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 H.B. Augustine is a junior undergraduate student at Denison University studying Philosophy and Communication. He has started a publishing organization called "Integral Publishing House" - contact him at august_h@denison.edu if interested in publishing Integral material. Integral Realism
for the 1st-Tier Reader
A Proposed Solution and Expansion
To the Platonic Explanation
Of So-Called Universals
Henry Augustine
In this essay, I will consider the problem of universals and its major interpretations. I will proceed to see which interpretation is the case, and – because it is Plato's theory – I will offer an alternative way of explaining his metaphysics and epistemology because, as they stand, they may seem too “dogmatic” and too “lofty.” What I offer likewise may seem just as “grand” and “abstract” as Plato's beliefs, but I intend to support my ideas with proper adherence to logic – though this logic may appear “metaphysical.” Overall, I present two main things in this work. First, I argue which philosopher and philosophy successfully explains the problem of universals. Second, in order to explain Plato's theory(s) through what I consider a more practical and understandable method, I will give my own interpretation that addresses the theory of forms and the theory of recollection together. The whole of this essay is meant to be understandable for the Modern, Postmodern, and Integral reader alike. The language and logic is Postmodern, while the level of understanding that dictates it is Integral.
Introduction
Plato raises controversial philosophic notions, one of these being the problem of universals. Like the debate between science and religion, the schism between nominalism and realism persists to this day. In this essay, I will defend two things. First, I will defend realism over nominalism with regard to the problem of universals, namely Plato's realism or what we know as the theory of forms. Second, I will defend my own metaphysical and epistemological explanation for how and why this view on reality and knowledge is valid, as well as sound. Please note that, in this work, I and we may venture, however so perceived, “well beyond” the “boundaries” of “conventional logic,” which constitutes “philosophy” today. This is a matter of opinion, for some, to be sure.
Concerning those for whom the latter is not the case, however, let us allow philosophic agreement, not the rules, to decide one's overall judgment and acceptance of this work altogether. Now, to begin. Let us see that philosophy has suffered ages in which it has relied too much on dogma, too much on reason, and too much on criticizing reason's age. Perhaps it is possible to transcend the Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and Postmodern ages and their respective statements, as much as possible in order to see beyond the limitations of our exhausted contemporary dominant paradigm. Let us continue this account by considering relevant scholarly information – beginning with what the problem of universals actually is.
The Problem
The problem of universals is the dispute over whether so-called “universals” or essential qualities exist, and – if they do exist – what, exactly, is the “nature” of these qualities. Just as there are two main and most-encompassing branches of epistemology, these being empiricism and rationalism, so are there two befitting the metaphysical branch which is the problem of universals: these are nominalism and realism. Nominalism rejects the notion that there in fact are universals, claiming that they are simply what our minds invent and that it just so happens that some things may appear “similar,” and others “different.” Realism thinks otherwise.
According to realism, there are essential, underlying qualities corresponding to the various “things” we see and use to structuralize the World. There are two main branches of realism as it concerns the problem of universals. One of these branches traces to Aristotle, while the other to Plato. Aristotle, an empiricist, claims that the universals are contingent on the things that we see. There are universals, in fact, but each “thing” is unique, though it still may share qualities in common with other “things.” Plato is a rationalist, and he sees otherwise.
For Plato, it is the reverse order: The things are contingent on the universals, or Forms. Because of this, the Forms or universals exist independently of the things. Plato calls the totality of all the Forms the intelligible realm and the totality of all the things the sensible realm. Now that we have considered these primary interpretations of the problem of universals, let us proceed to see first why nominalism is utterly absurd, and clearly false.
The Solution
Certainly, there are things that we recognize, know, and understand. For instance, we know that a tree, Certainly, is not a rock. There is no such thing that is anywhere near a sort of “middle ground” between “tree” and “rock” (perhaps petrified wood, but that is beyond the point). The latter applies to a vast number of things in life. There are aspects of experience that, as we know and understand, belong to some sort of common group. With our intuitive discerning ability, we are able to categorize the World. There are concrete categories of the World, and we can know, understand, and be Certain that one thing we see falls under one category, instead of another. These categories are inherent, and they are legitimate. We simply must agree that nominalism is as false a view as geocentricism is. Realism, instead, is correct. However, as noted, there are two main branches of realism just as there are two main branches befitting the problem of universals. Let us now see why Aristotle's realism is inferior to Plato's realism.
