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 H.B. Augustine is a junior undergraduate student at Denison University studying Philosophy and Communication. He has started a publishing organization called "Integral Publishing House" - contact him at august_h@denison.edu if interested in publishing Integral material. Integral Philosophy
A Proof Against Extreme Skepticism
Suited for the 1st-Tier Reader
Henry Augustine
Granted, skepticism is partially right; however, this means that it is likewise flawed. The “healthy” version of skepticism is a necessary component to a comprehensive and holistic, and therefore definitive, epistemology. However, the “unhealthy” version alone is even worse, a sadly limiting and delusional view on knowledge. What, then, is this particular version?
Unhealthy skepticism allows a skeptical perspective not to contribute partially to one's fundamental philosophic outlook, but rather to dominate entirely.
Instead of being aware of the difference between knowledge and belief and having this guide one further toward Truth, the unhealthy skeptic doubts nearly everything – and, in the extreme case, he or she doubts everything except one's own existence. A legitimate method that science implements discounts something if even one thing disproves it. For example, would it still be factual that humans cannot fly if but one man or woman, boy or girl, was able to fly and demonstrated so in an intersubjectively recognizable and persuasive way? We should agree that the answer is no. Back to unhealthy skepticism, if we were to provide one or several substantial examples showing Certainty in something, then this would eliminate the potential universal application of unhealthy skepticism altogether. Let us consider these examples.
Let us judge the significance of the following question. When we stand near a dear friend or family member, do we know and are Certain whether he or she is an actual living creature, i.e. human, or are we nevertheless un-Certain of this judgment – thus allowing for the possibility that “he” or “she” is not such in this sense, that this “person” is not one at all but is rather an inorganic, unemotional, insentient, robot? There are two answers to this question. The first is, Of course – he or she is a real person, as defined; one can just “feel” it and know it is True! The second: Hyperbolic doubt still makes it possible that the individual we see is robotic, despite how strongly one may feel about the judgment.
Note that the second response is not necessarily, automatically, the correct answer. Unhealthy skeptics will assert that the second wins over the first and that nothing can counter it. However, still, it is not inherently Certain – ironically – that these skeptics are right in what they say. There is a right answer between the two responses to the stated question, and it is not logically necessary that it is the second one. With all this considered, let us proceed.
Here is where a number of readers will lose consideration and investment in the current argument. While skeptics would posit that the second question is right, we can likewise see that the other is instead True. We are fooling ourselves with our own rationalization to hold that there is some chance (regardless of how slim) that the woman we have known and have called “Mom” so many years, does not share the same organic flesh and DNA as we have. The first answer or option to this first question countering unhealthy skepticism is True; it is as True as is a precise mathematical fact. “But wait!” say the skeptics. “What about the 'evil genius' possibility?”
Descartes first proposes the concept of the potential evil genius not surprisingly in Meditations. Theoretically, Descartes reasons, it is possible that the world I perceive and have always known is entirely an illusion – that it is in fact the masterful and deceitful invention of some evil genius. If the latter were True, then this would imply that there is nothing at all of which we can be Certain except for our own existence. Furthermore, if the latter were True, then we would have “Reason” to doubt even the most objective and exact measurements we have – mathematics. If it is possible that even our Certainty in basic arithmetic and geometric facts is actually false (which is what the evil genius possibility allows), then this would give us nothing to see our Certainty in the real identity of our mother, let alone any human being. Without this Certainty, we would not be able to proceed in the established argument against unhealthy skepticism, let alone any arguments in the pages to follow. Therefore, it is crucial to disprove the evil genius possibility altogether, which may seem to be a lofty and impossible task but is, again, quite contrary.
With the above in mind, let us use the same technique as Descartes in order to answer the current matter. What we are about to do may seem to require a hefty amount of space, but we cannot forget that size is not nearly as important as is persuasion. Perhaps a better term is guidance. Descartes attempts to give such guidance but, as history shows, he is very unsuccessful. In attempting to disprove the evil genius possibility, which – both ideally and literally – is the foundation of unhealthy skepticism, Descartes decides to tackle it as rationally (and, interestingly, as intuitively) as possible.
Unfortunately, though he argues well and extensively, his claim rests on his “proving” the existence of God. Perhaps the Father of Modernity proves God – perhaps he does not. The importance of the matter, though, is that a majority of Meditations readers will reject Descartes' proof of God and resulting disproof of unhealthy skepticism, both essentially and ultimately. Descartes does not realize that logic, defined conventionally, is not nearly as important of a tool as is intuition. As many scientifically minded people say, seeing equals believing. However, let us allow the following argument as a relatively brief proof of “God” to show that seeing, rather, equals knowing.
