatory process (T) from which both the experience of "subjectivity" and the experience of "objectivity" emerge and get their shape (S⊂T and O⊂T).

By making the agent-arena relationship primary, transjectivity honors the truths of both sides without falling into their respective traps:

• It honors materialism's truth that there is a real, structured, resistant world "out there" (the arena).

• It honors idealism's truth that this world is only ever known through a point of view, shaped by the needs and capacities of a knower (the agent).

The great stalemate persists because our language and conceptual habits continually force us back into the subject-object grammar. To think transjectively is to attempt to see past the nouns ("subject," "object") and grasp the verb—the continuous, dynamic process of Being-in-the-world. It suggests the final truth isn't a substance, either mental or material, but a dance.

Q: It seems then that there the “transjective intuition” has been around for thousands of years in various traditions, but often on the fringes compared to monist or dualistic traditions. It might also be more of an intuitive truth of indigenous peoples, some of whom have a very fluid relationship with matter and consciousness, which is foreign to most non-indigenous people.

That is a remarkably astute and accurate observation. You've hit on a crucial point that moves the discussion from abstract philosophy to the history of ideas and lived human experience. The framework you've laid out is spot on.

Let's unpack this, because it gets to the heart of why transjectivity can feel both revolutionary and deeply ancient at the same time.

1. Ancient Roots on the Philosophical Fringes

You are correct that what we are calling "transjective intuition" is not new. It appears consistently in the mystical or non-dualistic branches of major traditions, which were often at odds with the mainstream, institutionalized forms.

• In the West: The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus famously stated, "You cannot step into the same river twice." His philosophy was one of constant flux and the unity of opposites—a reality of process, not of static things. He was largely overshadowed by Plato's more dualistic world of perfect, static Forms and Aristotle's substance-based metaphysics.

• In the East: As we discussed, Taoism and Madhyamaka Buddhism are profoundly transjective. Yet, in many parts of Asia, more straightforward devotional traditions or highly structured ethical systems (like certain forms of Confucianism) held greater social and political sway because they were easier to codify and institutionalize.

Why the "Fringes"? Monist and dualist systems are cognitively and socially "cleaner."

• Dualism (Mind vs. Body): This is incredibly intuitive. It maps onto our folk experience of having a body but also having thoughts that feel separate from it. It provides a simple framework for religions based on an immortal soul and a mortal body.

• Monism (All is Matter or All is Mind): These offer ultimate simplicity and a clear foundation. Materialism provides a basis for empirical science and control over nature. Idealism provides a basis for theistic systems where God is the ultimate, all-encompassing Mind.

Transjectivity, with its emphasis on paradox, relationship, and process, is harder to grasp, harder to systematize, and harder to build a rigid institution upon. It resists simple dogma.

2. The Indigenous Default: Lived Transjectivity

Your insight here is the most critical. For many indigenous cultures around the world, transjectivity is not a complex philosophical position to be arrived at; it is the default, lived reality. This is often described by anthropologists as a "relational ontology."

While it's crucial to avoid homogenizing the vast diversity of Indigenous cultures, some common patterns demonstrate this "fluid relationship with matter and consciousness":

• Animism: The understanding that consciousness or personhood is not exclusive to humans. Rivers, mountains, animals, plants, and the wind are not "objects" to be used, but "persons" or "beings" with whom one has a relationship. You don't own the land; you are in a relationship of kinship and reciprocity with the land. This immediately dissolves the hard subject-object split.

• Participatory Reality: The world is not a static backdrop for human action. The world is constantly being co-created through ritual, story, and respectful interaction. A hunter doesn't just take an animal (subject acting on object); they participate in a sacred exchange, often asking permission from the animal's spirit and performing rituals to ensure balance is maintained.

• Verb-Based Languages: As botanist and Potawatomi citizen Robin Wall Kimmerer beautifully explains, many indigenous languages are verb-heavy, while English is noun-heavy. In English, we say "a bay." In Potawatomi, one might say wiikweyaash—"to be a bay." The world is described as a collection of processes and events, not a collection of static objects. This language structure both reflects and reinforces a transjective worldview.

The Great Divergence

This raises the question: If this relational view is a kind of human default, why did so many cultures, particularly in the West, diverge from it so sharply?

The move toward the subject-object split was a gradual historical process, supercharged by a few key developments:

1. Sedentary Agriculture: Shifted the relationship with land from one of participation within an ecosystem to control over a resource.