Aristotle claims that the universals are contained in the things themselves. Each thing, as we know, is slightly different from other aspects of its respective category. Therefore, according to Aristotle, each universal is slightly different from others of its kind. However, paradoxically, universals are similar to each other for some reason and different from each other for another: “…Aristotle insists…nothing can be both a universal and a particular” (Fine 20). For Aristotle, it is almost as if there are universals and there are not universals simultaneously. In other words, he is essentially (no pun intended) saying, “There are universals, but they are not the exact same.” Aristotle is right – if we only regard the way that the universals are as the things containing them. Plato has no problem with this. If we consider only the physical things, then we can agree that each one is physically unique in relation to everything else belonging to its own group. Yet Aristotle says that the universal for each thing is, likewise, “similar, but not the same” as the universal “similar” to the other. None of this makes any sense. Aristotle defies the very definition of universals.
A universal is the perfect ideal that embodies the pure and undifferentiated essence of a category of things in the sensible realm, or the World. Pretend there are as many universals for “tree” as there are trees in existence. With further examination, we see that these “universals” still are all related in that they have to do with the idea of “tree” – and there is only one idea of tree. The law of non-contradiction states that something cannot be something and not-something simultaneously. This rule applies to the current matter. Aristotle emphasizes the significance of things so much over ideas that he contradicts himself in asserting there are universals, and yet implicitly there are not universals at the same time. We know that there are universals because realism, not nominalism, is correct. Furthermore, the only possible interpretation of realism that still supports it, in fact, is that belonging to Plato.
In the Parmenides, Plato says, “If…one does not admit there are forms…one will have nothing [of] which to [think]” (Fine 133). For Plato, Forms or universals are evident in and necessary for our ability to rationalize and understand the environment around us. There is a difference between things and ideas, between the things in the sensible realm and the ideas in the intelligible realm, the latter participating in the things. There is a difference between the body and soul, and between opinion or true belief and knowledge or true justified belief. For Plato, because there are universals, they must transcend and precede the things that are manifestations of them – because the Forms or ideas are timeless, unchanging, perfect, and ideal while the things are temporary, changing, imperfect, and corporeal. Out of logical necessity, all of the Forms must have a means of dependence that likewise transcends and precedes them. Plato calls this hypothetical “property” the Good. Plato's metaphysical system first contains the Good, then the intelligible realm of Forms, and finally the sensible realm of things. Plato's metaphysics naturally complements his epistemology.
When we die, our soul leaves the physical plane of existence or sensible realm and reenters its home, the psychic plane of existence or intelligible realm. It proceeds to inhabit a new body with the wisdom acquired from its previous life. During life, we do not “gain” knowledge; rather, we regain or recollect it. Because Plato's theory is the only one that can be legitimate between it, Aristotle's realism, and nominalism in general, we can agree that it is correct. However, Plato's explanation is arguably too “dogmatic” and/or a priori in order for it to suffice fully, for a number of readers, to be sure. For this reason, let us consider whether the theory of forms and the theory of recollection, in addition to being valid in this case, are likewise sound. As we have seen that the theory is correct, let us further see why. We may begin by considering the World as such.
The World and the Ultimate
We can refer to the World also as the Universe; it does not matter which label we use. What really matters are the semantics or the meaning, belonging to this particular linguistic symbol – so, we have the World. We can think of the World as the totality of substantial existence. “World” is the philosophic name synonymous to the scientific one, “Universe” – both of which referring to the totality of substantial existence, in the fullest sense. What we are about to examine will likely be more persuasive if we consider the Universe from a more scientific, practical standpoint, as opposed to the World from a more philosophic, theoretical one (though both ways in themselves are equally legitimate). Now, with all this considered, we can agree that there are two, and only two, primary ways of explaining the origin of the Universe.