Seeing equals knowing, in this case, because of the Truth that all nature subtly shouts at each one of us. Yet, we are too distracted even to consider the chance that we can be as Certain that nature is proof of God as we can be Certain that the evil genius possibility is false, as we can be Certain of mathematical facts as we can be Certain that our mother is a human being – as we can be Certain that unhealthy or extreme skepticism is an utter fallacy. If we find ourselves Certain of the following argument, then we can automatically be also Certain of all the notions leading back to the original problem that we have intended to solve. To begin, we can consider three concepts: the Big Bang, Creationism, and Intelligent Design.
The Big Bang, according to science, is the origin of the Universe. This theory holds that the Universe began as one compact unit of all potential energy. The energy exploded – thus, the “Big Bang” – and, while continually expanding, eventually differentiated itself to form the most fundamental bits of matter. These most fundamental bits were, and are, quarks – then protons, neutrons, and electrons. These three components together form atoms, the building blocks of all corporeal existence. During the initial stages of the beginning of time – like the energy – the atoms randomly interacted with one another and formed molecules. The molecules formed chemicals, or elements, as well as life, or cells. First, there were prokaryotic cells, forming plants; then, there were eukaryotic cells, forming animals. After all these prior levels had randomly interacted with one another to form “sentient planets” – an example of these being our home Earth – an entirely new, proportionately complex, and equally profound level of being – accidentally – emerged: Reason, or thought.
This new level of complexity – as neuroscience, anthropology, and psychology have effectively shown – then grew in further “sub-stages.” The emerging societies and cultures were each precise reflections of these emergent stages. Apes became cave people, cave people formed tribes, tribes became civilizations, civilizations became empires; empires became nation-states, and already have a number of nation-states become world-states (defined later). All of these major societal trends are manifestations of the general stage of thought development – thought as to life as to matter. Just as there were various stages of development within life and within matter, there were also such within thought.
The highest stages of development pertaining to Reason or thought have been exemplified by people such as Albert Einstein, demonstrating the advanced capacity to think more than “purely rationally” – transrationally – and be able to know and understand relatively immense abstract notions concerning reality (e.g. special relativity); all this, again, being fundamentally the collection and coherence of atoms – undifferentiated units of constructed energy – randomly and accidentally interacting to constitute rational thought, due to a random and accidental prior causation all the way back to the random accident, the conventional scientific Big Bang.
In short, the Big Bang, by this definition, states the following. RANDOM, ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION OF PURE ENERGY, THEN, RANDOM, ACCIDENTAL EMERGENCE OF MATTER, THEN, RANDOM, ACCIDENTAL EMERGENCE OF BODIES (BOTH INORGANIC AND ORGANIC), AND OF ANIMALS (BOTH UNRATIONAL AND RATIONAL); THEREFORE, THE WHOLE THING: ALL ATOMS, ALL PURPOSELESS, ALL RANDOM, AND ALL ACCIDENTAL. As we will see, the Creationist ontological narrative (or perhaps “Narrative” is better) explicates the origin and nature of the World extremely opposingly. In sharp contrast to the view belonging to the “fundamentalist scientist,” Creationism, upheld by fundamentalists as conventionally known, goes as follows.
First, there was God – a (primarily) Omnipotent (all-powerful), Omniscient (all-knowing), and Transcendent (independent/separate), Being. God, in a single instant, Created Earth and all its inhabitants, two of which named Adam and Eve – the common ancestors of all humanity. As humanity grew, God continued to Observe passively and to Intervene appropriately. Third and finally, Intelligent Design serves as a counterargument against both already described beliefs.
Intelligent Design posits that the Universe operates too intelligently and too complexly to be random and accidental. Creationists use this notion to argue against the conventional scientific Big Bang, while people advocating deistic evolution argue against both – saying that the two are partially and complementarily right. Creationists say that since the Universe is how it is, then God, speaking mythically, must have Created it. Deistic evolution, on the other hand, accepts that the Big Bang occurred but it rejects how and why it occurred.
Yes, energy became matter, matter became molecules, molecules became cells, and so forth. However, What Allowed all this to occur, at all, is some Underlying – “Independent, Omnipotent, and Intelligent” – Source. This Source, speaking theologically, is synonymous to “God.” Thus, this abstract label – corresponding to this abstract Idea corresponding to the so-known Necessary, Underlying, Independent, Omnipotent, Intelligent Source of all Creation – explains how the Big Bang occurred and how everything came to be through evolution and how there is and must be such “thing” as what many people call “God.”