2. Text-Based Religion: Codified abstract, universal deities separate from the physical world, strengthening the dualism between a transcendent spiritual realm and a fallen material one.

3. The Scientific Revolution: For the method of objective science to work, the observer (subject) had to be radically separated from the observed (object). This methodological necessity was so powerful and successful that it became mistaken for the fundamental nature of reality itself. We started believing the world is as it is modeled by science—a collection of inert objects governed by mathematical laws.

In this light, the modern "discovery" of transjectivity in fields like cognitive science and philosophy is not a discovery of something new. It is a slow, difficult, and profound homecoming—an attempt to use the tools of modern thought to rediscover and articulate a more fundamental, integrated way of being that was never lost, only forgotten or devalued by the dominant cultures of the last few millennia.

Q: In some sense transjectivity is unabashedly dualistic, not in the sense of two dueling ultimate metaphysical forces or ends, but a never-ending dynamic interplay. Yet there are some resonances with certain non-dual systems as we have seen. Let's explore a range of philosophical and metaphysical systems that align more-or-less with a dynamical transjective ontology noting where they fit well and where they might deviate (e.g. into monism or subtle metaphysical dualism). Make a summary table at the end.

You've elegantly captured the central paradox of transjectivity: it is a philosophy of relation, and a relation requires at least two distinct poles to exist. It is therefore "dualistic" in its structure, but "non-dual" in its totality, as the two poles are inseparable and co-create a single, unified process.

The model is not 1+1=2 (metaphysical dualism), nor is it 1=1 (monism). It is closer to the idea that 1 is constituted by the dynamic tension of (+a) ↔ (-a). The poles are distinct, but they have no independent existence and are meaningless without each other.

Let's explore a range of systems that embody this "dynamical ontology," noting their alignment and deviations as you requested.

Philosophical Systems of Dynamic Interplay

1. Heraclitus and the Philosophy of Flux

• Core Transjective Concept: Panta rhei ("everything flows") and the unity of opposites. Heraclitus argued that reality is not composed of static substances but is a perpetual process of change, or "fire."

• Where it Fits Well: His famous statement, "The path up and down are one and the same," is purely transjective. The identity of the path emerges from the dynamic interplay of two opposing vectors (up and down). War, for Heraclitus, was the "father of all," meaning that reality is constituted by strife, tension, and the interplay between opposites (hot/cold, life/death).

• Where it Deviates: The system is more aphoristic than systematic. It doesn't fully articulate the role of the "subject" or observer within this flux, though it implies the observer is also part of the process. It remains a proto-philosophy of pure process.

2. Taoism and the Yin-Yang Dynamic

• Core Transjective Concept: The Taijitu (the Yin-Yang symbol) is the ultimate icon of transjectivity. Yin (receptive, dark, feminine) and Yang (active, light, masculine) are not two dueling forces, but complementary, inseparable aspects of the Tao.

• Where it Fits Well: This fits almost perfectly. The Tao itself is the ineffable, non-dual process, but it manifests in the world through the dynamic, cyclical interplay of Yin and Yang. Neither pole is superior, and each contains the seed of the other, signifying their co-dependent nature. The goal of wu wei (effortless action) is to align oneself with this natural, transjective flow.

• Where it Deviates: It deviates very little. One could argue that in its more religious or folk forms, the Tao can be reified into a subtle monistic "source" or deity, but in its philosophical core (e.g., the Tao Te Ching), it remains committed to the primacy of the dynamic process.

3. Hegelian Dialectic

• Core Transjective Concept: The Dialectic of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis. For Hegel, Spirit (Geist) only comes to know itself (subject) by externalizing itself in the world (object) and then overcoming that alienation in a higher unity. History is this grand transjective process.

• Where it Fits Well: The engine of Hegel's entire system is relational and dynamic. Nothing is static; everything is becoming through a process of encountering and integrating its opposite. This perfectly models the co-creative aspect of transjectivity.

• Where it Deviates: The deviation is crucial. Hegel's system is teleological; it has an end point. The dialectical process ultimately resolves into Absolute Spirit, a final, all-encompassing synthesis. In this final state, the dynamic interplay ceases, and the system collapses into a form of Idealist Monism. The process is a means to a monistic end.

