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Dr. Joseph Dillard is a psychotherapist with over forty year's clinical experience treating individual, couple, and family issues. Dr. Dillard also has extensive experience with pain management and meditation training. The creator of Integral Deep Listening (IDL), Dr. Dillard is the author of over ten books on IDL, dreaming, nightmares, and meditation. He lives in Berlin, Germany. See: integraldeeplistening.com and his YouTube channel. He can be contacted at: [email protected]

SEE MORE ESSAYS WRITTEN BY JOSEPH DILLARD

What Progressives, Liberals, and Integralists Get Wrong About Democracies

Joseph Dillard

Democracy/Authoritarianism is a false and misleading dichotomy that creates an “us vs. them” mentality that stokes fear, not mutual respect and diplomacy. It is used to reassure the masses that they really are superior, without having to do any thinking about what these distinctions mean. This polarity creates fear, sells weapons, and keeps us fighting over our divisions while elites laugh all the way to the bank. The smarter move is to step back and ask, “Why is this person or source peddling this distinction? What's in it for them?” “What would change if I decided this distinction was unhelpful or simply distracting nonsense?”

Good reasons to love democracy and fear authoritarianism

There are a lot of good reasons to love and prefer democracies, and we all know what they are: freedom of speech, a vote, checks and balances, the rule of law, adaptability, and the chance of prosperity. We can align ourselves with Pericles in classical Athens, Thomas Jefferson and the triumph in the American Revolution of freedom over domination, victory over authoritarian Germany and Japan, and the prosperity of postwar Europe and the U.S. It is empowering to have a voice and be able to shape our world.

We must defend democratic governments or we risk falling to authoritarians and losing all the benefits democracy has brought to us. In Integral terms, we will collectively decline from a “late personal,” meaning egalitarian and pluralistic society, to a “late prepersonal” one, meaning tribalistic, repressive, might makes right, cruel developmental level, without personal liberties or prosperity. The inane shorthand for these stages, used by Wilber and most Integrals, are “green” and “red,” respectively. However, it is about time that we all evolved past cultish in-group talk and returned to terms that Wilber used originally and that reflect a broad and non-cliché, broad understanding of developmental hierarchies. These are early, mid, and late prepersonal, personal, and transpersonal, with the addition of transitional vision-logic (also called “integral-aperspectival”) and non-dual.

We are all also acutely aware of the weaknesses and evils of authoritarianism. Such leaders, such as Mao, Stalin, Hitler, Khomeini of Iran, Kim of North Korea, Pol Pot of Cambodia, Pinochet in Chili, and now Trump in the U.S., bring a loss of freedom, abuse of power, unpredictability, repression, and institutionalized inequality. We get Mao's cultural revolution and Tiananmen Square, Stalin's purges and pogroms, Hitler's Holocaust, Khomeini's theocracy, Kim's poverty and nuclear weapons, Pol Pot's killing fields, Pinochet's torture, and Trump's trampling of human rights, betrayal of Ukraine, and cozying up to Putin.

Without governmental checks and balances rulers can turn tyrannical fast. Corruption festers, and brutality becomes a tool. We are subject to the whim of Tump's mood or paranoia. Opposition is crushed, with Trump and Musk as his enabler firing thousands of attorneys and government employees. Authoritarians crush opposition. Loyalty trumps merit. The elites get richer while the rest get scraps.

Our fear of authoritarianism springs from the helplessness that it creates. Our hatred of late prepersonal grows when we are the ones who are getting crushed, or we are forced to watch it happen. Under a system of checks and balances power is accountable. Nixon resigned because the system worked.

Democracies evolve with the people, overcoming slavery, providing rights to women and minorities while authoritarians are chiefly conservative and regressive. Free societies tend to innovate and thrive. Look at GDP per capita with democracies like South Korea outpacing authoritarian peers like North Korea. Look at the history of creativity and inventiveness of the enlightenment and of Western democracies in comparison to the non-democratic world. While authoritarians demand obedience, democracies offer participation and opportunity.

While we understand and recognize that democracy is far from perfect, it beats a dictator's free-for-all. Integral Theory expresses this principle in the weaknesses and evils of “dominator hierarchies” and “the Mean Green Meme,” or the Dark Side of democracy, freedom, egalitarianism, and pluralism. Late personal includes and transcends late prepersonal and therefore is obviously more developed. Wilber argues, as would most integralists, that he would rather have “Mean Green Meme” late personal than authoritarian late prepersonal development. Late prepersonal is not only less evolved, it represents a world view that is less supportive of development. It is much better to fix the ailments of the dark side of late personal than to allow a regression to late prepersonal. Such a regression is what Trump represents to many, perhaps most of those who see themselves at a late personal or vision-logic “2nd Tier” level of development, or beyond.

In order to safeguard our civilizational gains and not backslide into repression, poverty, and cruelty, a responsibility of government and media is to remind us of what we have, to teach younger generations the strengths of democracies and the weaknesses of authoritarianism, and to generate realistic, fact-based fear of authoritarianism so that we do not become appeasers, like Chamberlain and allow ourselves to be steamrolled by authoritarians. These are the sorts of concerns that lead people to call for the overthrow of authoritarians like Putin, Trump, and Xi.

How cognitive dissonance is setting in among Western liberals and progressives

Cognitive dissonance occurs when evidence threatens our world view and self-image, who we take ourselves, at our core, to be. When this occurs we use whatever strategies we can to tamp down cognitive dissonance. These largely boil down to Freud's famous defense mechanisms, beginning with denial and repression. When repression of cognitive dissonance fails, interior chaos threatens the eruption of an existential crisis. Western integralists, liberals, and progressives in the US and Europe (WILPs) are now finding themselves in chaos for a number of very good reasons. Trump has branded Zelensky, the defender of Ukrainian democracy against authoritarian Russia, a “dictator” and cut off weapon deliveries and intelligence sharing to Ukraine. Trump points out Zelensky governs under martial law, not democracy. In addition, Trump has stated that Putin, along with himself, was vilified unfairly by Russiagate. Both Boris Johnson and Marco Rubio, the U.S. Foreign Secretary, have stated that the war in Ukraine is a “proxy war” between the U.S. and Russia, thereby requiring a settlement over the heads of Ukraine and Europe. Trump looks determined to “abandon” Europe, withdrawing military support and moving toward economic war by imposing tariffs. Trump has in the short time he has been President, already made many decisions supporters of democracy view as dangerous and authoritarian. For example, the firing of masses of government officials by Trump looks and feels like an authoritarian purge to many progressives, liberals, and integralists. Trump has aligned himself with Putin, the authoritarian, in his view of the Ukraine war.

