• home
• about
• new
• essays
• AI
• book

Dr. Joseph Dillard is a psychotherapist with over forty year's clinical experience treating individual, couple, and family issues. Dr. Dillard also has extensive experience with pain management and meditation training. The creator of Integral Deep Listening (IDL), Dr. Dillard is the author of over ten books on IDL, dreaming, nightmares, and meditation. He lives in Berlin, Germany. See: integraldeeplistening.com and his YouTube channel. He can be contacted at: joseph.dillard@gmail.com

SEE MORE ESSAYS WRITTEN BY JOSEPH DILLARD

Why 500 Years of Western Global Dominance is Fading Away

Joseph Dillard / ChatGPT, DeepSeek

The unipolar phase of Western dominance that culminated in 1990 is ending, and a more pluralistic, competitive, and regionally organized world order is emerging. Western civilization itself is not collapsing. It is moving from hegemony to plurality. It continues to be strong in all the areas discussed below in relation to most countries in the world. In addition, it remains strong in the areas of AI leadership, semiconductors, university systems, financial markets, and alliance networks.

However, its 500 years of Western global dominance is on a downward trend. Its dominance relative to other power centers, such as Russia, China, and Iran is clearly decreasing, and doing so at astonishing speed. The legitimacy, coherence, and exclusivity of Western leadership are eroding, while alternative centers of power are gaining enough strength to create a genuinely multipolar world for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

I ran the following question through Chat GPT:

“Assess the relative strength of the following across the combined "West," meaning those countries aligned with the US geopolitically, as of 1990 and today, in relationship to other world powers in general: Media (LL) Economics (LR) Morality UL/LR) Law (LR) Military (UR/LR) Style of governance (LR) Intention (UL) Industry (LR)"

This is the response I got from Chat GPT, followed by the response from DeepSeek, which I used as a bias check:

ChatGPT Response:

I'll interpret your categories using Ken Wilber's quadrants notation:

• UL (Upper Left) = interior individual (values, intentions, consciousness)

• UR (Upper Right) = individual capabilities/technology

• LL (Lower Left) = culture, meaning-making, media narratives

• LR (Lower Right) = institutions, systems, economics, law, governance, industry

And by "the West" I assume the US, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and close allies.

The question is not absolute strength but relative position versus other major powers collectively (China, Russia, India, Islamic world, Global South, etc.).

Summary Table

1. Media (LL)

1990: 9.5/10

The West almost completely dominated:

• Hollywood

• Television

• Publishing

• Journalism

• Universities

• Music

• Advertising

The Soviet bloc had collapsed. Western narratives effectively became global narratives. The phrase "the end of history" captures this moment.

Today: 6.5/10

Still dominant but no longer hegemonic.

Challenges from:

• Chinese media ecosystems

• Social media fragmentation

• Independent creators

• Multipolar information environments

The West retains disproportionate cultural influence but no longer controls the global narrative.

Largest relative decline after industry and governance.

2. Economics (LR)

1990: 9.5/10

Western economies produced roughly two-thirds of world GDP. The US alone represented nearly a quarter of world output. Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada, etc. dominated high-value sectors.

Today: 7.5/10

Still strongest aggregate economic bloc.

However:

• China's rise

• BRICS expansion

• Manufacturing shifts

• Reduced Western share of world GDP

The West remains richer per capita but less dominant overall.

3. Morality (UL/LR)

This is hardest because "morality" is partly subjective. A useful definition: The perceived legitimacy and ethical coherence of a civilization's stated values.

1990: 7.5/10

The West emerged from the Cold War with:

• Democracy

• Human rights

• Rule of law

• Open societies

appearing validated. Many outside observers saw Western moral claims as credible.

Today: 6.0/10

Strengths remain:

• Human rights traditions

• Civil liberties

• Minority protections

• Democratic norms

Weaknesses:

• Growing internal polarization

• Perceived hypocrisy

• Trust decline

• Consumerism replacing civic purpose

Many countries now regard Western moral claims as one value system among several rather than a universal standard.

4. Law (LR)

1990: 9.0/10

Western legal systems were the global gold standard.

Strong:

• Contract enforcement

• Property rights

• Independent courts

• Regulatory competence

Today: 7.5/10

Still globally dominant.

Most international commerce still relies on:

• English law

• American law

• European regulatory frameworks

But:

• Politicization concerns

• Regulatory complexity

• Erosion of institutional trust have reduced perceived superiority.