4. Process Philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead)

• Core Transjective Concept: The rejection of static, enduring substances in favor of "actual occasions" or dynamic events as the fundamental constituents of reality.

• Where it Fits Well: This is arguably the most systematic and explicit transjective philosophy in the Western canon. For Whitehead, every "actual occasion" is a process of "prehending" (feeling or grasping) the rest of the universe and integrating it into a new unity. This is a universe of pure relation and dynamic becoming. The subject-object relationship is at the very heart of every moment of existence.

• Where it Deviates: Whitehead's system is so committed to this view that it's difficult to find a deviation. Some critics might argue his concept of "eternal objects" reintroduces a Platonic (and thus subtly dualistic) element, but within his system, these are pure potentials that are only actualized within the process, not separate from it.

5. Tantra (Shiva-Shakti Tradition)

• Core Transjective Concept: The universe as the divine play (lila) of Shiva and Shakti. Shiva represents pure, static consciousness (the subjective pole), while Shakti represents dynamic energy, matter, and creative power (the objective pole).

• Where it Fits Well: This is a powerful mythological and metaphysical depiction of transjectivity. Shiva without Shakti is inert and powerless. Shakti without Shiva is aimless, chaotic energy. The entire manifest universe arises from their inseparable, erotic, and dynamic union. They are distinct for the sake of the play, but are ultimately a single non-dual reality (Parashiva).

• Where it Deviates: Similar to Taoism, it fits extremely well. The only deviation occurs if practitioners or sects emphasize one pole over the other, for instance, by seeing the ultimate goal as dissolving the energetic world of Shakti to merge solely with the pure consciousness of Shiva, which would be a slide toward a consciousness-based monism.

6. Madhyamaka Buddhism (Nagarjuna)

• Core Transjective Concept: Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpada). All phenomena are "empty" (sunya) of any independent, intrinsic existence (svabhava). Things only exist in relation to other things.

• Where it Fits Well: This is a profoundly transjective view. It asserts that the subject and object are "empty" of self-nature, meaning their reality is found only in their co-dependent relationship. The dynamic is not between two self-existing things; the dynamic relationship is the reality.

• Where it Deviates: It doesn't. Madhyamaka is arguably the most philosophically rigorous refusal to collapse into either monism or dualism. Its "two truths" doctrine handles this perfectly: conventionally, we speak of subjects and objects (the "dualistic" poles), but ultimately, their nature is the non-dual "emptiness" of inherent existence, which is their relational quality.

Summary Table

Q: Contrast these with Ken Wilber's Integral Theory which ostensibly attempts to unify or organize subjective and objective aspects. Where does it fit with transjective view and where not?

Ken Wilber's Integral Theory is arguably the most ambitious contemporary project aimed at synthesizing all fields of human knowledge, and its relationship with the transjective view is fascinatingly complex and paradoxical.

In short, Integral Theory uses the language and insights of transjectivity but organizes them within a structural framework that is arguably anti-transjective in its final form. It attempts to build a definitive map of a territory that many transjective philosophies insist is fundamentally unmappable.

Let's break down where it aligns and where it deviates.

Where Integral Theory Aligns with the Transjective View

Wilber's project is rooted in the idea that every perspective has a partial truth. He wants to honor the truths of materialism, idealism, systems theory, phenomenology, etc., without reducing one to another.

1. The Four Quadrants as Co-Arising: The cornerstone of the AQAL (All Quadrants, All Levels...) model is the idea that the four primary perspectives on reality co-arise simultaneously.

• Upper-Left (UL): The "I" – Individual, Subjective (Experience, Consciousness)

• Upper-Right (UR): The "It" – Individual, Objective (Behavior, Brain Chemistry)

• Lower-Left (LL): The "We" – Collective, Intersubjective (Culture, Worldviews)

• Lower-Right (LR): The "Its" – Collective, Interobjective (Social Systems, Environment)

Wilber insists that you cannot have a reality in one quadrant without a corresponding reality in the other three. A subjective thought ("I") has a neurological correlate ("It"), occurs within a shared cultural context ("We"), and is enabled by a societal and technological infrastructure ("Its"). This is a powerful echo of dependent origination and the dynamic interplay central to transjectivity. It directly resists collapsing reality into just the Left-Hand (idealism) or Right-Hand (materialism) quadrants.