The problem for democracy is that an increasing number of progressives, liberals and historical supporters of democratic parties in the US and Europe, like RFKjr, Elon Musk, and Tulsi Gabbard are now finding common ground with individuals and governments traditionally branded as authoritarian. They are questioning the historical narratives from the history they were taught and the cultures they were raised in regarding the virtues of democracies and the evils of authoritarianism. For example, they point to authoritarian aspects of states, like the United States and Europe, that claim to be democracies. They point out studies, like that of Yale University, that provide evidence that the U.S. is no longer a democracy but rather an oligarchy, in which decisions are made by monied elites, bought off by wealthy corporate (military and Big Pharma) and ideological (Zionist) lobbies, while pubic voting yields no power to the electorate in the actual creation of policy or the carrying out of governmental decisions. This shift is breaking down the traditional black and white distinction between who and what is democratic and authoritarian.

There are multiple reasons for this. For example, there is solid evidence that at least some authoritarians can and do deliver on efficiency and prosperity. A large reason for Hitler's rise to power and support by the masses of Germans during WWII is that his policies returned prosperity to Germans after the economic catastrophe of democratic Weimar Germany.[1] Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew built a powerhouse with a tight grip. Under a succession of authoritarian leaders, from Mao through Xi, China has grown to be the most industrialized and economically powerful country in the world, based on purchasing power parity (PPP). It is slated to pass the US in GNP by the end of the decade.

Progressives, liberals, and integralists are losing unity and attacking each other instead of authoritarians. The dissenters call out authoritarian characteristics of liberals, democrats, and integralists. To these people, the ignoring of the obvious fascistic history and nature of the Ukrainian military and government appears authoritarian and late prepersonal, not democratic late personal. So does support of ongoing apartheid and genocide against the Palestinians. So does massive censorship in the U.S. and Europe of voices demanding a stop to the genocide. So does the attempt by Germany to ban an entire political party (the AfD). So does the attempt to destroy a presidential candidate by weaponizing the Department of Justice.

The late personal and 2nd Tier WILPs tend to see the dissenters as aiding and abetting authoritarians, for example, by Hillary Clinton calling Trump supporters “deplorables.” Are such people merely early or mid-prepersonal in their development, striving to evolve to late prepersonal authoritarianism? The fundamental stance of WILPs is that yes, democracy has its flaws, but it is intrinsically better than authoritarianism and both deserves and needs our support, not our betrayal of it. Late personal pluralism and egalitarianism is obviously intrinsically better than egotistical, might makes right, tribal, late prepersonal.

The fundamental stance of the “fallen,” the betrayers of democracy, is that authoritarianism has over-run the strengths of democracies while the strengths of authoritarianisms have, at the same time, won out.This is an argument, a position, a worldview, that is positively anathema to WILPs. Nevertheless, what this paradigmatic shift among some members of the WILP camp has done is shift them into a very strange and unexpected alliance with some traditionally conservative voices, like Tucker Carlson, Larry Johnson, Douglas MacGregor, or Joe Rogan. Elon Musk provides a vivid example. A democratic supporter for decades, through the Obama years, and a strong supporter of freedom of speech and free enterprise, the wake-up call for Musk was unlimited immigration supported by the Democratic Party. His objection was that the great majority of these immigrants would in time become citizens and vote Democratic, turning Democratic the few toss-up states that decide national elections and functionally capturing the Federal government under one-party rule, which he views as authoritarian and not democratic.

This historic shift of some WILPs toward alliance with “authoritarian” conservatives has been equally perplexing to many conservatives, who find themselves having more in common with some traditional Democrats than with some fellow Republicans. Are progressives and liberals regressing to late prepersonal or are late prepersonal conservatives evolving to “late personal?” Do such questions make any sense at all?

The weaknesses of democracies

The various weaknesses of democracies are generally ignored in Western history and civics textbooks as well as in the popular media. In the US, the tendency is to extol and build nationalism associated with the strengths of democracies. In Europe, and particularly Germany, democracy is praised while nationalism is downgraded. On the whole, democracies trade control for freedom, leading to gridlock and indecision, to a short-term focus, vulnerability to populism, inefficiency in crisis, and corruption. When these weaknesses and limitations are allowed to gain a foothold, they leave democracies with the exterior symbols of democracy, like voting and public narratives extolling human rights, but little actual public control over the formulation of policy, law, or governmental behavior. Instead, the reality of the U.S., UK, and EU, as well as many Western European states appears more and more to be a horrific combination of oligarchy and authoritarianism moving toward fascism.

Regarding gridlock and indecision, too many voices in democracies undercut decision-making. The U.S. Congress can't pass a budget on time half the time. $31 trillion in debt by 2025 proves it. Pre-WWI Poland, called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, demonstrated what gridlock and indecision in democracies can lead to. A weak central authority left the Polish government prey to internal division and external perpetrators. The Commonwealth's “golden liberty” gave nobles too much sway, turning democracy into anarchy. The liberum veto let any noble kill legislation, paralyzing the state. The demand that everyone have a voice under democracy leads to organizational gridlock and state collapse. By the 18th century, the Polish government was so gridlocked that it couldn't raise taxes or an army. Russia, Prussia, and Austria then moved in and in 1795 partitioned Poland out of existence. Weak institutions and no cohesion spelled doom. Something similar is now evolving in Germany and France, where coalition governments are unable to reach decisive decisions. In the U.S. Congress, it has long been difficult to gain the majority necessary to pass clear, non-ambiguous legislation.

An emphasis on elections in democracies forces leaders to hype “bread and circuses,” tax cuts, and human rights to maximize votes in the short run in order to win. Long term plans are sacrificed. In the EU, net-zero climate goals have gotten bogged down by national squabbles. Germany's coal phaseout keeps slipping because voters fear job losses. The Green Party of Germany, which started out strongly pro solar and wind and anti-coal and nuclear power, and was largely anti-war, now embraces both coal and nuclear and supports increased military spending.

In democracies, people can vote for charisma over competence. Lawyers and confident-sounding actors like Reagan and Zelensky can rise to power. Obama came across as both charismatic and competent. However, both characteristics created public space for the furtherance of authoritarian policies that made a lot of life-long Democrats, like the example of Musk, mentioned above, question whether the Democratic Party really was democratic or whether that was window dressing, covering something much more sinister. Authoritarian policies and actions under Obama included the loss of freedoms, abuses of power, unpredictability, repression, and institutionalized inequality, all of which are features of authoritarianism. Loss of freedoms include Obama's expansion of National Security Agencies' mass surveillance capabilities. For example, the 2013 Snowden leaks revealed PRISM and XKeyscore, which collected phone metadata, emails, and internet activity from millions of Americans without individualized warrants. The FISA court rubber-stamped bulk data grabs, including up to 250 million internet records yearly by 2011. Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, reauthorized in 2012 under Obama, let this run unchecked, eroding privacy for citizens who weren't even suspects.