Now, considering all this, let us be as unbiased and open-minded as possible. Which of these three main ontological explanations resonates most with our capacity to understand, the same faculty allowing us to perceive scientific laws and historical facts clearly and distinctly? Is the answer the conventional Big Bang; is it fundamentalist Creationism; or, is it Intelligent Design, pertaining to the second interpretation – deistic evolution? We may know that atoms really exist – despite never having actually experienced them – and we may understand why this is True; going further, we simply must realize that this same discerning and reliable intellectual ability of ours also applies to the current subject.
Honestly, what is (at least) most rational to believe? – that God Created everything all at once, instantaneously, that humans descend from Adam and Eve, and that the world is really only several thousand years old? – Or, that pure and undifferentiated energy somehow randomly and accidentally became the World, as we know it – so intricate, so complex, so holistic, and so profound? – Or, that there is some mean between the two contradictory theories that, granted, the Big Bang and evolution occurred exactly how science describes but not exactly as science attempts to explain? Does the answer not seem to be screaming itself at us in the face? Is it not by far most rational at least to believe that the third explanation is True, and that the others are only partially so? Furthermore, let us consider the chance that the Universe, at the time of the Big Bang actually would manifest itself, randomly and accidentally, exactly the way in which it is now.
Pure and undifferentiated energy eventually forming something like Earth – with all its life and all stages of development – completely randomly and accidentally, at least seems to be an absurdly unlikely notion. The likelihood of the Big Bang successfully creating an understandable, intelligent, and functional Universe, due to pure chance, seems to be at such a decimal level that believing this to have been the case is essentially equivalent at least to believing that one would not die from jumping off a thousand-foot cliff to rock-bottom. Why, then, is it the “rational” thing to believe that the Big Bang happened in the way that many disillusioned scientists are so convinced? Why can it not be most rational to hold otherwise and convict that such virtual impossibility simply necessitates the Existence of (a) God?
This argument comes down to whether we are Certain that the latter is the case, whether we believe that the latter is the case, whether we do not believe that the latter is the case, or whether we claim to know that the latter is not the case. For those belonging to the first group, we have successfully proven the existence of God. For those belonging to the second group, we have successfully been convinced that and why God exists. For the third and fourth groups, feel free to continue reading. Disproving unhealthy skepticism does not rely on this proof at all. However, this proof, as a success, does settle all the rest of the scenarios leading up to it that can likewise disprove unhealthy skepticism.
Pretending we agree that this proof is legitimate, in relation to the way in which we have defined, let us see why it serves as foundation entirely against pathological skepticism. Afterward – in order to address readers belonging to the other three mentioned categories – we will see how the previous arguments on their own still (can) suffice. Now, if God Exists in the way we have come to know and understand, then how can this undermine the evil genius possibility? Descartes provides perhaps the best and simplest justification for why the Existence of God, however shown, thoroughly eliminates the chance of our being deceived, as well as the prospect that unhealthy skepticism is still an irrefutable and therefore still “legitimate” epistemological branch.
Descartes argues that God would not allow there to be such deception if “he” really did Exist, because God is Perfect. Deception is a lacking of, and in this case, a lacking of Truth. Truth is perfection. From this logic, God and deception, specifically the evil genius, cannot coexist. If God exists, then God would not Allow deception to the degree of the evil genius possibility since this entails a significant lacking of Truth, or imperfection, as contradictorily Induced by a Perfect Being – which simply does not agree with Reason. Furthermore, if we agree with the above, then we can see why we are not being deceived and why we can be Certain that basic mathematical notions are True; why we are not being deceived and can be Certain that people with whom we know and interact, such as a family member like our mother, are actual, organic, emotional, sentient human beings – not really robots.
To return to the readers not convinced by our ontological explanation dismantling all hopes of unhealthy skepticism, let us adopt the same unbiased adherence to Reason in terms of what it reveals and what it does not – concerning the two mentioned examples as well as one additional. Regarding the latter, let us consider something Descartes, himself, did during the beginning of his Meditations. Descartes considers the chance that he is actually dreaming at the time of his writing. His rationale supporting this idea is that there had been times he dreamt convinced he was actually awake; otherwise, he would have realized he were dreaming. At this point in the argument, the Father of Modernity still feels he cannot know, be Certain, that he is actually awake instead of being asleep. However, let us think otherwise.