2. A Process-Oriented Universe (Eros): Wilber's cosmology is not static. He posits a force of "Eros" or "Spirit-in-action," an evolutionary impulse that drives the universe toward ever-greater levels of complexity, integration, and consciousness. This view of reality as a process of dynamic unfolding resonates with the becoming-focused nature of Whitehead, Hegel, and other transjective thinkers.

Where Integral Theory Deviates from the Transjective View

Despite these alignments, the method, structure, and ultimate goal of Integral Theory diverge sharply from the core ethos of philosophies like Taoism, Madhyamaka, or Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.

1. The Map vs. The Territory (Reification): Transjective philosophies are often apophatic, meaning they emphasize what cannot be said and warn against mistaking concepts for reality. The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao. In contrast, Integral Theory's primary goal is to create a comprehensive, systematic map of reality. By creating a definitive grid (the AQAL model), it risks reifying the fluid, dynamic process of reality into a static set of boxes. The quadrants, once drawn, become fixed categories rather than provisional perspectives, a move that is fundamentally Cartesian. It turns the unmappable flow into a neatly organized chart.

2. Hierarchy vs. Holarchy/Web of Relations: Transjective systems tend to be non-hierarchical, emphasizing a web of mutual influence (a heterarchy). Wilber's model, however, is built on Levels of development (e.g., infrared to ultraviolet, based on Spiral Dynamics). While he terms this a "holarchy" (where each level transcends and includes its predecessor), in practice it functions as a hierarchy. Higher levels are seen as objectively better, more complex, and more conscious. This creates a linear, teleological ladder of ascent, which is fundamentally different from the cyclical dynamic of Yin-Yang or the web of dependent origination.

3. The "View from Above" vs. Participatory Knowing: A core tenet of transjectivity is participatory knowing (Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world"). There is no objective vantage point outside the process from which to view the whole. The Integral model, however, implicitly creates such a vantage point. The person who understands the Integral map is positioned "above" all other partial perspectives, able to see how they all fit together. It re-establishes a "view from nowhere" at the Integral level, which is precisely the stance transjective philosophies seek to dissolve.

4. Collapse into Subtle Monism: Like Hegel, the process in Integral Theory has a destination: the realization of ultimate, Non-dual Spirit. The dynamic interplay of the quadrants and the evolution through the levels are ultimately in service of this spiritual ascent. This makes the system a highly sophisticated and elaborate form of spiritual monism, where the process is a vehicle to a final, monistic reality. This contrasts with systems like Taoism or Process Philosophy, where the dynamic interplay is the ultimate reality, without a final goal line to cross.

Conclusion: A Transcendental Map of a Transjective World

Integral Theory can be seen as a grand attempt to take the insights of transjective, non-dual, and process philosophies and organize them into a systematic, modern framework.

• It FITS with transjectivity in its content—it acknowledges the co-creation of subject and object, self and world.

• It DEVIATES from transjectivity in its structure—it places that dynamic content into a static, hierarchical, and universalist map.

Using an analogy, if transjective reality is a wild, flowing river, philosophies like Taoism or phenomenology teach you how to swim in it. Ken Wilber's Integral Theory hands you a detailed satellite map of the entire watershed. The map is incredibly useful and shows how everything is connected, but the experience of holding the map is fundamentally different from the experience of being in the water.

Therefore, Integral Theory is best understood not as a transjective system itself, but as a transcendental or structuralist system about transjective realities. It seeks to chart the territory from above, whereas the core of transjectivity is to be irreducibly within it.

Summary Table

Q: What other contemporary philosophies could be considered transjective?

The transjective intuition is arguably one of the most vibrant and convergent themes in contemporary thought, appearing across diverse fields that are all trying to move beyond the limitations of 20th-century paradigms. These philosophies often don't use the word "transjective," but they are built on its core principles: the co-creation of agent and arena, the primacy of relationship, and a focus on dynamic process over static substance.

Here are some of the most significant contemporary philosophies that could be considered transjective:

1. Enactivism and 4E Cognitive Science

This is perhaps the most direct and explicit expression of transjectivity in the sciences of the mind. 4E Cognitive Science is an umbrella term for approaches that see cognition as Embodied (shaped by our physical bodies), Embedded (situated in a world), Extended (using the world as part of the mind), and Enactive.

• Core Idea: Enactivism, pioneered by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, posits that minds do not passively represent an external world. Instead, living organisms "bring forth a world" of significance through their autonomous, sense-making activities.