Abuse of power under Obama included executive overreach and the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. Obama's drone program, from 2009 to 2017, killed between 384 and 807 civilians abroad, Obama stretched executive power into judge-and-jury territory. He personally signed off on drone strike “kill lists.” Civilians lost freedom from arbitrary death and hundreds died as “collateral.” Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born cleric, was killed by a drone in Yemen in 2011, in a strike co-ordinated by Obama, in violation of both U.S. and international law, without trial. His 16-year-old son, also American, died in a follow-up strike. There was no clear accountability and no outcry from pluralistic and egalitarian, democracy and human rights proclaiming late personals or 2nd Tier integralists. National and international law was ignored. So what? How can this be described as anything other than acceptance and even appeasement of authoritarian?

Obama issued 271 executive orders to bypass the accountability of Congress. Trump has issued even more. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, a move hailed by supporters but was what turned Elon Musk and some other powerful life long Democrats into adversaries.

Unpredictability is a feature democracy tends to reduce and authoritarianism tends to expand, yet both Obama's Libya intervention of 2011 and his ignoring of his “red line” regarding Syria's Assad alleged use of chemical weapons are examples of Obama undercutting his own stated policies. In Libya, a “no fly zone,” sold to the UN Security Council, morphed into regime change, leaving Libya a chaotic, unpredictable failed state.

Obama also supported repression, another clear characteristic commonly associated with authoritarianism. His whistleblower crackdown, in which is Department of Justice prosecuted more leakers under the Espionage Act than all prior administrations combined. Those totaled eight cases, including Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden. Manning got 35 years; Snowden fled. The message: expose government secrets, face ruin. Critics like Glenn Greenwald called it a war on transparency. Is exposing government crimes criminal when done against “late personal,” democratic states but a justified and honorable thing when done against late prepersonal autocratic governments?

Obama also practiced suppression of his political opponents, another characteristic of authoritarianism. In 2011, Occupy Wall Street, a largely populist demonstration against authoritarian government tendencies, faced coordinated crackdowns by the FBI. FBI documents showed federal-local collaboration to clear encampments with arrests and tear gas. In Oakland, more than 300 were arrested. Nonviolent dissent got put down violently, with jail terms, echoing authoritarian crowd control. Republicans and Trump are no less prone to suppression of political opponents than Democrats. We can see this in the suppression of any support for Palestinian rights, labeled as “anti-Semitism.”

Obama institutionalized inequality. His 2009 bank bailouts, including the $700 billion TARP program that he extended, propped up Wall Street after the 2008 crash while homeowners drowned. There were an incredible, outrageous 2.9 million foreclosures by 2012. Almost three million low income and middle income American families lost their homes while big banks got “too big to fail” lifelines. This widened the national wealth gap, with the share of the top 1% rising from 17% to 22% by 2016. Charisma and competence could not suppress the clear and obvious authoritarian nature of Obama's sell-out of middle America. This trend carried over into Obama's Medicare reforms. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 expanded coverage but baked in inequality. Subsidies favor middle-income earners while the poorest got stuck with high premiums or nothing.

Now, in 2025, Trump and Musk under DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) are forcing transparency onto the government that screams the loudest that it is democratic (the U.S.). We can see the same process in Europe, particularly in Germany and the UK, in which “hate laws” are weaponized to enforce censorship and crack down on political opponents. Who are the authoritarians and who are the democrats in this picture? This repression of accountability drives people toward populist, authoritarian, and supposedly anti-democratic alternatives.

Contemporary Europe provides another case study in the deconstruction of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism, while concurrently adamantly denying that process is occurring. The EU has 27 member states, all of which have veto power, functionally reflecting the impotent democracy of pre-WWI Poland. The EU can't agree on migrant quotas and has increasing difficulty finding agreement on sanctions on Russia. France and Germany push, while Hungary and Slovakia resist, and nothing gets done fast. Belgium's 2020 government took 652 days to form. In 2025, Euroskeptics like Italy's Meloni or France's Le Pen exploit this, winning votes by slamming Brussels' bureaucracy. France and Britain proclaim an intention to raise armies to defend Ukraine when they have neither the means nor the popular support to do so. The new government of Germany under Merz proposes a massive increase in military spending when neither the national public nor the public will support it.

Supporters of the long-standing status quo in the U.S. and Europe, enforced by all governments, can dismiss governmental acts of unilateral action without public support, combined with various forms of repression, as digressions within a larger picture of the upholding of democracy against broader forms of authoritarianism, represented by say, opponent's policies, like those of the AfD in Germany, terrorism, or Putin's Russia. This is essentially what Wilber does when he ascribes such injustices to the “mean green meme” instead of recognizing it as evidence for what it really is: regression into full-blown authoritarianism, masquerading as democracy. Wilber and integral will not even consider this reality. Taken together, these actions create a pattern of authoritarianism that is not so easy to ignore, discount, or explain away. It is both the most obvious and parsimonious explanation for why WILPs are abandoning mainstream governance and narratives in the U.S. and Europe in droves. And it is due to the reality of that pattern that a major and growing fracture among WILPs exists and is growing. Noam Chomsky has called it “soft authoritarianism.”

The conclusion that has been driving WILPs and conservatives together in both the U.S. and Europe is that Western governments are in fact, pervasively authoritarian, but have effectively constructed narratives and used media to convince populations that they are democratic. It is the construction of a message and reality that says, “Don't believe your eyes; believe what we tell you.” An increasing number of people aren't buying it. For an increasing number of Westerners, it is “the Emperor has no clothes.” Access to social media, Chinese based sources like RedHat, and to alternative geopolitical narratives, means that Western control over groupthink is diminishing. These are reasons why 500 years of Western dominance is collapsing, and why the Integral model, when applied to geopolitics, fails.

What exactly is “authoritarianism?”

Beginning in 1981, Bob Altemeyer began developing his “Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scales.” He boiled authoritarianism down to three clusters: authoritarian submission (obey the boss), authoritarian aggression (punish deviants), and conventionalism (stick to norms). He showed that fears of social disorder make the choice of authoritarian governance more likely. Pre-rational needs for control and conformity, to generate security and reduce fears, undercut rational decision-making. Those issues as precipitators of authoritarian choice were clarified by John Duckitt in 2001.[2] He argued that research data showed there are two paths to authoritarianism: threat-driven and dominance-driven. For threat-driven, he found a robust link between perceived danger and social instability and authoritarian attitudes. When the world feels like a “dangerous place,” people hunker down, preferring obedience, enforcement, and stability.

This is reminiscent of Wilber's “relational exchanges” and Maslow's “Hierarchy of Needs.” For both, safety and security are foundational. If they aren't, it becomes difficult to build a stable life focused on the attainment of higher order “relational exchanges” or needs. So while it may be “better” or even wiser to choose higher level relational exchanges, like consciousness expansion or spirituality, if you live in fear or you have to worry about whether your children will have enough to eat, pursuit of those higher level relational exchanges becomes impractical. You will gamble on authoritarian governance because insuring safety and economic security is your priority.