There is the “scientific version,” a.k.a. the “Big Bang,” and there is the “mythical version,” a.k.a. “Creation.” There are no most fundamental or general ontological explanations other than these two – this is a fact. The reason for our considering all this is in order to prove the existence of “God,” or simply an “Ultimate.” Naturally, we can abandon the deranged concept of God tracing back primarily to the Abrahamic traditions. This Ultimate, which we are preparing to prove, is beyond nearly as many (however abstract) semantic labels of which we can conceive – except for several few. Let us regard the Ultimate, to name a few, as the Independent, Omnipotent, Intelligent, Infinite, and Eternal Source of all Creation, Creation being synonymous to the World or Universe. Now – returning to the origin of the Universe – which, between the two only main ontological explanations, is most rational (at least) to believe? We can disregard the mythical or Creationist version, since our objective is to prove the existence of God or the Ultimate, as defined. Now, as we may have guessed, there are two, and only two, main interpretations of the scientific version embracing the notion of the Big Bang. They are as follows.
One interpretation holds that the Big Bang itself was random, accidental, meaningless, and utterly unexplainable. Pure, undifferentiated energy randomly came from nothing and randomly became quarks, and these quarks randomly interacted with one another to form protons – then atoms, then molecules, then cells, and so forth. The entire process, according to this interpretation, occurred due to pure chance, and nothing more. In sharp contrast, the second interpretation sees that the Big Bang and Universe altogether simply was and is not a random accident – that there is a reason why the Universe is so complex, so rational, so profound, and so precise. In this sense, it is virtually impossible for pure, undifferentiated energy, somehow, to create a fiery ball that eventually hardens, and – over the course of millions of years – for it to develop life, by mere chance. It is virtually impossible for the human being to have evolved from a single-cell organism, by mere chance. It is virtually impossible for atoms to interact with one another, eventually to create the intelligent layout and construct of the Universe, in its utmost totality, by mere chance. Let us now consider which of these two ways of perceiving the Big Bang – and the Universe itself – is, in fact, the case.
We simply must see that believing the first interpretation to be true is like believing that, for instance, someone will survive jumping off a three-thousand foot cliff to rock bottom. Says scientific theorist Robin Collins in “Teleological Arguments for God's Existence”:
If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little as one part in 1060, the universe would have either quickly collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form. In either case, life would be impossible.
Going further, as John Jefferson Davis elaborates, “An accuracy of one part in 1060 can be compared to firing a bullet at a one-inch target on the other side of the observable universe, twenty billion light years away, and hitting the target.” In the words of Deepak Chopra (the “poet-prophet” of the 20th century according to Time):
The universe, after all, is not “energy soup”; it is not mere chaos. The incredibly exact fit of things in our world – above all, the astonishing existence of DNA – argues for an infinite amount of intelligence in nature. As one astrophysicist put it, the likelihood that life was created randomly is about the same as the likelihood that a hurricane could blow through a junkyard and create a Boeing 707.
It is simply impossible, from a blatantly empirical standpoint, for the Big Bang and the Universe to be random, accidental, meaningless, and utterly unexplainable. Perhaps we may have a problem with this assertion because it seems to be a colossal a priori claim; however, it is rather the very opposite. This ontological conclusion is, perhaps, the most a posteriori and empirically justified posit possible. Let us pause and observe the current setting. Let us remind ourselves that it is all too easy to grow far too accustomed to the splendor and magnificence, the complexity, the sheer beauty and intelligence, behind every aspect of the Universe, as we know from experience. However, consider the human being: It grows from the union of a single sperm and single egg, potential to become something or someone as arguably wise and insightful as Plato – or Jesus, or da Vinci, or Einstein, or Mother Theresa. There is simply too much empirical evidence proving the fallacy of seeing the Big Bang and Universe in the way that many disillusioned scientists and individuals in general choose. Furthermore, now considering the issue in terms of logical necessity rather than physical evidence, we can Certainly agree that it is both logically and physically impossible for something to come from nothing.