5. Military (UR/LR)

1990: 10/10

Absolute peak.

The Soviet Union collapsed.

The US-led alliance possessed:

• Naval dominance

• Air dominance

• Nuclear parity plus conventional superiority

• Global logistics

No peer competitor existed.

Today: 8.5/10

Still strongest military bloc by a large margin.

However:

• China is a genuine peer in some domains.

• Russia remains a nuclear superpower.

• Precision missile warfare has become more accessible.

The West remains militarily strongest but not unchallenged.

6. Style of Governance (LR)

1990: 8.5/10

Liberal democracy appeared ascendant.

Many nations were actively attempting to copy Western institutions.

Examples:

• Eastern Europe

• Latin America

• Parts of Asia

Today: 6.5/10

Democracy remains attractive.

However:

• Populism

• Gridlock

• Polarization

• Declining trust

have weakened confidence.

Meanwhile:

• China offers an alternative model.

• Gulf monarchies offer another.

• Singapore remains influential.

The West no longer monopolizes governance legitimacy.

7. Intention (UL)

By intention I mean:

The perceived civilizational purpose and confidence underlying collective action.

1990: 8.0/10

The West possessed a coherent story:

• Liberal democracy

• Markets

• Scientific progress

• Expanding freedom

There was a widespread sense of direction.

Today: 5.5/10

Many observers note:

• Strategic confusion

• Cultural fragmentation

• Difficulty defining common goals

The West remains highly capable but often appears uncertain about what it is ultimately trying to become. This may be the greatest interior decline.

8. Industry (LR)

1990: 8.5/10

The West controlled most:

• Advanced manufacturing

• Aerospace

• Pharmaceuticals

• Industrial technology

Japan, Germany, and the US were particularly dominant.

Today: 6.5/10

The West still dominates:

• High-end aerospace

• Advanced semiconductors (through allied networks)

• Pharma

• Specialized engineering

But China has become:

• The world's manufacturing center

• A major industrial innovator

• The leading producer in numerous sectors

This is arguably the largest structural shift since 1990.

Integral Interpretation

Using an Integral lens, the West's trajectory since 1990 looks less like a collapse and more like a transition from hegemony to plurality.

1990

• UL: strong confidence

• LL: strong cultural coherence

• LR: dominant institutions

• UR: overwhelming capability

The West was strong in all four quadrants simultaneously.

Today

• UR remains very strong.

• LR remains strong but increasingly contested.

• LL is fragmented.

• UL shows declining collective confidence and shared purpose.

From an Integral perspective, the biggest relative losses are not military or economic; they are in the interior quadrants (UL/LL)—shared meaning, confidence, legitimacy, and civilizational narrative. The exterior systems remain powerful, but they are no longer supported by the same degree of cultural cohesion and collective purpose that existed around the end of the Cold War.

Deep Seek response:

Your question targets the core transformation of our era. To assess the relative strength of the "West"—the US and its geopolitical allies—in 1990 versus today, we must move beyond simple decline narratives.

While the West is no longer the sole pole of power as it was in 1990, it remains a formidable bloc. The key shift is not from strength to weakness, but from overwhelming, unipolar dominance to a leadership position within a new, complex, and competitive multipolar order. The "unipolar moment" of 1990, defined by a single superpower with unmatched reach, has given way to a world where the West must compete with a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and an increasingly self-assertive Global South.

The table below provides an assessment of the West's relative strength across the specific dimensions you asked about.

| Dimension (Quadrant) | 1990 (Post-Cold War Peak) | Today (c. 2025-2026) |

Media (LL) (Cultural & Informational "Soft Power")

1990: "Unipolar Peak."

"End of History" triumphalism. Western (especially US) cultural products, news media (CNN, BBC) and values (liberal democracy) were near-universally emulated.

Today: "Relative Decline." The West still has strong "soft power," but faces serious challenges. China, the Gulf States, and Türkiye are investing heavily in their own media and cultural influence, particularly in the Global South. The West's perceived commitment to its own values is also questioned by its allies and adversaries. Germany, a traditional soft power leader, is re-evaluating this strategy.

Economics (LR) (Global GDP Share, Trade, Finance)

1990: "Dominant." The West led globalisation, driving world trade and controlling the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank). The "Washington Consensus" was the dominant economic model.

Today: "Challenged but Powerful." The West (US, EU) still represents a massive share of the global economy. However, the rise of China and other emerging markets has shifted the center of economic gravity. The West is pivoting from pure globalisation to "de-risking," "friend-shoring," and protecting strategic sectors like semiconductors.