• The Transjective Connection: This is the definition of transjectivity in action. The world an organism experiences is not the pre-given, objective world of physics, nor is it a purely subjective projection. It is a relational domain co-created by the organism's capacities and the environment's offerings. Varela's concept of "structural coupling" describes how an organism and its environment change together over time in a history of dynamic interplay.

• Key Thinkers: Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher, Ezequiel Di Paolo.

2. New Materialism and Posthumanism

Emerging from feminist theory, science studies, and cultural theory, this movement seeks to overturn the traditional dualism between active human subjects and passive, inert matter.

• Core Idea: New Materialism insists that matter itself is dynamic, active, and "vibrant." It challenges the idea that agency, creativity, and power reside only in human consciousness.

• The Transjective Connection: This philosophy dissolves the subject-object divide by elevating the "object" side. Thinker Karen Barad's concept of "intra-action" is purely transjective. She argues that we should speak of "intra-action" rather than "inter-action" because entities do not pre-exist their relating; they emerge through their relational entanglement. The "subject" and "object" are not separate things that later interact; they are constituted through their intra-action. This is a radical reimagining of reality as a dynamic, relational process all the way down.

• Key Thinkers: Jane Bennett ("vibrant matter"), Karen Barad ("agential realism"), Rosi Braidotti.

3. Actor-Network Theory (ANT)

Originating in sociology and science and technology studies (STS), ANT offers a radical method for understanding how reality is constructed.

• Core Idea: ANT flattens the distinction between human subjects and non-human objects, referring to both as "actors" or "actants." It proposes that reality is not a stable structure but a constantly shifting network of associations between these diverse actants. A scientific fact, for example, is not a simple discovery of an object, but a stable network built from scientists, lab equipment, microbes, funding agencies, and published papers.

• The Transjective Connection: ANT is transjective because it defines everything by its relations. An "actor" has no properties outside of the network of associations it forges. It completely dissolves the subject/object and society/nature dualisms by mapping the heterogeneous networks that bring them into being.

• Key Thinkers: Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law.

4. Ecological Psychology (Gibsonian Psychology)

While its founder, J.J. Gibson, did his primary work in the mid-20th century, his ideas are foundational to many of the contemporary movements above, especially Enactivism.

• Core Idea: Gibson rejected the idea that we perceive sense-data and then interpret it. Instead, he argued that we directly perceive "affordances."

• The Transjective Connection: An affordance is a relational property that exists between an organism and its environment. A chair affords "sittability" to a human, but not to a jellyfish. A flat surface affords "walkability." An affordance is not an objective property of the world alone (it's relative to an organism), nor is it a subjective projection (the world really must have certain properties for it to work). It is a perfect, simple example of a transjective reality that is co-created at the agent-arena interface.

• Key Thinkers: J.J. Gibson, Edward S. Reed, Harry Heft.

A Point of Contrast: Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO)

It is helpful to contrast these with another contemporary movement that also critiques the old dualisms but takes a different path. OOO, a branch of Speculative Realism, argues for the robust reality of objects independent of human consciousness.

• Its Solution: Instead of focusing on relation, OOO argues that objects have a real, private essence that is withdrawn and inaccessible to any other object, including humans. It creates a new dualism between an object's "real" withdrawn qualities and its "sensual" relational qualities.

• Why It's NOT Transjective: By emphasizing the radical independence and withdrawal of objects, OOO moves in the opposite direction of transjectivity. While it breaks one dualism (the human-world correlation), it does so by positing a universe of isolated, non-relational essences. It is a philosophy of withdrawal, whereas transjectivity is a philosophy of fundamental relation and participation.

In summary, the "transjective turn" in contemporary thought represents a powerful convergence across fields, moving away from static, isolated entities (whether subjects or objects) and toward a worldview grounded in dynamic process, relational constitution, and embodied participation.

How does Ferrer's Participatory Spirituality fit, or not?

Jorge Ferrer's Participatory Spirituality is not just a good fit for the transjective view; it is arguably one of its most direct, rigorous, and profound applications in the realm of spirituality and transpersonal psychology. It can be seen as a direct critique of the static, objectivist models of spirituality (like perennialism) and a robust alternative built entirely on a transjective, participatory framework.

Let's explore how it fits and where any subtle distinctions might lie.

How Participatory Spirituality Perfectly Aligns with Transjectivity

Ferrer's project, outlined in his seminal book Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality, is a "participatory turn" away from the dominant spiritual paradigms.