From this way of thinking, democracy is something of a luxury that is a product of physical security and economic prosperity. Democracy is a way of maximizing the benefits of freedom while authoritarianism is a way of insuring things don't get worse. Then why do prosperous societies, like China or Singapore continue to choose authoritarianism with “weak” forms of democracy? The best answer is probably a combination of respect for authority and fear of social backsliding. This makes sense for China in particular, which has a long history of environmental disasters - massive floods and devastating earthquakes - and military invasions and disruptions. A fear of the reality of threats is baked into Chinese consciousness in ways and to a degree that is not in the U.S., for reasons not difficult to understand. The U.S. is largely a young and successful country that does not have a history of ruin by natural disasters or foreign oppression. Furthermore, it has huge natural fortifications from enemies in the form of the Atlantic and Pacific. China has a completely different history and geographical positioning that makes it more inclined to trust a strong, centralized government. Therefore, the conclusion is not that “democracy is better,” or that “authoritarianism is better,” but that different factors in all four quadrants combine to cause populations to tilt one way or the other, depending on history, circumstances, and available opportunities.

The strengths of Autocracies

It is impossible to discuss the strengths of autocracy in the West today without being called a “Putin lover” or “useful idiot” of Putin or Xi. Those are ad hominem attacks, a form of logical fallacy, that attacks the opponent's character instead of disproving their argument. Those who recognize what is going on lose respect for those who use such tactics. They undermine their accountability and public trust in even their legitimate arguments.

Authoritarian systems thrive when decisive action and control are prioritized over consensus. This is because such systems of governance possess speed and efficiency, stability, long-term planning, order over chaos, and the ability to mobilize the population. China's high-speed rail network, over 40,000 kilometers by 2025, is an astounding engineering marvel that carried 3.27 billion passengers in 2024. That's billion, not million. It was built in record time because the Communist Party said “do it” and it happened. Meritocracy got rewarded. Hard work got rewarded with a lifestyle of economic security. No local protests or lawsuits slowed it down.

China's elections are local, not national. Local elected officials elect regional officials based on performance and meritocracy. Regional officials elect national officials. The result of this system is that centralized government is freed from worrying about the next election. As a further result, it can focus on long-term planning, setting five, ten, and twenty year national goals. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a long-term trillion-dollar global infrastructure investment. It demonstrates how an authoritarian regime can stick to a vision while democracies bicker over short-term budgets. The consequences of the BRI for Western global influence are difficult to over-estimate. Due to its success, control of third world economies by the IMF and World Bank is rapidly diminishing, weakening the economic power of the West.

China was admitted to the World Trade Organization under Clinton due to the assumption this would allow the private capital firms of Wall Street and the City of London to capture Chinese markets and deconstruct the competitive advantages of Chinese centralized government. When China grew economically, gained global markets, and successfully controlled privatization in China, this strategy failed. Instead of adopting a better strategy or economic model, the US paralyzed the World Trade Organization so it could not rule in favor of China and against Western economic interests. Who are the late prepersonal authoritarians in this picture?

Authoritarianism can effectively reduce crime, and corruption, as well as dissent. Between 2005 and 2025 between 1.2 an 1,7 million bureaucrats have been tried and imprisoned in China. Between 5,000 and 10,000 corporate leaders have been arrested and punished for corruption in China during the same time period. Compare that to the very infrequent “show trials” of bureaucrats and corporate heads in the west. Where is accountability for criminality occurring, something one would assume late personal democracies would insist on? Where is the absence of accountability for criminality occurring?

To get a sense of how important and impressive the quick mobilization of society under authoritarianism can be, consider Chinese and Western responses to COVID. In China, enforced national lockdowns suppressed the spread of COVID very early. Official estimates are that under 5,000 Chinese deaths from COVID occurred by 2025. Death rates from COVID in the U.S. through 2023 have been an astronomical 1,116,208. A similar degree of “authoritarianism” in the U.S. could have saved over a million lives during that time period. WILPs may find those methods repellant, due to restrictions on individual liberties, but those who either died or those who lost loved ones might beg to differ.

The Chinese Communist Party's control over tech giants like Alibaba lets it steer AI without privacy debates. We can cite DeepSeek as a current example. It has undercut Silicon Valley's AI plans, producing a more robust chatbot at a greatly reduced price. Isn't pluralistic and egalitarian late personal supposed to support innovation while authoritarian late prepersonal stifles it? If that is true, which governments are late prepersonal and which are late personal?

China has lifted 800 million out of poverty since the 1980s, a historically unprecedented achievement that no democracy has come close to matching. This is how authoritarianisms can deliver because it prioritizes results over rights. The common WILP response is to say “yes, but…” Westerners commonly claim that Chinese are repressed by their government and lie about it on surveys of their trust in government out of fear of reprisals. But a number of Western surveys of Chinese trust in their government have taken this possibility into consideration and concluded that no, Chinese on the whole really do trust their government to a much greater degree than do citizens of Western democracies.[3]

A favorite tactic in WILP media is to recognize authoritarian strengths but then to ask, “But at what cost?” The implication is that the advances created by and within authoritarian societies are superficial, not worth the cost, or destined to backfire. What looks late personal gains in authoritarian societies, like egalitarianism, pluralism, or trust in government, is really late prepersonal authoritarianism masquerading as a much higher level of development. The further implication is, “better stick with the poorly performing system you have, democratic mostly in self-image, than to respect or adopt aspects of authoritarian societies that provide greater prosperity and even greater personal freedoms.” When supposedly authoritarian societies and governments are highly successful, the integral developmental hierarchy breaks down. Who is authoritarian and who is democratic?

For example, after its civil war from 1939 to 1975, Spain's infrastructure was rebuilt by Franco with forced unity and central government repression. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, with prosperity, infrastructure, and solar farms, demonstrates how monarchies, dictatorships, and authoritarian states can pivot an economy without dissent. Prosperity within Saudi Arabia, due to its enormous oil wealth, tamps down and buys off internal opposition. Well-paying employment, personal prosperity, and family security can compensate for the absence of personal freedom in any society. Prosperous late prepersonal living standards are superior to corrupt late personal societies that perpetually siphon prosperity away from the majority and direct it into the hands of a ruling oligarchy. Integral doesn't see this because it doesn't want to see it.