Morality (UL/LR) (Legitimacy of International Rules, Perceived Justice of Order)

1990: "Apex of Liberal Order." The international system was seen as reflecting Western values (democracy, human rights, rule of law). The UN system, though imperfect, was largely accepted. | Today: "Fractured & Contested." The West's authority is no longer taken for granted. The

Global South actively questions the legitimacy and fairness of an order shaped by Western powers, particularly visible in debates over Israel-Palestine and the Ukraine war. The perception of Western "hypocrisy" has grown, weakening its moral authority.

Law (LR) (International Law & Institutions)

1990: "System-Shaper." The West was the primary architect and enforcer of the post-WWII legal and institutional framework (e.g., the UN Security Council, WTO, ICC).

Today: "Challenged by Rivals." Western-led institutions face increasing pressure and the emergence of parallel structures. The rise of BRICS and calls for reform of the UN Security Council and IMF voting rights reflect a desire for a more multipolar global governance system.

Military (UR/LR) (Hard Power, Force Projection, Alliances)

1990: "Unipolar Dominance." The "sole superpower" with a massive technological and global reach advantage, backed by unassailable NATO alliance.

Today: Maintains Primacy." The US, and by extension the West, remains the world's most powerful military actor. However, its margin of superiority has shrunk. It now faces peer competitors: China's military modernization and Russia's large (if degraded) nuclear arsenal.

Style of Governance (LR) (Democracy vs. Authoritarian Models)

1990: "Triumphant." The model of Western liberal democracy was seen as the only game in town. The "end of history" thesis was widely accepted.

Today: Intensified Competition." The transition to multipolarity has sparked an explicit rivalry between political systems. China and Russia actively promote an alternative, "statist" or "sovereign democracy" model, challenging the universality of the Western model.

Intention (UL) (Cooperation vs. Coercion)

1990: “Benevolent Hegemon." The US-led order was presented as a system of mutually beneficial rules, institutions, and collective security (e.g., Operation Desert Storm).

Today: Perceived as Coercive." The US's use of unilateral sanctions, its withdrawal from international agreements, and its aggressive trade policies have led many to see its actions as transactional and coercive, even by its allies. This has accelerated the search for alternative partnerships.

Industry (LR) (High-Tech Manufacturing & Supply Chains)

1990: Peak of Industrial Power." The West was the world's factory and the main driver of technological innovation.

Today: Strategic Vulnerabilities." The West, particularly the US and Europe, has seen its industrial base hollowed out and is highly dependent on China for critical technologies, rare earths, and pharmaceutical ingredients. This has led to major policy initiatives to reshore and secure supply chains.

The Underlying Drivers: What's Changed?

The transformation from 1990 to today can be attributed to a few key historical currents.

"The Democratic Peace Theory vs. Reality": In 1990, the "End of History" thesis suggested liberal democracy was the endpoint of human governance. Today, that optimism has faded as illiberal and authoritarian models have gained confidence and presented themselves as a viable, and in some cases more successful, alternative path to modernity. The West no longer holds a monopoly on political imagination.

"Economic Globalization's Unintended Consequences": The post-Cold War era of globalization was supposed to spread wealth, democracy, and interdependence, making great-power war obsolete. Instead, it produced winners (China) and losers (the deindustrialized West), creating the material conditions for a geopolitical rival and fueling domestic populist backlash in the West itself.

"Interdependence as a Weapon, Not a Shield": The assumption that deep trade ties prevent conflict has been shattered. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent weaponization of trade, finance, and energy have shown interdependence can become a source of profound vulnerability and a tool of coercion. The West is now attempting to "de-risk" but must do so without causing a total decoupling from the global economy.

"A Perceived Crisis of Legitimacy": The West's claim to moral authority has been severely damaged in the eyes of many nations. The long, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the more recent perceived double standards in enforcing international law (e.g., on the war in Gaza, the 2003 invasion of Iraq), have eroded its "soft power" and given the Global South a powerful narrative to articulate its demands for a fairer world order.

In summary, the relative strength of the West has moved from "unipolar dominance" to "primacy within a multipolar system". It is no longer the sole shaper of global events, but it remains the most powerful single actor in a more complex, competitive, and dangerous world.