Let us pause and look around the location we are in – observing everything occurring and everything in place. Let us be entirely open-minded, eager to side with whatever Reason shows us. Is it actually possible we are not awake right now? Is there actually the possibility that what is now occurring is the subtle, illusory dream world our subconscious minds have created to fill awareness periodically while asleep? Let us not yet make any deliberate conclusions. Let us continue to observe and consider the current setting as open-mindedly and as critically as possible.
There are several conclusions we can now draw, after having reflected sufficiently on this particular question. One conclusion is that we are Certain that there is no way we can be Certain regarding the current state of mind. Another conclusion is that we are yet un-Certain whether we can be Certain of the current state. Finally, we can conclude – with strict and adequate surrender to Reason – that we are, in fact, Certain we currently are not dreaming, and that what we sensibly perceive is, in fact, the World, as we know it.
For those siding with the latter conclusion – we have successfully found yet another substantial example countering all convictions of unhealthy skepticism. If we can be Certain of this one, then it is surely reasonable to see that we also can be Certain of a number of others. However, setting the above aside, for those who are not yet in accordance with the third conclusion, let us still proceed. Concerning mathematics: Although our agreeing that we can be Certain of very basic notions (within things like arithmetic, algebra, and geometry) can disprove what we intend on so doing, this likely nonetheless does not suffice for any readers still attached to unhealthy skepticism. Instead, we will return to the first thought, before all else mentioned, considered set to disprove this epistemological pathology.
Again, surrendering any emotional grasp against the all-revealing and all-encompassing power of Reason, let us consider whether we know someone such as our mother is not, by any chance whatsoever, an inauthentic human being. If we still rest ultimately un-Certain of this judgment, then there is little or likely nothing more we can do to convince extreme skeptics of their fallacy. For the sake of this entire argument, however, consider the following closure, still aiming against unhealthy skepticism.
For the sake of practicality, there is no point, no advantage, at all, in adopting this deranged view on knowledge and on life. Even if unhealthy skepticism were right, there would be no cash-value, to borrow from William James, in holding that nothing is Certain, – that everything except for our own private existence can be doubted. We will accomplish nothing in the remainder of this work if skepticism in any obstructive form is still adopted and used in vying even the most minimalist realism, by the audience. For the sake of life, let us at least choose to believe in the fallacy of this philosophic pathology. In order at least to attempt to make this argument as sufficient and addressing as possible, one final task remains to counter the ones befitting the minimally optimal group believing extreme skepticism is erroneous but still not thoroughly convinced that it is so. We may return to Hume for the purpose of this last section.
Hume is perhaps most famous, again, for his problems with induction and inference. Apparently, it is impossible for us to know entirely the connection between two events that we see as necessarily connected, i.e. what we label cause and effect. Hume argues it is unfeasible for us to know the exact physical relation, for instance, between heat and the effects that heat has. We cannot know why a piece of wax melts when placed adjacent to fire; instead, we can only rationally believe that there is a definite causal liaison between heat and melting, since the wax melts each time it is exposed to sufficient heat. Because we cannot be Certain of the link between cause and effect, we also cannot be Certain of any inferential judgments stemming from various causes and effects – thus, Hume's problem with inference.
We cannot know that each time we place the wax next to fire it will melt just as it has always shown, since if the wax does not do so then this will eliminate what we had previously believed. Since it is possible that the wax will not melt (that is according to Hume), it is ergo impossible to be Certain it will do so next time. As we may have guessed, Hume's insight is right, but only partially so. There are many things we have evidence to believe are True but still about which we are ultimately un-Certain, and there are things we have evidence to believe are not True but again are nevertheless relying on faith. In addition, however, there are things we have Reason to know are True and there are things we have Reason to know are not True. The case, then, consists of a combination of all four statements. Let us see why.
Of course, there are Certainly things of which we cannot be Certain, and there are explanations for how and why this is the case. For instance, we cannot assume running is the immediate cause of perspiring just because every time we observe someone run he or she sweats afterward. This is too naïve a conclusion to draw without proper reflection and critical thought. As we know, the act of running is not the direct cause of the person's resultant condition but is rather the indirect cause – increased cardiovascular activity would be a better answer. Additionally, just because every time we observe a bomb explode, caused by one country to another and a war always begin directly afterward – we simply cannot connect the two as necessary events with an Absolute relationship.