In another example, the West militarily and economically supports ongoing genocide carried out by Israel. It only allows news that justifies it. What could be more “late prepersonal,” authoritarian? It could be argued that genocide is indeed a “holocaust,” and that it is even worse than that perpetrated by The Third Reich, in that it has been perpetuated not for five, but for at least 80 years. Yet prominent integralists refuse to draw that conclusion. Why? The most likely reason is that it would force them to conclude that the Integral model is wrong, that states that embrace late personal values may actually be profoundly late prepersonal, and that that is in fact the case in the U.S. and Europe. Another reason may be a of fear defenestration by the guardians of the Western status quo.

As noted above, prosperity and security tend to take priority among populations in all countries, regardless of their political persuasion, because they are foundational for higher order relational exchanges like freedom of speech and egalitarianism. There is no doubt that under Chinese authoritarianism the Chinese as a whole benefit from increased security and greater prosperity. Quality of life in China continues to increase while we are witnessing increases in insecurity and late reduced standards of living in the U.S. and Europe. Facts on the ground speak louder than narrative and Integral ideology.

“Is it true that an authoritarian shift is occurring within Western democracies?”

When does a democracy become an authoritarian state? In the 1980's. UK's Thatcher era gutted unions and public housing, doubling child poverty to 20% by 1990. France's 2015 state of emergency after the Paris attacks let police raid homes and ban protests. This was extended into 2017, curbing liberties for thousands. Poland's PiS government, from 2015 to 2023, stacked courts and restricted abortion, shrinking women's autonomy. Is it authoritarianism when non-western countries repress, stifle free speech, and pass laws that gut the middle and lower classes but somehow not authoritarianism when western countries do the same? Hypocrisy much? From 1994 to 2011, Italy's Berlusconi used media dominance to dodge corruption charges, bending laws for personal gain. Hungary's Orbán (2010-2025) rewrote the constitution, neutered the judiciary, and funneled EU funds to loyalists, with €1.2 billion misallocated by 2022, according to EU audits. Sweden's 1990s neoliberal shift widened income gaps. The top 10% now hold 70% of wealth, as of 2023. That is support of oligarchy, on the road to authoritarianism.

Germany is currently jailing people who speak out against the ongoing genocide on Palestinians carried out by Israel with the military, financial, and media support of the US and EU. Germany's 2008 anti-terror laws let police surveil without court orders, targeting activists. For example, climate protests were raided in 2022. Climate protests!!

Aren't repression, censorship, and denial of freedom of speech supposed to be marks of totalitarianism, of authoritarian states?

Authoritarianism is not just a feature of individual European states. The European Commission's 2015 Greek bailout forced austerity on an already weak economy. Pensions were cut 40%. Voter rejection in a referendum of the austerity measures being imposed were simply ignored prepersonal. The Greek government, doing the bidding of the EU, crushed 2011 anti-austerity riots with tear gas and arrests. Over 1,000 were detained in Athens alone. EU sanctions on Poland (2021) withheld €36 billion in funds, punishing a member state without clear democratic input

The 2021 Digital Services Act polices online speech, fining online platforms for “hate” or “disinformation.” Who gets to define those terms? X was fined €10 million by the EU in 2024.

“The BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) expanded on January 1, 2024, to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, forming “BRICS+. This brought its population coverage to about 46% of the world's total (roughly 3.6 billion people), up from 41% pre-expansion, compared to the G7's 10% (around 780 million). Over 40 countries have expressed interest in joining, with 16 formally applying—nations like Indonesia (now a full member as of 2025), Algeria, Cuba, and Thailand. This suggests a growing alignment with BRICS, at least in terms of membership or partnership interest, pulling in more governments and people.”

So yes, it is true that such a shift is, in fact, happening.

Grok 3 provides the following factors as contributing to why this shift is occurring:

“Economic power and opportunity, resources, geopolitical realignment, sanctions fatigue, sovereignty and autonomy, multi-polar appeal, and practical incentives. In terms of economic power and opportunity, the GDP of China, India, and Russia is more rapid than that of the G7. “Emerging economies see BRICS as a gateway to trade and investment without Western strings (e.g., IMF structural adjustments).” In terms of resources, because BRICS members control a large chunk of oil and rare earths, resource-dependent nations that seek stable suppliers outside Western trading conditions, which often demand government reforms, are attracted. Discontent with the West is a factor in the shift for at least some countries shifting toward BRICS. The sources of discontent include perceived imperialism and colonialism, meddling in local governance, and cultural imposition. The imposition of sanctions have driven important countries, like Russia and Iran, into closer alignment with China. Regarding sovereignty and autonomy: “Unlike Western models often tied to democracy or human rights conditions, BRICS emphasizes sovereignty. Authoritarian regimes (e.g., Iran, Ethiopia) find this attractive, as do democracies like Brazil seeking less prescriptive partnerships.” Many countries are tired of the dominance of a unipolar economic system imposed by the West via SWIFT, the IMF, and the World Bank. Practical incentives include increased opportunities for trade and reduced labor costs due to larger and younger populations.”

The point of these factors is that they are primarily exterior quadrant, measurable, objective, and functional, and only secondarily about principle and intent - interior quadrant measurements, like the definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. We must therefore conclude that at least some authoritarianism is functional, practical, rational, and beneficial. I am reminded of the meaning of the word “tyrant” in Ancient Greece. Tyrants could be beneficent or cruel, beneficent tyrants were not deemed less worthy than say, Athenian democracy. Peisistratos of Athens, Polycrates of Samos, Cypselus of Corinth, and Cleisthenes of Sicyon are notable examples.

Westerners do not have to agree with that conclusion, nor does anyone else. Everyone is perfectly free to prefer their own version of governance. However, what we are seeing globally is a massive shift by countries, when and if they are free to make an autonomous choice, toward the BRICS model, which is fundamentally a Chinese model of governance and interdependence, and away from a more traditionalist Western model of governance and interdependence. It is important to note that this is not universal. Argentina, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela have declined or paused BRICS membership. Whether Westerners agree with it or not, whether or not they think countries are making a mistake by aligning with what, by their definition, is a more authoritarian and less democratic way forward, the traditional Western definitions of democracy and authoritarianism are losing credibility and followers, world-wide.

This increase in authoritarianism, as measured by a loss of freedom, abuses of power, unpredictability, repression, and institutionalized inequality, has not been limited to Democratic or Republican administrations in the U.S. One can argue that one party is worse than the other, but that misses the forest of authoritarianism for a quibbling over this or that tree species. Both the Democratic and Republican parties use surveillance, force, and favoritism under democratic cover, and justified by post 9/11 security claims. In both Europe and the U.S. freedom continues to erode under “emergency” pretexts, as power, privilege, and wealth continue to fatten elite pigs at the trough. Repression hides behind “rule of law.” Until the amazing and completely unexpected arrival of the Department of Government Efficiency under Trump and headed by Elon Musk, government transparency and accountability have been largely non-existent, an additional important hallmark of authoritarianisms. Of course, at this date, the jury is out as to whether corruption and fraud will actually be ferreted out of the US government or whether this is simply another ploy to consolidate authoritarian power. It is wise to remain skeptical.

