 H.B. Augustine is a senior undergraduate student at Denison University studying Philosophy and Communication. He has started a publishing organization called "Integral Publishing House" - contact him at august_h@denison.edu if interested in publishing Integral material.A Proof Against Extreme RelativismSuited for the 1st-Tier ReaderH.B. AugustinePathological, extreme, or unhealthy relativism sees archetypal notions such as Goodness and morality, Beauty and art, and Truth and science, as in fact “relative” – now let us ask, what does this mean? We have already examined relativism concerning why it is True as an epistemology. Perhaps we have agreed that relativism is True in all the claims that we have considered. Unhealthy relativists would say, “Well then, we should agree that nothing is Absolute,” and, naturally, Reason replies, No. We will engage in yet another meditation, in which we pause and think, let go of all passion, and let in as much of the repressed on-pour of luminous and revealing intuition as possible. Having engaged in this preliminary stage of contemplation, let us now consider the pressing question to which many relativists hopelessly cling. Is morality Absolute? – or – perhaps – the better thing to ask is, Is it not? As noted, morality Certainly is not Absolute in the sense that it necessarily and sufficiently contains a specific number of parts, each also Absolute, just as the human body contains a specific number of parts we can universally recognize. For instance, morality is not anything like the Ten Commandments in its essence. Morality, however, is not the same as anatomy or science altogether. Perhaps we may agree that science, at least a decent portion of it, is Absolute – since it seems absurd to deny the validity and significance of many scientific facts. What we will now consider is whether morality, from one standpoint, is Absolute in the same general way that we can regard science as such. Before delving into this question immediately, it is first necessary to see upon what morality, and ethics, rests. Science is exclusively concerned with Truth; with this in mind, we may find another “Metaconcept” that is unique to morality. This Primary Idea is nothing other than Goodness. Perhaps Truth exists in the Absolute sense; however, does Goodness likewise exist in the same way? What is Goodness? What does it mean to be “Good?” What does it mean to be or to do wrong, or evil, or bad, or un-Good? Is Goodness not simply a human construction by which we have been conditioned from such an early age that we readily mistake it for being inherent? Where is Goodness? What does Goodness look like? If Goodness really is Absolute, then why cannot we objectively map it and recognize exactly what it is? Science is the study of Truth, after all. Science discovers Truth through sufficient objective proof. If an object is physical, and there is no object proving Goodness like a microscope proves cells or a telescope proves planets, then how is it not rational to assert that we cannot know it is True that Goodness is Absolute? In response to all that we have asked, let us ask another question: Why is there a study and concept of Goodness in the first place? Perhaps there is a study of Goodness because there is this idea called “Goodness” that seems to be interpreted in multiple ways. It would be odd if there were a study of Goodness before the idea of Goodness ever existed. We can agree it is True that the effect cannot exist before the cause. In this case, ethics is the effect and Goodness is the cause. If the idea came to be based on human creation, relative to the creator, then did this in itself not have a cause? Perhaps something can come from nothing. Perhaps the laws of logic are relative as well, as must be the laws of mathematics, and the laws of nature. Perhaps it is not necessarily false that the Idea of Goodness was merely randomly devised by humanity, whence nothing was. Perhaps the Idea of Goodness is merely a random symbol randomly and relatively referring to a potentially infinite list of additional random symbols or ideas each randomly and relatively referring to a potentially infinite list of additional random symbols or ideas, ad infinitum. Yes, perhaps all this is True – in the Absolute sense, of course. However, the latter aside, there must be some kind of physical catalyst that would have caused people to think of such thing as morality. Has the concept of Truth always existed? Before the emergence of rationality, we may agree that Truth could not have existed in the sense that it was not a recognized and understood notion by our sensorimotor and archaic ancestors. Truth eventually came to be by our realizing the fact that there are aspects of the World, and that these aspects are consistent and widespread. Similarly, perhaps Goodness came to be by our realizing the fact that there is a significant difference concerning the way people are, specifically how people act as well as how people treat each other. It so seems that some individuals are “better people” than are others, just as it so seems that some inferences are “better judgments” than are others. The contemporary scientific description of the World is closer to Truth, or “Truer,” than is that of Aristotle – there is no doubting this. Similarly, perhaps we can see that Jesus, from an interpersonal or moral standpoint, is closer to Goodness, or “better,” than is someone such as Adolph Hitler. For readers disagreeing we can be sure Jesus is more moral than Hitler is – let us not be fooled. Regardless of whether we believe morality to be a human convention or something of which we can be intrinsically aware – let us still agree, without any need for explanation, that Jesus is most moral between the two, for this is a given. In addition, more than merely several individuals deem Jesus the moral superior. In fact, Jesus is praised and worshipped globally for his life of universal love and sacrifice. Although such reverence is but relative to the group who embodies it, we should remember that it was also but relative to Einstein knowing and understanding that space and time themselves are relative. It was furthermore relative to the group knowing and understanding the concept and reality of evolution, and to the group knowing and understanding the concept and reality regarding the geography of this planet. Viewing Truth in this way, we can agree that the people regarding Jesus as the better person likewise know that they are correct. If we disregard all the sticky philosophic questions that would impel one to say, “I believe Jesus is the better person, but I still do not know he is such because of the looming chance that Hitler could be better” – then we can more readily acknowledge our Certainty, not faith, in this particular judgment. We may now ask ourselves, “What is the significance of this apparent recognition?” That Jesus is a better person than many others are, no doubt, that he embodies “more” Goodness than do the majority of human beings – to what does this point or imply? Do we not see the implication that Goodness exists, despite what, exactly, Goodness is? We can agree that the interpretations of Goodness regarding what it is are variant and relative and that they Certainly are human constructions. However, what is not a human construction is the Idea inducing all branches of ethics, all theories and agreements and disputes. Goodness in itself exists apart from the way people interpret it. The fallacy of unhealthy relativism is confusing the Absolute Idea Goodness with the relative subsequent explanations ethicists provide. Someone can assert that simply because we see studies and opinions debating one common theme, this does not necessitate that theme's Absolute nature. On this note, perhaps we can acknowledge that theology's existence does not necessitate God's Existence, for instance. Nonetheless, we must keep in mind the fact that we can make moral judgments, and know and understand what is superior and what is inferior; however, we cannot do the same for God – at least tantamount to our familiarity with Goodness. For us to claim something or someone is “closer to God” is different from when we claim such is closer to Goodness – and why? God as a concept is not directly related to interpersonal relations and individual volitions. We can objectively observe the latter and intersubjectively agree with confidence that one person is better morally. However, we cannot objectively observe things befitting God – at least with as mutual agreement. Moreover and for example, psychology is the study of the mind, and we can agree with Certainty that the mind exists – and the same for economics, that the economy exists; and cultural studies, that culture exists. It seems, then, that what makes any study's focus legitimate is how relevant and apparent it is to some or to all components of human existence. Just because Goodness is regarded by humans and studied by humans does not mean that its intrinsic significance is illusory. We can agree that the mind is; that it is an Absolute notion in that what it symbolizes Certainly exists. We can agree that the economy is; that it is likewise Absolute in this sense. We can further agree that culture is; that culture exists. May we ask would it be so wrong to write the latter “Culture,” just as we write “Goodness?” Having considered all this, we can see that morality or Goodness is Absolute in the same way that the mind or sentience is Absolute, and that science or Truth is Absolute. We can infer from our ability to say confidently, readily, and almost innately, for instance, which of two figures, such as Jesus and Hitler, is the better moral agent – again neglecting semantics of what specifically is morality. Perhaps the concept of evil is a social construct; however, this does not mean that its opposite, Goodness, is also created and meaningless. Perhaps evil is simply a relative significant lacking of Goodness as opposed to an Absolute infinite abundance of such. The foundation of Postmodern philosophy consists of a fascination with language. However, the epistemology of Postmodernity (relativism), similar to the epistemology of Modernity (empiricism), hyperbolizes and