The Universe – something – comes from “what was” before the Big Bang – nothing. Yet, the Universe was able to come from “nothing.” Let us agree that it Certainly violates the undeniable laws of both Reason and nature for something to come from nothing without the existence of that which transcends and precedes both logical and physical necessity, thus eliminating “nothing” as being “literally nothing.” We may now conclude, agreeing that the Universe simply must be contingent on the Ultimate, as we have seen. The Ultimate, again, is and must be the Independent, Omnipotent, Intelligent, Infinite, and Eternal Source of the World, as we know it. Now – how, exactly, does the existence of the Ultimate relate to Plato's theories?
The Nous
If the Universe comes from and is contingent on the Ultimate, then every aspect of the Universe is really an expression or manifestation of the Ultimate. The human being, most fundamentally, is not the collection of atoms, nor is it, most fundamentally, the collection of electrons, or of quarks – for what are quarks, most fundamentally? As a matter of fact, quarks, most fundamentally, are and must be manifestations of pure, undifferentiated energy – quantum physics' “quanta” – and this pure, undifferentiated energy, as we have agreed, is contingent on the Ultimate, is the primary manifestation of the Ultimate. Therefore, the human being, most fundamentally, is a manifestation of the Ultimate. Every component of the human being – the latter a microcosm of the Universe and the Universe a manifestation of the Ultimate –, by this logic, is connected to the Ultimate. Let us now agree that, in an abstract yet legitimate sense, the Universe pertains to a sort of “Idea” belonging to the Ultimate.
The Universe is the “Intention” of the Ultimate. Every single part, whether visible or invisible, of the Universe is the Intention of the Ultimate. We cannot doubt this. Earth is the Intention of the Ultimate, and all parts of Earth are the Intention of the Ultimate. Trees are the Intention of the Ultimate. Mountains are the Intention of the Ultimate. Animals are the Intention of the Ultimate. Humans are the Intention of the Ultimate. In short, every naturally induced, identifiable, universal component of Earth and of the Universe is the Intention of the Ultimate. Furthermore, natural laws such as “gravity,” “conservation of energy,” and “motion,” are the Intention of the Ultimate. Any feature of the World, again whether visible (“things”) or invisible (“ideas” and/or “laws”), is the Intention of the Ultimate. In this sense, what we call “universals” are, in fact, Intentions – in an abstract yet legitimate sense. The totality of all these Intentions deduces from what is single and undeniable, into a sort of magnificent “family tree” of all Intentions – Plato's intelligible realm, the totality of all the Forms. This notion is virtually identical to St. Augustine's interpretation. He remarks:
…if these reasons of all things to be created and [already] created are contained in the divine mind, and [if] there cannot be anything in the divine mind that is not eternal and unchangeable, and [if] Plato calls these principal reasons of things “Ideas”, [then] not only are there Ideas but they are [also] true…
Let us agree that an Intention of the Ultimate is like an “Idea of God,” since “Idea” and “Intention,” and “God” and “Ultimate,” are synonymous in this case. Furthermore, let us agree that Ideas of God and Intentions of the Ultimate are likewise synonymous to Plato's “Forms of the Good.” Plato uses this notion to explain the process of intellection – or, how we come to gain knowledge and understanding. Plato's theory rests on a premise arguably and unsatisfactorily existing between dogmatism and rationalism, both of which – as we can agree – are methodologies or schools to avoid, or perhaps transcend. Let us consider another way of explaining Plato's theory of recollection.
For Plato, knowledge comes from the soul perceiving a Form, or the Forms. Ultimately, in favor of his theory, let us consider that knowledge in this case, or in relation to this essay, is the mind recognizing an Intention, or the Intentions. We have agreed that every aspect of the World is ultimately a manifestation of the Ultimate, and the totality of all the Intentions, as we have seen, is and must be “contained in” the Ultimate. Plotinus provides considerable evidence for why all the Intentions, or Forms as we will now write, must be contingent on “something” that, in “itself,” is totally independent: “…postulating Forms without a superordinate principle, the One, which is virtually what all the Forms are, would leave the Forms in eternal disunity.” Plato calls the metaphysical but real domain, which encompasses the totality of all the Intentions, the intelligible realm. Plotinus calls it the Nous. Out of respect for Plotinus and for simplicity sake, we will refer to the totality of all the Intentions of the Ultimate, which is the “architectural layout” of the World or Universe, as the Nous.