Regarding a loss of freedom, as we have seen, the Obama era, from 2009 to 2017, saw the expansion of NSA surveillance under the PRISM program, exposed by Snowden in 2013. Americans lost privacy as metadata collection swept up millions of calls and emails. It was warrantless, broad, and justified by the “war on terror.” Biden's 2021 push for vaccine mandates also sparked backlash, with private employers pressed to enforce rules, shrinking personal choice for some. Bush's Patriot Act of 2001 shredded Fourth Amendment protections, letting the government wiretap, detain, and search with little oversight. Trump's 2017 travel ban on Muslim-majority countries restricted entry based on nationality, curbing freedom of movement for thousands. It was an authoritarian move upheld by the Supreme Court in 2018.

Regarding authoritarian abuse of power, Clinton's 1994 crime bill fueled mass incarceration, disproportionately targeting Black communities, with over 2 million jailed by 2000. Obama's Libya intervention in 2011 flipped from “no boots on the ground” to airstrikes and chaos, leaving a power vacuum. With Hillary cackling over the brutal, obscene murder of Gaddafi. Authoritarianism much? Reagan's Iran-Contra affair (1985-1987) saw officials illegally fund Nicaraguan rebels, bypassing Congress. Sure looks like authoritarianism. Obama's DOJ prosecuted more whistleblowers under the Espionage Act than all prior administrations combined, signaling an upswing in repression and censorship, hallmarks of authoritarianism. Bush's Guantanamo Bay, maintained by Obama, detained hundreds without trial, with some tortured. Waterboarding was confirmed by CIA reports. I thought democracies didn't torture, Authoritarian dictatorships and rogue regimes were supposed to be the ones that tortured. How does one torture and rationally claim to be indicative of anything other than a totalitarian, authoritarian state? Isn't that how the West views non-western states that torture? How were Trump's response to Black Lives Matter 2020 protests, including tear gas in Lafayette Square and militarized police, not authoritarian crowd control?

Repression of one's own population was something Westerners were taught authoritarian governments do. Yet Reagan's tax cuts (1981, 1986) slashed rates for the wealthy, ballooning the wealth gap—top 1% share rose from 10% to 20% by 1990. Yet Clinton's welfare reform of 1996 cut safety nets and deepened poverty gaps in ways that were real and painful to the most vulnerable. By 2000, single mothers faced a 20% income drop. Biden's tax policies from 2021 to 2025 kept corporate loopholes intact, favoring the rich while inequality hit GINI highs (0.49 in 2022). Trump's 2017 tax overhaul gave 83% of benefits to the top 10%, according to the Tax Policy Center, entrenching elite advantage.

If Western democracies are actually disguised prepersonal authoritarian regimes, so what?

Integral Theory maps political systems onto a developmental spectrum. Late prepersonal represents power-driven, hierarchical authoritarianism and late personal signifies pluralistic, egalitarian democracies. What are the implications for this framework when Western democracies back neo-Nazis in Ukraine and Israeli genocide, ignoring the International Criminal Court's rulings that Israel's prime minister and past military commander are international criminals? What are the implications for the integral framework when purported authoritarian and late prepersonal Russia and China oppose the genocide as well as the neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine?

The superficial explanation is, “It's authoritarianism if states we deem prepersonal do it, but it's just “shadow” of higher level development if we do the same thing, or worse.” This is a clever cop-out and avoidance of responsibility. “We are excused because our barbarity comes from a higher level of development than theirs.” By that reasoning, why are we not more accountable instead of less, because due to our higher level of development that includes and then transcends theirs, aren't we more conscious and responsible? Aren't we, according to Kohlberg's care of moral judgment, supposed to be more ethical, not less?

The integral model oversimplifies by assuming ideological purity aligns with developmental stages. It expects late personal democracies to consistently embody pluralism and fairness, while late prepersonal authoritarian regimes stick to raw power and tribalism. Reality contradicts this theoretical framework. For example, the U.S., UK, and EU, which are considered by integral theory to be broadly late personal, support Israel, often ignoring or downplaying its apartheid-like policies like West Bank settlements and its ongoing genocide in Gaza. This isn't “pluralistic” or “egalitarian.” Nor is it the “shadow” of late personal, as Wilber would have it. It is late prepersonal authoritarianism masquerading as late personal.

This political and narrative subterfuge is strategic, rooted in geopolitics, including countering Iran and historical guilt for the Holocaust. It is enabled by the authoritarian ability of AIPAC to bribe U.S. politicians into submission and of Zionists to throw non-compliant British politicians out of power (See Jeremy Corbyn). Late personal values get sidelined for early personal ethnocentric concerns, like collective guilt, or by mid-personal pragmatic interests like keeping our jobs and status.

Wilber attempts to save his model by attributing authoritarian, regressive and late prepersonal behavior by late personal governments to the “shadow” of late personal, which he poetically calls the “mean green meme.” So non-western authoritarians are really late prepersonal in their development but western authoritarians are really just misguided late personals who require redemption. They aren't “really” authoritarians when they censor, starve, torture, or murder people. It is as if an individual or a nation, once it embraces higher order values, is no longer capable of authentic regression. Why not? Isn't there compelling evidence that this is exactly what is going on?

The basic problem is that AQAL makes two basic mistakes in this regard. Because development in some lines is permanent and does not regress, it assumes that development in any and all lines is permanent, and any regression that occurs is within the highest attained level of development and not to lower levels of development. For example, cognitive development, following Piaget, is not easily or normally undone. Wilber agrees and I agree. Moral judgment is not easily or normally undone. However, the ability to rationalize any behavior as moral continues to exist, meaning that moral behavior can easily regress to earlier developmental levels. It doesn't take PTSD, dissociation, or personality breakdown, as Wilber contends, for genuine developmental regression to occur. Fear, status, compliance demands, and security needs can all create a genuine shift toward amoral and even immoral behavior. Otherwise, how do you explain the widespread Western support for genocide? To the best of my knowledge, Integral AQAL does not recognize this profound and fundamental regression into prepersonal immorality as a stage regression.

Secondly, Integral Theory evaluates development based on UL interior intent and LL values, like Kohlberg's scale of moral judgment, not by actual UR behavior and LL collective standards of justice. If it did, western democracies would be assessed as being at least as authoritarian as Russia or China or Iran.

Why do intelligent integralists continue to delude themselves?

Why do WILPs not recognize these realities? Most integralists come from western countries and maintain a bias that is invisible to them toward a western worldview. They come from a long line of brilliant western innovators in philosophy, sociology, physics, biology, anthropology, law, psychology, and ethics. Therefore, they identify as the best and the brightest. They are confident they are multi-perspectival, pluralistic, and egalitarian, even when they are either ignoring or supporting genocide and neo-Nazis.