exhausts the significance of and relationship between language and semantics. If we sheathe this delusional cloak obsessed with language – as equally limiting and wrong as the obsessions with things and with un-Certainty – then it will evidently reveal itself that the ability some of us possess, to make moral conclusions readily and to know that we are correct about them, is the massive piece of evidence necessitating that the subject of our judgments, morality, must correspond to a kind of metaconcept, just as science corresponds to Truth. A notion perhaps as equally apparently un-Absolute as Goodness may have seemed is Beauty. Like the Jesus-Hitler example, let us compare two things, except supposedly relative to Beauty. Consider the halls of the Sistine Chapel, lavish with gold, marble, and some of the most highly acclaimed artwork humans have come to appreciate. Now, consider the image of a 100+ acre industrial zone. Might we consider the former image a bit more Beautiful than the alternative is? Furthermore, did we choose to perceive the Sistine Chapel in such a way, or is there instead an inherent and intangible cause of this appreciation? Put differently, are the two examples essentially neutral from an aesthetic standpoint, and our labeling one more Beautiful than the other is merely the construct we have fully chosen? – or, is it the other way around – is our “inner-awareness” of some significantly more Beautiful quality or qualities, pertaining to the Sistine Chapel, the subtle cause of our “choosing” it most Beautiful? Regardless, if we agree that the industrial zone is significantly inferior aesthetically, and if we agree that we are not fooling ourselves in acknowledging the sentiment we have for this judgment, then – like with Jesus – we can see that the Chapel in its essence is again significantly “closer” to “something” than is the alternative. This “something” is Beauty. Again, the interpretations of Beauty are not necessarily Absolute and are entirely relative to the ones creating them; however, what is not relative and what is Absolute is that Beauty exists. Like Goodness and morality, Beauty and art are collectively regarded and revered throughout the world. Regardless of what exactly makes the Taj Mahal Beautiful is irrelevant to this matter, but that the Taj Mahal is Beautiful in contrast is not. Unhealthy relativism asserts that Ideas such as Goodness, Beauty, and Truth are not the same for all people and do not necessarily even exist for some individuals – therefore, they must be no more than an ultimately insignificant human construct. The term that this pathological epistemology and worldview takes to be construct or construction is actually recognition. Humans do not create the laws of science; they recognize them. Humans do not create acts embodying superior character, virtue, and care; they recognize them. Likewise, we recognize the common sense of appreciation or awe that is invoked by a number of aspects in life, both natural and artificial. We have linguistically devised a symbol – “Beauty” – representing the meaning of this independent source to which we attribute aesthetic sentiment. Linguistically, Beauty is constructed and relative, no doubt; semantically and actually, however, it most Certainly is not. Let us end this discussion now by concluding that, in addition to Goodness and Beauty, Truth also undoubtedly and inherently exists. Although we have already seen that Truth exists in our critique of unhealthy skepticism, let us still analyze this issue, except this time not logically and abstractly but plainly and commonsensically. We know that Truth exists Absolutely because there are Ideas of which we can be Certain. We know that the world is round and that it orbits the Sun, that it is billions of years old, and that it contains a molten-hot core. We know these things. We also know that there is such “thing” as a human “unconscious,” that the notion of supply-and-demand dictates the course of economics, that intelligence is a product of “nature” in addition to “nurture,” and that roughly 365 days constitute one year. Perhaps these Ideas of Truth are relative to some particular context; alas, this still clearly does not mean that they are not Absolute in nature. Perhaps a better way to see “Absolute” is “unquestionable.” It is unquestionable, for instance, that Earth is far older than several thousand years. It is unquestionable, for instance, that space and time are ultimately relative, and that once a coherent world continent we call Pangaea (from which all separate continents come) existed. Because knowledge exists, so does Truth. Knowledge, Truth, and Certainty each coexist alongside one another, because they are necessarily of the same fundamental essence. Because Ideas such as Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, Certainly, exist, and because everything relative and un-Absolute about these Ideas are only the interpretations stemming from them – but not the Ideas in themselves – we can see the fundamental confusion of unhealthy relativism.
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