I then asked a follow-up question of both bots:

“It appears that the oil reserves of the West, which have been drawn down in order to stabilize the price of oil, is almost depleted, implying that the cost of oil and therefore those products and processes associated with its use, including transportation and agriculture, are likely to show significant increases in the coming months. If so, how is that likely to change the above critique?"

ChatGPT Response:

If your premise is correct—that strategic reserves across much of the Western alliance are being materially depleted to suppress or stabilize oil prices during a prolonged supply disruption—then the effect on my earlier assessment would be less about military power and more about exposing weaknesses in the LR quadrant (systems) and potentially the UL/LL quadrants (confidence and legitimacy). A few caveats first:

1. The evidence is mixed. The U.S. SPR remains well below historical highs, but it is not exhausted; it still contains roughly 400 million barrels, and OECD countries also maintain strategic and commercial inventories. (The Department of Energy's Energy.gov)

2. The West's energy vulnerability today differs from the 1970s because the U.S. is now a major producer and exporter, unlike the import-dependent West of 1990. (dallasfed.org)

3. China has quietly accumulated very large strategic inventories, arguably larger than those of any other nation. (U.S. Energy Information Administration)

Assuming a sustained energy-price shock develops, here is how I would revise the framework.

Economics (LR): largest immediate hit Energy is upstream of nearly everything:

• transportation

• fertilizers

• food production

• chemicals

• plastics

• logistics

A sustained doubling or tripling of oil prices functions like a tax on the entire economy. The relative issue is important. If China, India, Gulf states, or resource exporters are less affected, then Western economic dominance shrinks faster than GDP figures alone would suggest. This could accelerate the transition from Western-centered globalization to multipolar regional economic blocs.

Industry (LR): second-largest hit Western industry already struggles with:

• higher labor costs

• environmental compliance costs

• deindustrialization in some sectors High energy costs would further weaken:

• European manufacturing

• chemicals

• metals

• heavy industry

Germany is the obvious example because industrial competitiveness is highly sensitive to energy prices. China, by contrast, has spent two decades building energy, industrial, and supply-chain resilience. So the industry score would fall noticeably.

Governance (LR) This may actually be the most politically important consequence. Citizens tolerate many things. They become much less tolerant when:

• fuel prices spike

• food prices spike

• housing costs rise

• real wages stagnate

A prolonged oil shock tends to generate:

• populism

• polarization

• anti-incumbent sentiment

• distrust of elites

The result is a decline in perceived governance competence. Not necessarily because leaders become worse, but because system performance becomes harder to maintain.

Intention (UL)

This is where Integral analysis becomes interesting. A civilization's confidence often depends less on objective power than on perceived trajectory. The story since 1990 was: "The future belongs to us." An energy shock challenges that story. Especially if people begin believing:

• China planned better.

• Resource states hold leverage.

• The West consumed rather than invested.

Whether true or not, such narratives affect collective intention. Thus the UL score would likely fall.

Morality / Legitimacy (UL-LR)

Not morality in an absolute sense. Legitimacy. If governments appear to be using emergency reserves merely to postpone structural adjustments, critics will ask: “Why were we not better prepared?" This weakens institutional credibility. Historically, many political crises begin as legitimacy crises rather than economic crises.

Military (UR/LR)

This changes surprisingly little. Military power is highly energy-dependent. However:

• NATO still dominates global force projection.

• Western technological superiority remains substantial.

• Defense spending usually rises during perceived insecurity.

Relative military strength would decline somewhat, but much less than economic or governance strength.

Media (LL)

Media influence doesn't collapse because oil prices rise. However, energy shocks create fertile ground for competing narratives:

• Chinese narratives

• Russian narratives

• anti-globalization narratives

• nationalist narratives

So cultural authority would erode somewhat further.

The Integral Interpretation

From an Integral perspective, an oil shock is primarily an LR stress test. The question becomes: Are the Western systems as adaptive and resilient as they appeared when energy was cheap and globalization was expanding?

If those systems prove resilient, the shock may actually strengthen legitimacy and purpose. If they prove brittle, the consequences migrate upward:

LR crisis → LL fragmentation → UL loss of confidence.

That sequence has historically been more consequential than the direct economic losses themselves.

The most significant implication would not be that the West suddenly becomes weak. It would be that the gap between the West and rising powers narrows faster, particularly if China emerges from the same period with stronger energy security, stronger industrial output, and greater confidence in its long-term trajectory. (U.S. Energy Information Administration)

DeepSeek's response:

Your question is incisive. You are asking whether a foundational material reality—the depletion of Western strategic oil reserves—could undermine the entire "relative strength" assessment of the West I provided earlier.