The blind spot for integralists involves three factors that interdependently support each other in delusion: 1) although Integral Theory is theoretically balanced, it exhibits a preference for viewing geopolitical events through interior quadrants rather than a balance of interior and exterior ones; 2) a preference for using a hierarchical developmental analysis of nation states which stereotypes them and produces absurd reductionisms, like that China must be late prepersonal on average, even though it is by almost every measure surpassing the West; 3) an over-reliance on cognitive multi-perspectival “maps” like Integral AQAL while lacking in empathetic multi-perspectivalism. While integralists see themselves as empathetic, the evidence is that most neither understand or have much respect for Chinese, Russian, or Palestinian perspectives.

This third factor, a lack of empathy, is hardly limited to integralists or even WILPs. I regard it as a hard-wired and fundamental cognitive bias, in which we are adapted in an evolutionary sense to first protect ourselves and our families, then our groups, and to be suspicious and defensive toward non-group “others.” However, one would think that if any group of humans would have evolved past that cognitive bias, it would be 2nd Tier integralists. Alas, this is not the case. This sort of empathy is more likely to be found in the third world, among people dependent on the good will of strangers, than it is among integralists and WILPs, who have a tendency to identify with the higher relational exchanges that they are invested in, like meditation, consciousness expansion, and enlightenment, than they are invested in the foundational and underlying relationship exchanges of security, the abolishment of poverty, and the insurance of opportunity for lower classes around the world. Part of the reason is very simple: economic prosperity produces physical and emotional security, meaning Westerners can afford to be more independent and less reliant on others. This is of course a short-sighted and potentially disastrous preference, because history has shown that there may well come a time when we need the help of strangers or alliance with supposed enemies. In addition, neglected “others” in time are likely to rise up and overthrow entitled elites who do not understand or respect their needs and interests. It is easier, with both psychological and economic benefits to dismiss them as “authoritarians” or as people deluded and captured by autocracies, than to consider the possibility that their interests and competencies are commensurate to our own. Defensiveness against possible threats, real or imagined, is good for business. At present, European elites would rather maintain conflict with Russia than enter into diplomacy and negotiate peace. How is an unwillingness to discuss the causes of conflict with adversaries integral? How is it late personal?

To reduce cognitive dissonance and maintain the consistency of a self-validating world view, it is better to stick to an ideologically rooted, delusional belief system. Challenging the late prepersonal-late personal binary can alienate peers who see democracy as inherently “better.” For such integralists, peer approval can be more important than either rationality or morality. In addition, a geopolitical hierarchy that parallels stages of individual development is theoretically elegant. It validates our worldview of our superiority to stereotype collectives while ignoring both the prepersonal behaviors of Western democracies as well as the late personal behaviors of non-western “enemies.”

Integralists often buy into progressive ideals. There is an important element of moral aspiration behind Integral suppression of overwhelming evidence of authoritarianism in western states. Integral Theory strives to guide humanity upward, toward enlightenment. By labeling democracies “late personal,” integral reflects hope that they will embody equality and inclusion, even if they manifest authoritarian behavior. For Integral theory, idealism blinds it to reality. WILPs too often can't see or acknowledge those characteristics of non-western states like Russia, China, or Iran that are superior to the West. It won't see or acknowledge the barbaric characteristics, like the support of state terrorism, genocide, and fascism, of western states. It is easier to discount and ignore those who point out the hypocrisy of those glaring inconsistencies.

Ideology serves to protect identity. It also uses reason selectively to defend beliefs upon which identity depends. Admitting that democracies can be late prepersonal, not just as “shadow,” but as authentic barbarity, risks unraveling the stages, threatening the model's integrity. Acknowledging Western support for Israel's policies as prepersonal, forces a reckoning with hypocrisy in a society integralists have generally given the benefit of the doubt. It's easier to call barbarity in democratic societies an anomaly than rethink the map.

Integralists tend to be big on spirituality, consciousness, and enlightenment but light on geopolitics. They can easily imagine themselves to be above the fray, focused on more important issues, such as enlightenment and “consciousness.” Ukraine and Israel do not fit into the theoretical hierarchical framework, so they tend to be ignored. When intellectual sunk costs and theoretical purity collide with facts on the ground, it is much easier to ignore or discount facts on the ground. Better yet, narratives can be constructed that support identity and suppress cognitive dissonance.

Toward an authentic Integral

An authentic Integral will recognize and respect the strengths of states deemed authoritarian while denouncing as prepersonal, pre-rational, and barbaric crimes against humanity committed by western governments. That in no way precludes denouncing the authoritarian behavior of states deemed authoritarian or extolling the behavior in democracies that is in fact democratic, egalitarian, and pluralistic. An authentic Integral avoids the stereotyping of entire nations in a developmental hierarchy. It would not simply acknowledge that nations aren't monoliths, which is easy enough; it would stop making moral judgments about other societies and cultures. It would actually practice authentic multi-perspectivalism instead of clinging to dysfunctional polarizations of “us” and “them,” jettisoning the simplistic, reductionistic, and asinine cult color designations used in its geopolitical analysis that are inherently stereotypical.

BRICS, led by China and Russia, is now the largest trading block in the world. It continues to grow because it is authentically egalitarian and pluralistic in addition to being largely non-ideological. That is an example of a concrete geopolitical economic reality that doesn't meet the current AQAL map, something an authentic Integral would openly acknowledge. Ukraine really does have statues and national holidays in honor of Stepan Bandera, Nazi collaborator and murderer of hundreds of thousands of Jews and Poles. The United States and Europe really do support neo-Nazis in Ukraine. The United States and Europe really do support genocide. The United States and Europe really are state sponsors of terror. The United States and Europe really do torture and impose censorship and imprisonment on those who do not toe the party line. Guantanamo remains open. The United States and Europe really do ignore and defy international law when they want to. The United States and Europe really are late prepersonal and not late personal in ways that are real and that matter.

So who is really authoritarian and who is not? According to multiple western surveys and studies, Chinese consistently report much higher trust in their government than do Americans or Europeans. Why is that? Calling China and Russia “authoritarian” is not simply lame name calling, a form of ad hominem attack by those attempting to shift the subject from the authoritarianism in their own culture and society. It damages the personal credibility of westerners and creates a roadblock to the sort of objective analysis that is required if there is ever to be a movement beyond polarization to mutual respect.

To further remedy this blind spot, AQAL could add a “regression line” to track when and how behavior does not match developmental aspirations. This could be quantified, like Loevinger's stage variance. It could point out that regression to lower developmental stages does not require trauma but instead can simply be a calculated response to context, like Haidt's moral foundations becoming priorities in response to perceived threat or advantage. Integral can also do a better job in its Integral Life Practice of developing methodologies to catch regressive rationalizations in real time. It can also do a much better job of defining not just moral intent and judgment but what is and is not moral behavior. Instead of largely appealing to collective norms and international law, as if it has transcended the need for them, integralists can state they not only need them, but are personally bound by them, for the simple reason that they want and need others to be bound by them.