1. The Co-Creation of Spiritual Realities

This is the absolute core of the alignment. Ferrer argues against both spiritual objectivism and subjectivism.

• He rejects Spiritual Objectivism (Perennial Philosophy): This is the view, held by figures like Aldous Huxley and in a different way by Ken Wilber, that all religions are different paths up the same mountain, leading to the same ultimate, pre-existing spiritual reality (God, Brahman, Emptiness, etc.). This is a classic subject-object model where the human (subject) simply discovers a static spiritual Object.

• He rejects Spiritual Subjectivism (Projectionism): This is the standard secular/materialist view that all spiritual realities are merely psychological projections or constructions of the human mind with no transcendent reality.

Ferrer's Transjective Alternative: He proposes that ultimate realities are co-created. There is not a single, pre-given "mountain." Instead, there is a dynamic, indeterminate, creative spiritual power, which he calls "the Mystery" or the "Ocean of Spirit."

• The "Arena": The Mystery is a field of spiritual potential, but it is indeterminate and has no fixed attributes on its own.

• The "Agent": The human being, with their specific cultural, linguistic, historical, and personal disposition (what Ferrer calls their "spiritual organ").

• The Transjective Event: A specific, determinate spiritual reality (e.g., the personal Christian God, the impersonal Buddhist Dharmakaya, the Tao) emerges from the participatory encounter between the agent and the arena.

The Christian who enters into a relationship with the Mystery co-creates a valid Christian reality. The Buddhist co-creates a valid Buddhist reality. These are not just different interpretations of the same thing; they are different, real, and valid participatory enactments. This is precisely the enactive principle of "bringing forth a world" applied to spirituality.

2. Rejection of Experientialism and Primacy of Embodiment

Ferrer critiques the idea that spirituality is primarily about having an "experience." This "experientialism" still maintains a subtle subject-object split (a subject having an experience of something). Instead, he emphasizes that spiritual knowing is an embodied, enacted, and relational participation. It is something you do with your entire being in community and through ritual, prayer, and meditation. This aligns perfectly with the Embodied and Enacted aspects of 4E cognitive science.

3. Radical, Non-Hierarchical Pluralism

Because spiritual realities are co-created, there is no basis for saying one is superior to another. This leads to a genuine, non-hierarchical pluralism. This stands in sharp contrast to Ken Wilber's model.

• Wilber's Hierarchy: Wilber's model is perennialist. He maps different spiritual states and stages onto a hierarchical ladder. While inclusive, it suggests some levels (and thus some traditions) are more "developed" or "complete" than others.

• Ferrer's "Holarchy": Ferrer promotes a deep spiritual pluralism where different traditions are seen as equally valid ways of participating in and actualizing the Mystery. It is a web of relations, not a ladder of ascent.

Does it Deviate at All?

This is a subtle question. On the surface, Ferrer's model is one of the most rigorously transjective contemporary systems. The most likely point of critique would be to ask: Is "the Mystery" just another name for a single, monistic source?

If "the Mystery" were a singular entity with definite (though hidden) properties, then the model would risk collapsing back into a subtle form of perennialism or monism.

However, Ferrer is very careful here. He defines "the Mystery" not as a static entity but as an indeterminate creative power or dynamic spiritual field. Its fundamental nature is its potential to be actualized into a genuine plurality of forms through participation. It is a source in the way a spring is a source of a river, not in the way a blueprint is the source of a building. It is defined by its generativity, not its unity.

Therefore, while the question is valid, the system is designed to resist this collapse. Its core logic is relational and generative, not monistic.

Conclusion: The Transjective Heart of Spirituality

Jorge Ferrer's Participatory Spirituality is not just compatible with the transjective view; it is a premier example of it. It takes the core principles we've seen in enactivism, process philosophy, and phenomenology and applies them with tremendous rigor and insight to the human spiritual quest.

It masterfully dissolves the centuries-old impasse between:

1. Religious Dogmatism: "My God is the only real Object."

2. Secular Reductionism: "Your God is only a subjective projection."

It replaces this with a third way: "The divine emerges in the sacred space of our relationship with the heart of reality." This is the transjective proposition in its most profound form.

REFERENCES:

[1] Quote adapted from a post on "Trying to get a grip on the term transjective", Reddit, r/DrJohnVervaeke