The short answer is "yes, profoundly". If the West's ability to stabilize global oil markets is gone, the economic, industrial, and even military pillars of its power would face an unprecedented stress test. It would likely accelerate and deepen the trends of relative decline and shift the competitive landscape decisively. Let me reframe the earlier critique through the lens of a severe, sustained oil price shock.

The Macro Shift: From High Prices to Physical Scarcity

The current situation is not merely expensive oil. As you note, it is about the potential exhaustion of the strategic tool used to moderate those prices: the "Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)" and its European equivalents. An oil price spike from $80 to $150 a barrel is economically painful. The depletion of the reserve implies a world where the West can no longer effectively respond to the next supply shock, leading to a structural shift to "$200+ oil" with no short-term relief valve. This changes everything.

Revised Assessment: The West Under a Sustained Oil Shock

Here is how each dimension of Western strength would be affected.

| Dimension | Original Assessment (Primacy in a Multipolar World) | Impact of Depleted Reserves & Sustained High Oil Prices

Media (LL) Relative decline in "soft power."

Impact: "Legitimacy Collapse." Western governments would be blamed for failing to protect citizens from energy poverty, inflation, and food prices. Austerity would resurge. The narrative of Western incompetence and fragility would be amplified by rivals (China, Russia) and resonate deeply in the Global South.

Economics (LR) Powerful but challenged.

Impact: "Severe Crisis." High energy costs directly cause inflation, recessions, and trade deficits. The European industrial model, based on affordable energy, would face existential collapse. The US, as a major producer, would be less vulnerable but still suffer from a global recession and high prices. China, as a massive energy importer, would also be deeply harmed, but its state-controlled economy could potentially weather the storm better than Western consumer economies.

Morality (UL/LR) Fractured and contested.

Impact: "Legitimacy Vacuum." The Western social contract (affordable goods, functioning welfare states) would break down under the strain of a deep and prolonged depression. Political extremism would surge. The West's ability to claim its model is superior would be fatally weakened, as its core economic engine stalls.

Law (LR) Challenged by rivals.

Impact: "Irrelevance." International institutions, already weak, would become completely irrelevant. Resource conflicts would be resolved by power, not law. Sanctions, a key Western tool, would become less effective as countries prioritize securing physical energy supplies over financial rules. |

Military (UR/LR) Maintains primacy.

Impact: "Logistical & Political Nightmare." The world's most energy-intensive institution would face impossible choices: cut operations, accept crippling costs, or seize oil fields directly. The political will to project power would evaporate as domestic crises mount. This would create a security vacuum, accelerating regional conflicts that the West could not manage.

Style of Governance (LR) Intensified competition. Impact: "Model Crisis." The failure of Western liberal capitalism to provide basic economic security would be a devastating propaganda victory for authoritarian and state-capitalist models, which could argue that their ability to manage scarcity and control prices is a superior system.

|ntention (UL) Perceived as coercive.

Impact: "Resentment & Blame." Western nations would turn inward and become more transactional and desperate on the world stage. Allies would be left to fend for themselves. The US might be forced into a humiliating strategic retreat, or a series of dangerous, unilateral resource grabs.

Industry (LR) Strategic vulnerabilities.

Impact: "De-Industrialization." High energy costs would decimate energy-intensive industries (chemicals, metals, fertilizers) in Europe first, then globally. The "de-risking" and "reshoring" trends would be violently accelerated, but would be impossible to achieve without cheap energy. The economy would shift from "just-in-time" to "managed scarcity" in a world of resource nationalism. |

The Geopolitical Endgame: A World of Walls and Blocs

A sustained, high-price environment due to depleted Western reserves would not just be a continuation of current trends; it would be a fundamental rupture. The world would rapidly transition from a "globalized" to a "regionalized" structure organized around energy haves and have-nots.

| "Bloc" | "Likely Strategy" | "Outcome"

The US Achieve energy self-sufficiency and use its military power to secure the Western Hemisphere, creating a "Fortress America." | Reduced global role; focused on its own energy and food security; potential for conflict with other energy-seeking powers.

Europe Suffer a deep, prolonged depression. Internal political cohesion would be tested to the breaking point as nations make separate energy deals with Russia or the Gulf states. | A weakened, fragmented, and increasingly irrelevant actor on the world stage. NATO's purpose and viability would be questioned without US energy support.