At this point, we can see the meta-sequence as follows. There is and there must be the Ultimate – the Independent, Omnipotent, Intelligent, Infinite, and Eternal Source, contingent on nothing but itself. Next, there is and there must be the Nous, the totality of all the Ideas, Intentions, or Forms (any name works) belonging to the Ultimate as it has designed the World. Naturally, or perhaps logically, the Nous is contingent on the Ultimate. The World, we may note, is directly and relatively contingent on the Nous and it is indirectly and Absolutely contingent on the Ultimate. This trichotomy pertains to that of Plato: There is the Sun, the world outside the Cave, and the world inside the Cave – the Good, the intelligible realm, and the sensible realm. Everything in the World, or the Cave, or the sensible realm, has a deeper identity than meets the naked mind.
Just as a body has a more rudimentary identity because it is the totality of organs, and these of tissue, and this of cells, and these of molecules, and so forth – so has the human being a more rudimentary identity as it is a manifestation of the Ultimate, and, most rudimentarily, as it is the Ultimate itself. However, we have seen that the Nous exists “between” the Ultimate and the World in terms of dependency. Ergo, the human's thorough identity includes not only that attributed to the World, and not only that attributed to the Ultimate – but it also includes that attributed to the Nous. Just as the human being is directly connected to the Ultimate, since there is only the Ultimate, really, so is the human being directly connected to the Nous.
To this point, everything we have examined follows from logical necessity. However, what we are about to consider, though in my opinion is in fact the case (and as I “hold,” “opinion” here means “knowledge” – but this is surely arguable), likely escapes or appears to escape the confines of Reason, Reason being that which allows us to make Certain inferences about the World beyond the scope of direct physical perception. Nonetheless, that being said, we may proceed.
Knowledge and Understanding
I contend that everything we come to know and understand, everything, is solely due to our mind's conceiving of an idea that is in direct accordance with such an Idea, Intention, or Form that comes from God, the Ultimate, or the Good. We know that this is the case because we experience the undeniable and distinct feeling of, frankly, whatever we wish to call it – whether “recollection,” “convincing conception,” “divine illumination,” “natural light,” or “intuition.” We will use Plato's recollection to represent the semantics shared by all these seemingly abstract and nonsensical labels. Why do we experience the “feeling of recollection” when the stated process occurs? We experience recollection because our deepest identity is the Ultimate, and the Ultimate, objectively speaking, is that which “comes up with” the World. The Ultimate knows and understands the World just as an artist or scientist knows and understands his or her work.
When we consider a notion that is by definition meta-physical, such as whether atoms exist and whether they exist as science tells us, we can agree that we (can) know it is True. Why do we know? We just do – it makes sense – it “fits.” The judgment in itself feels right. The same explanation applies to any number of inferences. Some of the judgments invoking intuition or recollection are the ones that we call “factual,” claiming to have knowledge. The fact, though, is we do have knowledge. We cannot deny that an Idea, Intention, or Form belongs to our transcendental identity once this Absolute enters our mind without any kind of pathetic attachment that would convince us otherwise to doubt its legitimacy. Emotional grasp, more so than rational inability, is what explains why so many people fail to recognize Certain Ideas, or Intentions, or Forms, or Absolutes, or Truths, to which they have access whether intrapersonally or interpersonally. The feeling of intuition, brought by recollection (which is brought by thought or reflection), is not to be confused with the feeling of emotion.
When one considers something such as the Earth being far older than roughly 6,000 years, – at least relative to the scientist adhering to objective natural principle – we can agree that there is no pathetic grasp constraining Reason to perceive Earth in such a way because there is only obedience to and recognition of Reason. However, despite there not being the presence of emotion, there is the presence of intuition – of recollection. There is no direct physical proof supporting this notion regarding how old our planet is. The proof, rather, resides in the mind's conception of the logical and physical significance and probability of this geological issue. More specifically, it resides in the mind's recognizing the presence of intuition, which is the distinct feeling or sentiment induced by recollection, which is induced by reflection and the latter by sensation.