Conclusion

The result of a little thoughtfulness regarding the democracy/authoritarianism polarity is an increase in integral multi-perspectivalism and an openness to the needs and interests of both sides of a dispute. Instead of bashing designated enemies of the West, notably, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Palestine, it won't hurt us to suspend our assumptions and move into dialogue, asking questions instead of delivering ideologically-based conclusions. The result is that we will gain new information about opponents and broaden our understanding of the sources of the disagreement. We are then in a better position to make informed interpretations of what is going on and work out solutions that are mutually respectful.

What are the common responses to the argument that so-called democratic Western states are authentically prepersonal, not shadow, in their behavior when they support neo-Nazis, genocide, terrorism, and illegal wars? I hear, “If you think China is so great, why don't you move there?” Or, “Why are you anti-Democratic?” “Why do you need to trash the West? You sound ungrateful for its many strengths and benefits.”

The problem with these counter-arguments is that they make assumptions. Many Westerners who travel to China write narratives about how amazed they are at the quality of life and the welfare of the general population. This is consistent with what multiple Western studies have found regarding the level of satisfaction that Chinese themselves have with the quality of their lives and government. To improve our objectivity toward those with whom we are in conflict we first have to become aware of the strengths of their positions and the weaknesses of our own. To name those weaknesses is not necessarily an attack. Instead, it can be a first step toward rehabilitation. The bottom line that democratic boosters have to face (but will not) is, “What if life really IS better in China or Russia?” “What does that do to my understanding of what a democracy is and what an authoritarianism is?”

The basic difference between democracy and authoritarianism is that the West, on the whole, judges governance on the basis of principles, such as balance of powers, elections, and protections of freedom of speech, peaceful protest, and religion under the law. China provides an example of a country and civilization that judges governance on the basis of results: “Does standard of living improve or not?””Does expressed satisfaction in governance improve or not?” “Are people happy with their government or not?” “Are public complaints and injustices dealt with fairly and promptly or not?” The reality is that most people care much less about what form of government they live under as long as it produces physical and economic security as well as opportunities for self-improvement and the improvement of their children.

In integral terms, this is a shift from a left, interior quadrant emphasis on stated intent and values to objectively measured transparency, accountability, and measurable results. In practical terms, this is a shift of emphasis from belief, ideology, and principles, to behavior, as measured by those who are most affected by government actions. The distinction between democracy and autocracy is an interior collective, ideological distinction. It is an interpretation that is projected onto experience. It is one of four possible lenses by which we can evaluate ourselves, others, and collectives, including nations. The other three are, “What is the consciousness of individuals themselves?” “What is their behavior?” “What are collective judgments regarding objective measurements like safety, prosperity, and opportunity?” Westerners tend to evaluate societies, including their own, primarily through the lenses of their own intention and distinctions - interior quadrant assessments. An integral and multi-perspectival approach says, “That is well and good, and what feedback do we receive from the other quadrants?” “What can we conclude when all four perspectives and their interdependence is taken into account?”

When all four quadrants are taken into account, Westerners are forced to recognize there are serious limitations created by their definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. It is not that democracy doesn't have many strengths; it does. It is not that autocracy doesn't have many weaknesses. It does. The point is that democracy can be more flexibly defined in ways that puts it less in conflict with a more flexibly defined autocracy. The result is a more adaptable governance which meets with greater public approval more of the time. The result on a personal level is less dogmatism and ideological polarization, combined with a greater willingness to suspend judgment, ask questions, look for common interests, and forge lasting bonds based on them.

NOTES

[1] Dillard J., “Why Smart, Compassionate Germans Supported Fascism, And Why It Matters Today.” Integral World, https://www.integralworld.net/dillard93.html

[2] Duckett, J., “A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology and Prejudice” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology.

[3] Edelman Trust Barometer: This annual survey by the U.S.-based PR firm Edelman polls 28+ countries on trust in institutions, including government. In 2023, 89% of Chinese respondents trusted their government to “do what is right,” topping the list, while the U.S. scolate prepersonal 43% and the UK 37%. Earlier years show similar patterns: 91% in China vs. 39% in the U.S. in 2022; 76% in China vs. 20% in the U.S. in 2017. European nations like Germany (44% in 2023) and France (39%) also trail China significantly.
Harvard Ash Center (2003-2016): A long-term study by Harvard surveyed 32,000 Chinese respondents, finding 95.5% were “relatively” or “highly satisfied” with the central government in 2016, the final year reported. This dwarfs U.S. satisfaction rates—Gallup pegged American trust at 38% in 2016, dropping to 16% by 2023. European comparisons aren't directly parallel, but Pew's 2017 data showed France at 20% trust, rising to 55% by 2020—still below China's peak.
Pew Research Center: A 2013 Pew survey across 39 countries found 85% of Chinese respondents satisfied with their country's direction, far outpacing the U.S. (31%), Germany (57%), and Japan (33%). While not a direct trust metric, satisfaction often correlates with trust, and Pew's U.S.-focused trust data (e.g., 22% in 2024 per Pew) reinforces the gap.
World Values Survey (WVS): WVS data on interpersonal trust (not government-specific) shows China lower than Nordic countries (e.g., 60%+ in Norway say “most people can be trusted”), but when pailate prepersonal with other polls, Chinese government trust still outstrips Western counterparts. U.S. trust in government via WVS-related metrics hovers around 20-30% in recent waves.
High trust in China often ties to tangible outcomes—economic growth (800 million lifted from poverty since the '80s), infrastructure (3.27 billion high-speed rail passengers in 2024), and COVID control (official deaths under 5,000 vs. 1.17 million in the U.S. by 2025). Harvard's Tony Saich notes rural Chinese view Beijing as distant and benevolent, blaming local officials for woes, while state media amplifies positive narratives.
American trust crashed post-Vietnam and Watergate, hitting 20% or below since 2007 (Gallup, Pew). Events like Iraq, 2008's financial crisis, and partisan gridlock fuel cynicism. In Europe, trust varies—Nordics like Sweden score higher (50-60% per OECD), but southern states (e.g., Italy, 35%) and post-Brexit UK lag. Corruption perceptions and EU bureaucracy dent confidence, per Pew's 2021 reform survey.
Trust in China: 79-95% trust/satisfaction (Edelman 2024, Harvard 2016).
Trust in the U.S.: 16-46% (Pew 2024, Edelman 2023).
Trust in Europe: 33-55% (Japan low, France high, per Pew and Edelman).