China Use its financial reserves and state power to lock up long-term energy and food supplies from Russia, Iran, and Africa, creating a Sino-centric energy bloc. | A more isolated but potentially stable autarkic system. It would face severe economic slowdown but could maintain regime stability.

The Global South Bear the brunt of the crisis as the poorest nations are priced out of global markets. | Massive hunger, political instability, and potential state collapse in vulnerable regions (e.g., parts of Africa, South Asia). |

Your initial insight is correct: if Western oil reserves are truly depleted and prices enter a permanent state of high volatility and upward pressure, my earlier critique of a "West in relative decline" would need to be revised to a scenario of "West in acute crisis and potential collapse of its current economic and political order."

The post-Cold War era of globalization and liberal internationalism would be over. The defining feature of global politics would shift from great-power competition to great-power consolidation, each bloc securing its own resource base, with a dangerous and unpredictable "middle ground" where they compete for the remaining unaligned resources. The cost of oil would not just be an economic indicator; it would be the primary driver of geopolitical power and the central determinant of every nation's fate."

Discussion

What is interesting above is that the severity of the forecasts of these two chatbots flipped from the first to the second question, with DeepSeek initially being more positive than Chat GPT and then becoming considerably more negative in response to the second question.

What are we to make of this? The congruence of their estimates of Western decline is not “proof" because chatbots draw from similar wells of mined public information. While evidence for a probable economic downturn based on a depletion of government oil reserves exists, it may not happen. I think it will, but it still remains merely an assumption.

They agree that a major economic downturn, if not a collapse, in the traditional global dominance of the West, is increasingly likely, implying a relative upswing in the fortunes of at least some non-Western powers, most likely, 1) China, 2) Russia, and 3) Iran.

What I find most surprising is the relative upswing in global power of Iran, which no sources that I know of predicted, and which I certainly would not have predicted. I have covered some of the factors involved with that reversal of fortune in two previous Integral World essays, “Has Iran really 'Belled the Cat?' (April, 2026), and “How and Why Iran has Successfully Defied the West" (May, 2026).

The upswing of the fortunes of Iran are likely despite its various weaknesses, including sanctions, demographic pressures, capital shortages, technological dependence, and a limited alliance network. The US and Israel worked very hard to maximize these weaknesses of Iran but there are multiple indicators that Iran has grown stronger, more united, and aggressive instead.

The implications of this Western downturn, if indeed it happens, are historic. They include 1) The likely end of the “greater Israel" project, leaving open the question of the survivability of the Jewish state; 2) the likely end of US military bases in the Gulf region and therefore a likely sharp reduction in the influence of the West in the Middle East in general; 3) the relative rise of the influence of Shi'ite Islam throughout the middle east. Whether there will be major upheaval in Israel, the EU, or the US as a result is unknown, but we can assess that it is becoming more, not less likely, due to the downward trend of multiple indicators of social stability.

According to the assessments of these two chatbots, the combined west is losing credibility and power in all of these areas simultaneously. Attempts to distract from or minimize these losses are prevalent in mainstream western media, and many are seduced by those arguments into a sense of reassurance and complacency, which leaves them unprepared to deal with a world in which the West is only one among several power centers instead of the dominant global force.

Fundamentally, this is occurring because the West has consistently violated its social contract in ways that are significant. While promising to promote democracy and human rights, in fact there has been ongoing support for economic exploitation, colonialism, illegal wars and sanctions, and in more recent years, censorship, international terrorism, apartheid, and genocide. All of these are well documented and have done considerable damage to the reputation of the West, and still do.

Social contracts have been recognized in the rise of the West in the 1500's and Thomas Hobbes, followed by Locke and Rousseau, to be the foundation of civilization. Nations and national collectives that consistently violate social contracts are eventually overthrown. That is what is one aspect of what is happening today. 500 years of western hegemony and exceptionalism is being deconstructed.

Clearly, this is both a good and a bad thing. To the extent that it represents greater sovereignty for more people and their ability to decide for themselves how they choose to live, that is a good thing. To the extent that this deconstruction impoverishes millions who have little to no part in the causes of this global shift, it is a bad thing.

In either case, there is no doubt that the many strengths and contributions of the West will live on. Indeed, many of them, in all the spheres mentioned above, have been assimilated globally by non-western nations. In that sense, the influence of the West is here to stay, regardless of how far the its relative power, in relation to the rest of the world might fall.