Our knowledge and understanding of the Kantian phenomenal realm, in this scope, give us further knowledge and understanding of the noumenal realm – the one that is the Voldemortian “You Know Who” of Postmodernism's pathological side fearing and loathing what seems so irrationally unlikely not to exist: complete knowledge and understanding of the World as it ultimately and comprehensively is in itself. In this sense, we recollect Truths when we recognize our Ideas, our Intentions, our Forms, our Absolutes, or our Eidos. Again, it does not matter what name we use to represent the metaphysical significance of the essential constituents forming the architectural layout of the World. Further, in this sense, “remembering the World” is the same as “remembering we are dreaming” upon having what we conventionally call a lucid dream.
Perhaps all the latter appears to extend far beyond anything in, at, or around Wittgenstein's “sensible box” of “philosophic boundaries.” However – perhaps Plato's theory is right. Perhaps it corresponds to Truth, if we even believe what we have considered. Perhaps, then, there is such thing as Absolute knowledge. Perhaps there is Certainty. Perhaps Spinoza is right and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Perhaps Plato is right. As it concerns this essay, according to Plato – and several others, doubtless – and according to myself of course, perhaps all of this is True, in the sense that the form of the word signifies. Perhaps we can agree that whatever seems “most” or “more” correct to the reader should be what he or she chooses at least to believe. He or she should do so for the purely logical, essentially pragmatic value of believing what one has Reason to believe over believing nothing at all. If all the above is the case for the reader, then let us muse.
As far as this personal philosophic explanation reasonably sounds, I urge the reader to choose, without conscious or unconscious pathetic grip, which account resonates at least to “opinion” or to “true belief.” For my explanation in particular, I ask the reader to consider that its logical and physical argumentative components in fact do “intuitively make sense” at the very least, and that there is no point in turning to the “conventional norms” of some dominant forms of contemporary “philosophy.”
Conclusion
Perhaps Wittgenstein is right. Perhaps language has its barriers, thus making the consistency of its semantics translate relative to the “psychic consistency” of the general understanding, if you will, belonging to the given audience. In the latter case, everything we have considered is True – meaning realism obviously beats nominalism apropos the problem of universals – meaning Plato clearly, but more subtly, beats Aristotle apropos realism – meaning my personal explanation perhaps likely complements Plato's explanation, in an attempt to support it from a less given or less neo-scholastic standpoint.
My explanation complements that of Plato because the World, as defined, must be contingent on an Ultimate. The Ultimate, identical to Plotinus' One, is (insufficiently) the Source of the World. We can regard the Source or Ultimate as it is in itself, and we can regard such as it is as Creator of the World, in itself. We can refer to the latter as Plotinus' Nous, which is the totality of all the Intentions of the Ultimate, or simply the architectural layout of the World. Most generally, the Ultimate manifests itself as the World in accordance with the Nous. “Aspects” of the World are ultimately the Ultimate and the Nous as experiential manifestations. Based on this logic, some aspects of the World are advanced or complex enough to gain knowledge and understanding of their deeper identities, these belonging to the Nous and to the Ultimate.
In addition to philosophy, there are scientific and religious names alike that each point in the same direction as the term “Ultimate.” Regarding science, these names are nothingness in quantum physics, and the tenth dimension in string theory. For religion, they are Consciousness (Hinduism), Emptiness (Buddhism), Unspeakable Tao (Taoism), and the Oversoul (New Thought Christianity or transcendentalism). Perhaps this overall theory is wrong, namely because it completely violates (however arguably on a relative scale) the way philosophy is today. However, perhaps it is instead right – because, as it in itself explicates, we acknowledge that its components are logically and physically legitimate in an all-encompassing or Absolute sense, and that we experience the sentiment of intuition upon reflection, which is what we acquire from sensation, indeed.
Bibliography
Cornford, Franci. Plato's Theory of Knowledge The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato (International Library of Philosophy). New York: Routledge, 2000.
Fine, Gail. On Ideas Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford UP, USA, 1995.
Gulley, Norman. Plato's theory of knowledge. Westport, Conn: Greenwood P, 1986.
O'Meara, Dominic J. Plotinus An Introduction to the Enneads. New York: Oxford UP, USA, 1995.
Scott, Dominic. Recollection and experience Plato's theory of learning and its successors. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995.
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