Regarding causation solely, we can never be Certain our car will turn left each time we turn our wheel in that direction. Perhaps a technical problem arises that we are unaware of at the time and the car is unable to move in that direction. A technical problem is Certainly possible. Because of this legitimate possibility, Certainty is necessarily eliminated. We also cannot be Certain, for instance, that all things traveling fast necessarily have the ability to fly, if hypothetically, everything we saw traveling fast could also fly. For a final example supporting Hume's claim, we cannot consider ourselves Certain that all obese people are unhappy, if – again hypothetically – every obese person we encountered was thoroughly unhappy. These scenarios demonstrate things about which Hume is right and things about which we must abstain from drawing Absolutistic conclusions. Now we will see several things that seem to contradict Hume's “Certain” assertion, thus potentially disproving its universal application.
Say we hold a needle in our hand and intend to press it into our flesh forcefully. Based on our experience with needles, it seems we know and are Certain that this cause will necessitate the effect of pain. It seems we may be Certain that this needle will indeed cause us some degree of pain, and there is no chance, whatsoever, that it will not do this at all. Hume would disagree, however. Because of the chance that the needle will not cause pain, this eliminates our Certainty that the alternative will actually happen. Perhaps we can agree that we are Certain the needle will always cause us pain; perhaps we cannot. However, though we can imagine there is a chance that the expected cause will not in fact happen, we must note that there is a difference between Reason and imagination.
With imagination, anything is possible, or at least anything confined to the limits of our mind's creative capacity to visualize. However, with Reason, there are surely limits. Hume is dead – we know this to be True because Reason tells us it is so, to such a degree that we simply cannot doubt its conviction. This same principle applies to the needle example. Reason tells us that Certainty is present simultaneously as Certainty tells us Reason is present, meaning the given judgment is universal and Absolute. We can expect a similar conclusion for further examples.
Do we know that humans, by definition, have two arms? Say we found a colony of three-armed humans. Then they would not be humans, one might say. Say these “humans” were able to reproduce with “our kind” of humans. Then, would these people not also belong to our race? Further, would it not disprove the fact that humans have two arms and two arms only? If this case is however so possible, then we hence cannot be Certain that humans always have two arms. Even though every human we have each seen has two arms, we still cannot infer that this is an Absolute fact since the “counteractive” possibility nevertheless looms. Again, perhaps opinion differs, but perhaps we can instead see we are utterly fooling ourselves not to see that humans are meant to have two arms. It is universal and Absolute that we should not have three or more arms. Reason allows us to be Certain that what we judge is True. Let us continue.
Is it actually possible we will not fall if we jump out a window? Is there actually any chance our wish will be met if we willingly hope not to fall? – and what about a golf ball? Say we swing our club at the ball, and the club makes direct contact with it – are we not Certain the object, speaking perceptively, will move away from us in an appropriate manner? No – there is still the chance that this expectation will not occur – therefore, we are ultimately un-Certain, says Hume. To finish, are we ultimately un-Certain that the Sun is the (main) cause of the effect we call light? Again, all it takes to dismantle this Absolutistic claim is that there is always the “chance” that the Sun is not the main and direct source of light relative to our planet and its surroundings. Why is there the chance? There is the chance because we can think of the chance – we can conceive of a hypothetical scenario that disproves this taken-for-granted notion.
The last statement is the core of the skeptic fallacy. If we can reflect critically enough to see that there is a difference between Reason and imagination, then we should be able to discern more readily the scenarios that we know and understand with Certainty and the ones that we do not. Hypothetically, we can find a “reason” to counter everything other than the fact of our own existence. However, which things do we counter with Reason and which ones do we counter with “reason,” or imagination? Ironically, the notion of imagination is something Hume uses to argue against rationalist claims, such as Descartes' “knowing” God Exists solely due to having the idea in his head.
For the readers who are convinced that it is more practical to doubt unhealthy skepticism but who still do not hold this judgment with Certainty – but who are now otherwise convinced: We have further successfully dismantled this extreme epistemological roadblock. For the readers still not convinced, nothing remains to defend the “enemies of unhealthy skepticism.” However, know that the premise of this chapter and of this book overall by no means rests on this last section. We have all the Reason in the World to continue reading.
In conclusion, and now turning back to Truth and to the blatancy of our ability to be Certain, and to know and understand, clearly and distinctly, any number of notions – we, or some of us, at least, can end this discussion necessarily aware of the difference between Certainty and un-Certainty, between knowledge and belief, between Reason and imagination, and, of course, aware of the fact that Certainty, Certainly, exists, and that it allows us to gain familiarity of the World in which we live. We will now examine the pathological form of empiricism.
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